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Created in 1966 primarily as a rulemaking body empowered to force the
technology of motor vehicle safety, the National Highway Safety Administration
(NHTSA) had by the mid-1980s largely abandoned rulemaking in favor of
aggressively recalling defective vehicles. Devastating losses in pre-enforcement
judicial review of rules combined with judicial embrace of recalls to drive that
first-period adaptation. Congressional reaction mimicked the signals from the
courts, and the Reagan administration's regulatory reform and relief programs
of the 1980s further solidified NHTSA's rulemaking retreat. Prodded by
congressional mandates, beginning in 1991, but largely of 21st century origin,
NHTSA returned to rulemaking in the last two decades, but in a radically
revised form. Rather than forcing new technologies, the agency has largely
required the diffusion of technologies already in widespread use-technologies
that may well have reached near universal deployment in the absence of the
agency's efforts. As the protracted airbag case makes clear, deferring to
industry's priorities and timetable in this manner may well have cost lives. But
the transformation also largely insulated NHTSA from judicial and political
challenge. Industry had little reason to contest rules requiring technologies it
was already implementing, and courts were unlikely to invalidate such
measures in any event.
Motor vehicle fatality rates have indeed decreased ramatically since
NHTSA's formation. Yet the agency's own research suggests that much of that
reduction would have occurred anyway, due to factors other than safety
technology. In the meantime, recalls (which have no demonstrable systemic
effect on motor vehicle safety) have continued at increasingly high (sometimes
astounding) levels, and have been combined with consumer information
campaigns, promotion of motorists' behavior modification efforts, non-binding
"guidance" documents, and agency-industry voluntary agreements, to round
out NHTSA's emerging model of cooperative regulation. Whether or not this
strategy has substantial effects in promoting motor vehicle safety, NHTSA's
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accommodating posture has resulted in congressional and OMB approval and
industry acceptance without litigation.
This Article describes the evolution of motor vehicle safety regulation and
interprets the agency's transformation as an almost perfect adaptation to a
legal culture that is skeptical of ex ante coercive restraints on individual or
firm conduct and accepting of post hoc compensatory or punitive action when
that conduct fails to satisfy broad social norms. And that process of adaptation
is very much a work in progress. Today, NHTSA finds itself in a world that was
unimaginable in 1966. Then, it was assumed that safety did not sell; that
motorists' misbehavior was intractable and accidents hence unavoidable; and
that optimal innovation, in particular to make vehicles more "crashworthy,"
required government o step in. Fast forward to the present, it appears that
safety, at least in some forms, does sell, motorists are at last buckling up in
response to mandatory seat belt use laws, and highly automated ("self-
driving") vehicles, combined with smart infrastructure, promise a near
accident free utopia. Meanwhile, innovation is advancing at a torrid pace, as
the automotive, advanced electronics, and software sectors converge. These
changes in NHTSA's operational context have reinforced the agency's
rulemaking reticence and promoted a preference for statements of "policy,"
that the agency asserts are non-binding yet potentially enforceable by means of
recalls. The agency's attempts to straddle the murky legal boundary between
guidance and rulemaking may well be the next arena in which it encounters the
constraints of legal culture-a culture that defines the conditions of legitimate
administrative action, but not the details of its implementation.
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Introduction
Overview: Federal regulation of automobile safety in America is a
complex and often ironic tale of political ambivalence, judicial skepticism, and
bureaucratic adaptation. Telling that story reveals the rule of law and separation
of powers at work, as seen through the prism of the National Highway Traffic
and Safety Administration (NHTSA), which administers the United States' auto
safety regime. The plotline maps the twists and turns of the judicial, legislative,
and executive branches as they have sought to oversee NHTSA, as well as the
ingenuity regulators have shown in dealing with their overseers' often opaque,
inconsistent, and enigmatic commands.
This Article is not our first venture into the thickets of automobile safety
regulation. Over twenty-five years have passed since the publication of our
book, The Struggle for Auto Safety (Struggle), which examined NHTSA's
regulatory record from its formation in 1966 through the mid-1980s. In a
nutshell, we found that American legal culture had made broadly applicable,
forward-looking safety standards hard to adopt, and case-by-case, retrospective
recalls easy to implement. In doing so, our legal culture upended the priority of
regulatory techniques envisioned by the architects of NHTSA's mandate, with
at best dubious effects on the achievement of the Agency's safety mission.
Over the ensuing quarter century, our findings have been widely cited in
academic literature for the proposition that a process of "ossification" has come
to afflict large portions of the American administrative state, especially those
organs responsible for informal rulemaking. Proponents of this theory argue
that informal rulemaking has become so encumbered by procedural and
analytic requirements that it is no longer capable of delivering the results
expected of it.' While "many observers across the political spectrum" believe
that ossification is "one of the most serious problems currently facing
regulatory agencies,"2 support for the theory is by no means universal. Some
have disputed the extent of the phenomenon or its causes. Others have argued
that ossification is a fairy tale altogether, unsupported by hard empirical data.3
1. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Garrity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1,385 (1992).
2. Id. at 1386.
3. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An
Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1,414 (2012); see also Justice Denied: Rules Delayed on Auto Safety and Mental Health: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Fed. Rights & Agency Action of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 24-25 (2013) [hereinafter Justice Denied Hearing] (statement of Cary Coglianese,
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania) (noting that the Struggle for Auto Safety has been widely
cited in support of the ossification thesis, but that claims of a slowdown in rulemaking and a surge in
recalls do not withstand empirical scrutiny). But see Richard J. Pierce Jr., Rulemaking Ossification is
Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1,493 (2012).
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To oversimplify only modestly, the ossification debate is largely a dispute
between quantitative analysts who look at the data available across the whole of
the administrative state, and qualitative analysts who focus more intently on the
performance of particular agencies. Although we will seek here to interpret
quantitative evidence, we remain firmly in the qualitative, case-study camp. In
our view, the broader quantitative analyses, however sophisticated, suffer from
a series of disabilities, including the elusiveness of comparable data that are
defensible proxies for agency rulemaking performance. Additionally, they lack
a clear specification of the expectations that can justifiably be treated as the
baseline against which to determine whether a rulemaking regime is "ossified."
More critically, the most interesting question about the confrontation
between regulatory ambitions and legal constraints- what we call here the
"legal culture"-is not whether an agency's rulemaking has become ossified.
Ossification is rarely, if ever, a regulatory death warrant; agencies continue to
function. Within a given agency, some regulatory techniques may atrophy, or in
the current vernacular, "ossify," while others are energetically and successfully
deployed. As Struggle emphasized, the legal culture features differential
responses -encouragement, indifference, or rejection-to differing regulatory
techniques. The critical question for legal analysts, we believe, is how agencies
adapt their regulatory techniques to the skewed legal constraints they face and,
more ambitiously, what those adaptations suggest concerning the design and
performance of the regulatory regime in question.
On the occasion of NHTSA's fiftieth anniversary, this Article revisits the
issue of the Agency's regulatory performance in the post-Struggle period (1986
to the present). Among other matters, we seek to understand whether legal
culture has continued to suppress informal rulemaking while elevating recalls at
NHTSA, and whether NHTSA has developed other regulatory techniques as
further bureaucratic adaptations to the tenacious legal culture enveloping it.
Here, as in Struggle, we construe that culture broadly: not just as a function of
judicial review, but as the message concerning legitimate administrative action
emerging from the interaction of all three branches of American government in
a system characterized by separated powers, checks and balances, and, more
particularly, administrative accountability to both political and legal overseers.
The Transformation in Brief The transformation we describe here is
largely a shift in regulatory focus and technique, as NHTSA has groped to find
feasible modes of action that are not only faithful to its governing legislation,
but also acceptable to the diverse preferences of the judiciary, Congress, the
executive branch, industry, and the motoring public. Regulation has not been
abandoned. Rather, it has been relentlessly transformed by an agency operating
in a highly durable legal environment, under changed technological and market
conditions, and responding to a barrage of new and sometimes bewildering
statutory instructions and executive directions. This is an account of agency
resilience and adaptation, not failure. The regulators here are better cast in the
role of resourceful survivors than knaves or fools.
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NHTSA's regulatory history can be characterized as describing the
evolutionary biology of administrative law in a particular domain-how that
law is shaped by and responds to the turbulent environment in which it is
implanted and nourished, or neglected and deprived. Briefly stated, in the fifty
years since the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
(MVSA) of 1966, NHTSA has progressed through a succession of distinct
phases. From its inception until 1974, it functioned largely as a rulemaking
agency, setting performance standards for new motor vehicles and motor
vehicle equipment. Consistent with the technology-forcing ambitions of
MVSA, these rules sometimes pushed the industry into uncomfortable territory
by demanding safety innovations that were not on the industry's product
development agenda and that it believed provided little or no competitive or
marketing advantages. Resistance to technology forcing in this form was fierce.
Responding to judicial and political skepticism of its rulemaking program
and enthusiasm for its recall efforts, NHTSA shifted its regulatory emphasis
from the issuance of performance standards to the recall of defective products.
By the mid-1980s, rulemaking at the Agency was mostly dormant, while recall
activity, reinforced by additional legislative authority, burgeoned. Then,
spurred in large part by congressional mandates, rulemaking re-emerged at
NHTSA around the turn of the twenty-first century. But the form of its rules
had changed profoundly. Rather than forcing the development of safety
technologies that were low on automakers' list of product development
priorities, NHTSA's rules in this new era largely demanded diffusion of safety
technologies the industry was already incorporating, or planning to incorporate,
in substantial numbers-sometimes in nearly all-of new vehicles.
This co-regulatory strategy relied heavily on auto manufacturers and
component developers to develop, produce, and initially deploy advanced
safety technologies. NHTSA then developed performance standards for these
design features or components, gently pushing the industry to diffuse its self-
initiated safety advances throughout the entire new vehicle fleet. To the extent
that diffusion would have occurred anyway, due to product liability exposure
and market pressures, this form of co-regulation has an illusory quality. Still, it
has proven highly effective in avoiding conflict with the Agency's legal and
political overseers.
Other regulatory targets, though suitable for rulemaking, were instead
slated for inclusion in the Agency's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP).
This program attempts to inform consumers concerning the comparative safety
performance of new vehicles through a five-star rating system based on crash-
testing protocols and information concerning whether new vehicles contain
optional safety features. More recently, NHTSA has added additional
collaborative techniques to its repertoire. It now places much greater emphasis
on industry-wide voluntary agreements for safety improvements rather than
mandating them by rule, and on "guidelines," "best practices statements," and
"recommendations" of various kinds. None of these approaches is legally
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binding or enforceable in court. Operating in this mode, NHTSA acts as a
coordinator of industry self-regulation, rather than a regulatory policeman
demanding improved safety performance. Meanwhile, the recall regime has
reached new quantitative heights: in recent years, NHTSA has recalled more
vehicles than are sold new in the United States.
In short, our research suggests that NHTSA is now predominately a
provider of consumer safety information (NCAP), an enforcer of implied
warranties (product recalls), a codifier of industry practice, a broker of
voluntary agreements, and a promoter of best practices and guidelines. This
Article describes the transformation of NHTSA's approach to vehicle safety
regulation in considerable detail and asks, "Why this regime?" Our answer is
straightforward. The Agency has adapted to a legal culture that is deeply
skeptical of ex ante regulatory requirements but supportive of the alternative
techniques NHTSA has developed. A regulatory agency that remakes itself as
the consumer's non-coercive informant, warranty-enforcement helpmate, and
industry collaborator should have few legal or political difficulties.
The main plot line of this complex story is thus' easily grasped: the
regulatory revolution of 1966 represented by the MVSA was grafted onto a
legal culture whose commitments to judicial oversight and political control of
delegated authority were structurally hostile to administrative lawmaking. And
over time, legal culture rejected the graft. Regulatory agencies are not the
unaccountable bureaucrats of popular mythology. They instead operate in a
politico-legal environment characterized by multiple sources of constraint,
limited sources of support, and the constant risk of being second-guessed by
often-fickle overseers. The life of a regulator is not for the faint-hearted.
The Plan of the Article: Part I begins with some background material on
the original vision for automobile safety regulation as of 1966. This Part then
summarizes the findings of our prior research on automobile safety regulation
through the mid-1980s. During these formative years, the brave new world of
NHTSA's command and control standards encountered the harsh realities of
pre-enforcement judicial review, public fury at incursions on its liberty to drive
unbuckled, implacable industry opposition, and rapidly waning political
enthusiasm for automobile safety regulation outside of the Agency's recall
program.
Parts II and III examine the "Ice Age of Rulemaking," the period from
about 1986 to 2002. In the post-Struggle ra, this was NHTSA's most dormant
period on the rulemaking front, as demonstrated by an evaluation of the costs
imposed and safety benefits gained through the Agency's rulemaking. We find
this dormant period to have been massively over-determined. New forms of
executive oversight delayed and derailed NHTSA's initiatives, as did
leadership by new political appointees with little or no enthusiasm for the
Agency's mission. Meanwhile, legislative attempts to reinvigorate the
Agency's rulemaking process by safety partisans were stymied by
Representative John Dingell's control of the House Energy and Commerce
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Committee. The checks and balances built into the American constitutional
system all operated in one direction. The MVSA remained facially intact, but
its implementation was all checks and no balance.
Part IV looks at congressional directives, all but one of which was
adopted after 2000, that ostensibly seemed directed at reinvigorating the
Agency's rulemaking efforts. But, on closer inspection, these directives turn
out to be much more ambivalent, vacillating, and even inconsistent. In eight
separate "agency-forcing" statutes, Congress mandated action but did nothing
to protect the Agency's rulemaking process from the vagaries of judicial
review. These legislative prods sometimes signaled a lack of enthusiasm for
coercive regulation and often appeared intent on refocusing the Agency on the
protection of infinitesimal populations.
Part V evaluates the Agency's response to these action-forcing statutes as
well as its overall rulemaking activity more recently. A rulemaking rebound has
occurred in what we will call the "post-Glacial period." However, these rules
are radically different from the key early rules seeking to force technology on a
reluctant industry. Instead, we find that the Agency's rulemaking process has
largely codified industry practice or borrowed standards in widespread use
outside the United States.
Part VI assesses the effects of these rules in promoting automobile safety.
From either a quantitative or a qualitative perspective those effects have been
modest, perhaps even illusory. Ordering automobile manufacturers to do what
they were already doing, or promising to do, produced little industry
opposition, while oversight by OMB and Congress occasionally pressed
NHTSA to adopt even weaker rules or focus its resources on vanishingly small,
even non-existent, safety issues.
Part VII briefly recounts the role of judicial review in the Agency's
activities from the mid-1980s to the present. In short, the industry had no
interest in suing the Agency when it did nothing or merely required the industry
to do what it was already doing, was planning to do, or could easily achieve as
demonstrated by foreign regulatory experience. While it has been suggested
that judicial review could not have been having significant effects on the
Agency's output, given the modest number of judicial review proceedings that
it has encountered overall during the last fifty years, that conclusion fails to
reckon with the distribution of cases over time and what the Agency was
actually doing. The industry's many early successes in getting agency rules
overturned as not "reasonable, practicable or appropriate" simply could not be
replicated with respect to later rules that did little more than mandate industry's
own widespread practices. NHTSA's only loss in judicial review of its rules
during this period involved a suit by potential regulatory beneficiaries attacking
the weakness of the Agency's standard.
Part VIII returns to recalls. NHTSA has intensified its recall efforts over
the last thirty years, a process that continues to this day. The Agency's efforts
have been strongly supported by judicial approval, congressional
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reinforcement, media coverage, synergy with products liability litigation, and
popular acceptance. While much of this activity seems to make common
sense-recalling exploding airbags, for example4 -there is unfortunately no
solid evidence that the safety benefits are even remotely equivalent to the
substantial costs imposed on both industry and consumers by the massive
recalls that have become commonplace in recent years. The best studies suggest
that no more than one percent of motor vehicle accidents are caused by
manufacturing defects.
Parts IX to XI offer some tentative thoughts on the future of motor vehicle
safety regulation. They focus on two developments that are reshaping
fundamentally the context in which NHTSA operates. The first concerns the
emergence over the past twenty or so years of something resembling a market
for motor vehicle safety. This development is socio-economic, perhaps also
psychological. Although NHTSA's regulatory strategy relies importantly on
this market's existence, very little is known about its origins, scope, and effects.
The second development concerns recent advances in the technology of
motor vehicle crash avoidance, including the much-publicized self-driving car.
Much of this innovation has occurred in parallel with the convergence of the
traditional motor vehicle, software, and advanced electronics industries. As in
the case of the market for auto safety, the implications of autonomous vehicles
and new software market entrants for NHTSA going forward can only be dimly
perceived at present.
A deeper dive into these developments awaits further research, but we do
offer some preliminary observations. First, changes in the market and
technological environment for vehicle safety regulation challenge some of the
basic assumptions underlying the MVSA of 1966. Second, those changed
circumstances tend to reinforce adoption of the regulatory strategies that
adaptation to the legal culture has also encouraged. The legal culture has
required that NHTSA adapt its regulatory techniques, but it did not control the
details of that adaptation. Third, these developments raise an obvious question
about the continued relevance of agency standard setting as a necessary and
viable regulatory technique in the field of motor vehicle safety. For reasons that
we briefly sketch in the final pages of this Article, we are skeptical that reliance
on information provision, voluntary commitments, and other market-based and
cooperative strategies can wholly substitute for the mandatory standard setting
envisioned by the proponents of the MVSA of 1966. At the same time, we note
the surprising versatility of recalls in enabling NHTSA to cope with changed
circumstances, both in the market and technology, that the Agency could hardly
have anticipated, let alone control.
4. See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Recalls Spotlight: Takata Air Bags
Recalls, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP., www.safercar.gov/rs/takata/index.htn-l (last visited Nov. 6, 2016)
("Takata air bags installed in tens of millions of U.S. vehicles are subject to recall due to a safety defect
that may cause their inflators to explode and cause serious injuries or deaths.").
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I. Some Background
A. The Original Vision
Drawing on the egalitarian impulses of the Great Society and exuberance
over technical advances in the race to the moon, Congress passed the MVSA
unanimously.5 The Act empowered a new federal regulatory agency to compel
motor vehicle manufacturers to develop and install safety technologies that
could, at the time, only be dimly perceived. The means for reaching that distant
horizon was the quasi-legislative power to set general rules governing the
safety performance of all new motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment.
This emphasis on rulemaking was hailed as one of the "greatest inventions
of modem government," and as a cure for the lethargy and ineffectiveness of
many old-line agencies, such as the FTC and NLRB, that regulated almost
wholly through case-by-case adjudication.6 The fledgling Agency established
by the Act, the forerunner of today's NHTSA, was authorized to set federal
motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) subject to the requirements that the
rules be "practicable," be stated in "objective" terms, and "meet the need for
motor vehicle safety."7 The latter criterion was defined to mean protecting the
public against the "unreasonable risk" of accidents and the injury and death
often resulting from them.8 The automobile industry, then the largest segment
of the nation's private sector, was subject to federal safety regulation for the
first time.9
NHTSA's rulemaking charge was three-fold. First, the Agency was
expected to compel industry to pursue innovations that it would not otherwise
pursue. This was the technology-forcing strand of the new regulatory tapestry.'°
5. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA) of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30,101-83 (2012)). For a discussion of the
scientific and ideological premises of the Act, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE
STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 1-7 (1990).
6. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (1st ed.
Supp. 1970).
7. MVSA § 102(2) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a) (2012)). In addition, the MVSA
provided that standards were to be "minimum" standards and that the agency should "consider whether
any such proposed standard is reasonable, practicable, and appropriate for the particular type of motor
vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment for which it is prescribed." MVSA §§ 102(2), 103(f)(3)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § § 30,102 (a)(9), 30,111 (b)(3) (2012)).
8. MVSA § 102(1) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,102(a)(8) (2012)).
9. At the time of the Act's passage, the Senate Report noted that "[o]ne out of every
six Americans is employed in the industry or in the provision of automotive components or the service
of automotive vehicles." S. REP. NO. 89-1301, at 272 (1966).
10. By "technology forcing" we mean simply innovations that manufacturers, left to
their own devices, would not pursue. The spectrum of technologies that might be forced is both broad
and indeterminate, ranging from existing technologies that by general consensus should be incorporated
into vehicles (such as the essentially design standards that Congress mandated be adopted in 1966) to
unspecified and perhaps unimagined technologies that might be deployed to meet specified performance
goals (such as fleet mileage standards). For our purposes, the question is not how dramatic of a
technological innovation agency rules require, but whether the safety innovations that emerge are driven
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Second, it was charged with making rules to ensure that all citizens,
irrespective of their means and abilities, would be secure in their vehicles. This
was the equal protection strand. Finally, Congress made clear that safety was
the overriding consideration in the issuance of standards. Costs were to be
secondary in guiding the Agency's rulemaking calculus."
Almost as an afterthought, Congress also authorized NHTSA to oversee
the recall of "defective" motor vehicles.2 Not much was expected of that
secondary power, however. Recalling automobiles was a form of the old and,
from a reformist perspective, disfavored adjudicatory model of regulation.
Moreover, equipment failure was understood to be responsible for a miniscule
percentage of vehicle accidents, injuries, and deaths. The Act was ambiguous
on the conditions that justified a recall: it defined an actionable defect simply as
"any defect in performance, construction, a component, or material of a motor
vehicle or motor vehicle equipment" that related to "motor vehicle safety."'
3
B. Reversal of Fortune
What happened next is elaborated in detail in our 1990 book, The Struggle
for Auto Safety, which focused on roughly the first fifteen years of the new
Agency's activity.'4 In short, NHTSA could no longer be described principally
as a rulemaking agency by the mid-1980s. Looking back on the impact
attributable to its own safety standards, the Agency itself reported in 2004 that
the "cost and weight in passenger cars changed little from 1974 to 1986, as no
major new FMVSS went into effect."'5
The Agency increasingly focused its efforts on recalls.'6 Yet the safety
benefits of this burgeoning activity were, and are, far from clear. A 2008 study
by regulatory demands or by other factors, such as consumer demand, market competition, or liability
risks.
11. The technology-forcing and egalitarian strands of the statute are discussed in
further detail in MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 5, at 59-65. The Senate Report memorializes the
primacy of safety in the statutory calculus, relative to other factors, such as cost, industry hardship, and
technological feasibility. S. REP. No. 89-1301.
12. MVSA § 113 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30,118-20(A) (2012)).
13. Id. § 102(1), (11) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30,102 (a)(2), (8) (2012)).
14. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 5, at 10- 14.
15. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT-HS-809-834, COST AND
WEIGHT ADDED BY THE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS FOR MODEL YEARS 1968-
2001 IN PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS, at xi (2004). This was by no means an isolated appraisal.
Testifying before Congress in 2013, a prominent auto safety activist noted that "during [thel first five
years after its creation in 1966, NHTSA issued more safety standards than it did in the next forty years."
Justice Denied Hearing, supra note 3, at 67 (statement of Clarence M. Ditlow, Executive Director,
Center for Auto Safety). An investigative report by the Los Angeles Times in 2000 came to a similar
conclusion. Myron Levin, Upgrades on Auto Safety Standards Languish, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2000, at
C1 (stating that a review of government documents and court records over thirty years showed a pattern
of agency failure to upgrade safety standards buried in a "bureaucratic mire").
16. Recalls under NHTSA's auspices increased from about fifteen million vehicles in
the period from 1966 to 1970 to over thirty-nine million vehicles from 1976 to 1980. MASHAW &
HARFST, supra note 5, at 10-14.
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funded by Congress reveals that some ninety-five percent of accidents were
caused by driver error or roadway conditions.7 Vehicle failure accounted for a
mere 2.4% of accidents.18 Safety standards might help drivers reduce their
mistakes (crash avoidance) or ameliorate the effects of accidents once they
occurred (crashworthiness). Recalls did neither.9
C. Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review
To explain this retreat to the old form of case-by-case regulation, Struggle
postulated a "legal culture hypothesis." In highly abbreviated form, that
hypothesis stated that the legal culture surrounding NHTSA had made issuing
rules hard and ordering recalls easy.20 Exhibit A for the hypothesis was the
Agency's record in defending its rules on pre-enforcement judicial review.
NHTSA lost six of the ten rulemaking cases litigated in its first decade (1968 to
1978).2 1 And in those cases, the courts stringently interpreted the statutory
criteria of "reasonableness," practicability," "objectivity," and "meeting the
need for safety."
In doing so, the courts subjected the Agency to a highly proceduralized
form of reasonableness review that played into the hands of the auto industry's
full court press opposing standards. Years later, when asked why the auto
industry opposed NHTSA's safety proposals no matter how minor, an industry
executive reportedly explained that when "we tie them up in so many little
17. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT-HS-811-059, NATIONAL MOTOR
VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY: REPORT TO CONGRESS 25-26 (2008).
18. Id. The survey found that only 130 accidents out of a total of 5,471 accidents in
the sample could be attributed to the condition of the vehicle, principally tire and brake failure or
degradation. Of course, not all such conditions are caused by defects: inadequate maintenance and
vehicle age are also factors.
19. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 5, at 11, 167-71; see also Kevin M.
McDonald, Do Auto Recalls Benefit the Public?, 32 REG. 12, 12-13 (2009) (noting that the benefits of
motor vehicle recalls are dubious and largely unproven). But see Yong-Kyun Bae & Hugo Benitez Silva,
The Effects of Automobile Recalls on the Severity of Accidents, 51 ECON. INQUIRY 1232 (2013) (finding
that there is no empirical evidence of the effect of vehicle recalls on safety but establishing a model that
suggests recalls of new models continuously diminish the severity of accidents over time); Yong-Kyun
Bae & Hugo Benitez Silva, Do Vehicle Recalls Reduce the Number of Accidents? The Case of the U.S.
Car Market, 30 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 821, 858 (2011) [hereinafter Bae and Silva U.S. Case
Study] (reporting that while the economic profession has not provided any quantitative evidence of the
effects of vehicle recalls on safety, the authors' econometric model suggests that recalls of a particular
model reduce accidents of that model by an average of ten percent, ranging from eight percent to
nineteen percent).
20. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 5, at 19.
21. NHTSA's six losses in court during this formative period were PACCAR, Inc. v.
NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978); B.F. Goodrich v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 541 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir.
1976); Nat'l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n Inc. v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Wagner
Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3rd Cir. 1972); H&H Tire Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 471
F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972); Chrysler Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972). The
Agency's four wins in court during this period were Chrysler Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 515 F.2d
1053 (6th Cir. 1975); Ford Motor Co. v. NHTSA, 473 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1973); Boating Industry Ass'n
v. Boyd, 409 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1969); and Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
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things, they never get to the big ones."22 The debilitating effects of this
obstructionism were magnified by the courts' demand for "real world"
evidence of the feasibility of technologies that the Agency was seeking to force
precisely because they were not yet in substantial use. And because the statute
provided for judicial review before anyone attempted to comply with a new
performance requirement, responsiveness to the rules themselves did not
generate the real world experience the courts demanded. Courts, struggling to
accommodate the statutory mandate that they review NHTSA's rules for
reasonableness in the abstract, seemed to define NHTSA's rulemaking role as
mission impossible.23
NHTSA's early losses in court included two critical challenges to its most
ambitious technology-forcing initiatives: the standards on passive restraints and
antilock brakes.4 These and other challenges could not have come at a worse
time. Judicial skepticism emerged at the very moment NHTSA was poised to
shift from the design-specific, component-based standards that typified the
Agency's congressionally mandated rules (and proved resource-intensive to
defend and keep abreast of technical advances) to more broadly based
performance standards that would shift the burden of technology development
to industry. 5 That approach, one clearly envisioned by the MVSA, seemed
virtually foreclosed by judicial demands that the Agency provide evidence of
real-world practicability prior to requiring compliance with the new
performance standards.
In contrast, the courts construed NHTSA's recall mandate about as
charitably as the Agency could have hoped. During roughly the same period, in
which NHTSA lost sixty percent of its rulemaking cases, it brought and won
several cases seeking to establish its per se theory of defects.26 According to
that theory, if the government could establish the existence of more than a de
minimis number of failures in a safety related component, it had established an
actionable defect that presented an unreasonable risk, even without showing
what caused the failure or that any accidents or injuries had occurred as a
result. The failure constituting the defect could even be attributable to owner
22. Justice Denied Hearing, supra note 3, at 74 (statement of Clarence M. Ditlow,
Executive Director, Center for Auto Safety).
23. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 5, at 87-100. The judicial demand for real-
world evidence of the feasibility of NHTSA's rules is reflected in H&H Tire Co., 471 F.2d 350. Court
insistence on a highly proceduralized form of rulemaking is reflected in Wagner Electric, 466 F.2d
1013.
24. See Chrysler Corp., 472 F.2d 659 (passive restraints); PACCAR Inc., 573 F.2d 632
(anti-lock brakes).
25. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 5, at 84-87.
26. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 561 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1055 (1977) (pitman arms); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. 565 F.2d 754 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), affig in part 417 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1976) (carburetors); United States v. Ford Motor Co.,
421 F. Supp. 1239 (D.D.C. 1976), affd in part, dismissed in part as moot, 574 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (seat backs); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (wheels); United
States v. Ford Motor Co., 453 F. Supp. 1240 (D.D.C. 1978) (wipers).
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misbehavior (for example, overloading the vehicle) if misuse was "reasonably
foreseeable."27
From the standpoint of the 1966 Act's attempt to reorient auto safety
regulation, the judiciary's skepticism of rules and embrace of recalls seem
perverse. And yet, it is utterly conventional from the viewpoint of
contemporaneous American legal culture. The major new health and safety
initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s gave vast lawmaking powers to new federal
agencies. Harmonizing administrative lawmaking-especially a variety that
featured coercive rules affecting huge swathes of the American economy- with
standard notions of separated powers and the rule of law seemed to demand
strong judicial checks on the legality of these new regulatory authorities. All of
the major health and safety statutes of this era permitted immediate review of
agency rules, and the courts responded with what came to be known as "hard
look" judicial review. Meanwhile, products liability law, the common-law
analog of recalling defective products, was moving relentlessly in favor of
easing the litigation burdens of consumers seeking redress from manufacturing
defects .28
D. Environmental Reinforcement
Congress and the executive branch reinforced the message. When the
Chrysler decision invalidated most of NHTSA's first passive restraints rule, it
did so on the basis of a complaint about the "objectivity" of the testing
methodology.29 But the problems with the test applied only to automatic seat
belts, airbags, and passive interiors. The court's decision left in place another
device, the ignition interlock, which prevented motorists from starting their
vehicles unless they buckled up. As a (presumably unintended) consequence of
the court's ruling, ignition interlocks were deployed in model year 1974
vehicles to disastrous political effect.
The public despised this interference with its liberty. Motorists bombarded
Congress with complaints. Over the objections of safety partisans who
estimated that interlocks might save ten thousand lives every year, Congress
amended the 1966 Act to prohibit the use of that technology or any belt
27. 518 F.2d at 427. The per se defects theory was laid out in a seminal memo by
then-NHTSA Chief Counsel Frank Berndt in 1978. Memorandum from Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel,
Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., at 1 (1978) (on file with authors) (postulating that the
demonstrated failure of a critical safety component (wheels, brakes, steering, lights, etc.) establishes the
existence of a safety defect, whether supporting accident data exists or not); see also Allan J. Kam,
Director, Highway Traffic Safety Assocs., LLC, Address on NHTSA Safety Defect Investigations at the
ATLA 2001 Annual Convention, Products Liability Section (July 17, 2001),
http://www.htsassociates.con/NHTSA-safety defect investigations.shtml (reviewing history of
litigation affirming per se theory of defects).
28. For a discussion of these developments and the legal culture hypothesis more
generally, see MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 5, at 1-46, 224-47.
29. 472 F.2d at 676.
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warning buzzer that sounded for more than eight seconds.3" For good measure,
the 1974 amendments attached a "legislative veto" provision3' (later ruled
unconstitutional) to ensure that Congress could rid the public of any further
unwanted safety regulations. Congress had instructed the Agency to meet the
need for auto safety-but apparently not if the public objected loudly enough.32
At the same time, the 1974 amendments greatly bolstered NHTSA's recall
authority. The new provisions required industry to provide repairs at no cost to
vehicle owners, strengthened companies' reporting obligations, doubled fines
and penalties, and endowed the Agency with subpoena and plant inspection
authority.'3 Meanwhile, executive branch intervention paralleled courts'
demands for rules that proceduralized and rationalized the regulations. Cost-
benefit analysis was coming into vogue. Starting in the mid-1970s, the
Executive Office of the President, acting initially via the Regulatory Analysis
Review Group and later through the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), imposed increasingly stringent requirements for cost-benefit review of
safety standards. Recalls, however, were not subject to such review, either
within the Agency or by OMB or any other executive branch body.
The external legal and political environment had significant effects on
agency organization, staffing, and priorities. Lawyers and cost-benefit analysts
gradually gained the upper hand over safety engineers in the battle for the
Agency's direction. In due course, the head of the rulemaking office, an
enthusiastic implementer of the 1966 Act's technology-forcing vision, was
exiled to a remote research facility in East Liberty, Ohio, to be replaced by a
cost-benefit "policy planner." Of course, the administrative tanker turned
slowly. But by 1978, NHTSA's internal procedures, defining the roles of
engineers, lawyers, and cost-benefit analysts in the rulemaking process, had
been profoundly recast. In simple terms, the new procedures put lawyers and
policy analysts in charge. Further, they institutionalized a reiterative, fastidious,
and ponderous rulemaking process intended to protect the Agency when
subjected to judicial, executive, or congressional oversight. NHTSA had
internalized the hostile legal and political environment surrounding it.34
Summing up the state of affairs in which NHTSA found itself in the mid-
1980s, Struggle concluded, "We therefore gave NHTSA a task of rational
implementation that it felt compelled to abandon, but no rhetorical tools with
30. Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492,
§ 109, 88 Stat. 1470, 1482 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1409 (2012)).
31. Id.
32. The interlock was championed by Lee Iacocca, then at Ford, and was opposed by
the Agency, which issued an official interpretation in 1971 that such "forced action" systems did not
qualify as "passive." The interlock was nonetheless included as an option in the version of Standard 208
proposed in October of that year, following a meeting between President Nixon and Ford officials and
subsequent political pressure. JOHN D. GRAHAM, AUTO SAFETY: ASSESSING AMERICA'S PERFORMANCE
60-65 (1989).
33. Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974.
34. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 5, at 172-201.
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which to justify its withdrawal. '35 The story that follows, covering NHTSA's
post-Struggle activity, describes the journey upon which the Agency then
embarked in pursuit of legally and politically acceptable regulatory techniques,
and the surprising destination at which it has now arrived. 6 In recent years
NHTSA has regained some rulemaking momentum. But "technology forcing"
is hardly an apt description of its contemporary work product.
II. The Ice Age of Rulemaking: 1987-2002
The period running from 1987 to the present can be divided roughly into
two stages. The first stage, the "Ice Age of Rulemaking," spanned fifteen years,
from 1987 to 2002. It is discussed immediately below. The second stage, to be
considered in due course, could be called the "Post-Glacial Rebound."
During the Ice Age, significant rulemaking at NHTSA atrophied nearly to
the point of extinction.37 To be sure, some rules and amendments to prior rules
35. Id. at 223.
36. Recent empirical research by Professor Cary Coglianese questions Struggle's
account. In testimony to a congressional subcommittee in 2013, he reported:
Despite widespread acceptance by virtually every major scholar of administrative
law, the claim that NHTSA has retreated from rulemaking and shifted instead to
recalls does not bear the weight of scrutiny. NHTSA has continued to issue a
substantial body of new regulations even in wake of judicial losses that have been
thought to have been paralyzing to the agency. Its recalls did not increase in the
aftermath of either the agency's losses in rulemaking challenges or its wins in recall
litigation. When a broad sweep of NHTSA's litigated cases is considered, it is clear
that NHTSA has not been beleaguered by high levels of judicial invalidations.
Justice Denied Hearing, supra note 3, at 14. One interpretation of Professor Coglianese's position
is that our description of rulemaking up to 1986 is correct, but that sometime after Struggle, there
occurred a surge in rulemaking (and possibly a decline in recalls) that belies our analysis. Professor
Coglianese states:
Given the time period when Mashaw and Harfst conducted their research, they could
understandably only observe NHTSA activity through the mid-1980s. Relative to
NHTSA's rulemaking output up through the mid-1970s, rulemaking did fall in the
subsequent decade. Mashaw and Harfst correctly observed a decline in the number
of NHTSA final rules issued after 1976. Between 1967-1976, NHTSA and its
predecessor agencies issued an annual average of 49 final rule documents in the
Federal Register, while between 1977-1986, NHTSA issued an annual average of
only 19. (The average annual output of rules during NHTSA's first decade is also
significantly higher that the annual average from 1977 to 2003.)
Id. at 9. The assertion that NHTSA did not retreat from rulemaking or shift towards recalls certainly
warrants inspection. If there has been resurgence in rulemaking and an increase in recalls that simply
mirrors the increase in the number of vehicles on the road, the deep structure of American legal culture
is a poor explanatory candidate for these trends. However, for the reasons discussed in the text that
follows, we are not persuaded by Professor Coglianese's critique.
37. For the reasons discussed in the text, the post-Struggle "Ice Age" is defined as the
period from 1987 to 2002. But recall that during the Struggle period, between 1974 and 1986, NHTSA,
by its own account, implemented no significant new safety rules. See supra note 15 and accompanying
text. Thus, the Ice Age is actually a nearly thirty-year period spanning both the Struggle and the post-
Struggle periods.
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were issued during this period. But very few had any demonstrable impact.
Documented costs and benefits hovered near zero. Whatever contributions
NHTSA's rulemaking efforts might have made to an ever more voluminous
Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations during this period, they had
little to do with its technology-forcing mission. Nor, for the most, part did they
make significant contributions to vehicle safety.
A. Costs and Weight in the Ice Age
In December 2004, the Agency published a study that identified only
fourteen standards as having had any quantifiable cost and weight impact on
passenger cars.38 It also documented that approximately ninety-eight percent of
the total cost impact measured in the last year of the study (model year 2001
vehicles) was attributable to either (1) standards in effect for MY 1974
passenger cars, or (2) subsequent improvements to two of those standards,
FMVSS 208 on passive restraints and FMVSS 214 on side impact protection.39
Weight told a similar story,4° as did the assessment of the standards' impact on
light trucks.4' The vast majority of NHTSA's rules (fifty out of fifty-nine)
either had no demonstrated cost or weight impact on passenger cars (forty-five
standards) or had only a negligible impact (five standards)-that is, less than
five dollars and three pounds each .42
38. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT-HS-809-834, COST AND
WEIGHT ADDED BY THE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS FOR MODEL YEARS 1968-
2001 IN PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS, at viii tbl.1 (2004).
39. Id. at x tbl.2. The agency estimated that the cost of implementing standards in
effect for MY 74 passenger cars was $309.97. By MY 2001, the last year covered in the study, the cost
had grown to $839.13 for passenger cars, an increase of $537.16. However, the agency attributed the
lion's share of this increase to the dual air bag provisions of Standard 208 ($396.72) and the dynamic
testing provisions of Standard 214 ($129.350). Id. at vii tbl.1. The impact of the Standard 208 upgrade
first began to be felt from 1991 to 1994, while the impact of the Standard 214 upgrade first began to be
felt in 1994 to 1997. Id. at x.
40. In fact, the weight impact of standards in effect for MY 74 (70.48 pounds),
together with the weight impact of the upgrades of Standard 208 (26.78 pounds) and Standard 214
(37.31 pounds), actually exceeded the total weight impact reported for the last year of the study (125.44
pounds). It appears that the weight impact of some pre-1974 standards diminished over time as
manufacturers found more efficient ways to comply with those standards. Id. at vii tbl.1, x tbl.2.
41. The light truck story is not quite as dramatic because much of the impact of
standards on light trucks was associated with simply extending passenger car standards to light trucks,
often years after they had been implemented in passenger cars. In effect, this stretched out the timeline
of the standards' impact. Id. at xi. The agency did not have any data on the impact of the Standard 214
upgrade at the time of the study. Id. at 126.
42. Id. at viii tbl.1. To be sure, many standards were outside the scope of the study
because they did not apply to passenger cars or light trucks (for example, standards applicable to school
buses or motorcycle equipment), and for many others, the agency lacked data. Id. at 15-135. The agency
often stated that no studies had been performed or were planned. Id. It seems reasonable to assume that
the agency doubted that the standards at issue had sufficient impact to warrant examination. In any
event, after nearly forty years of operation, it seems remarkable that the agency was able to document
only fifteen percent of its inventory of standards as having had any quantifiable effect on the cost or
weight of passenger cars and light trucks, the predominant means of transportation subject to its
jurisdiction.
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But costs and weight were not the whole story. It was at least theoretically
possible that NHTSA had found a way, perhaps by forcing some breakthrough
technologies, to achieve significant life-saving benefits at nominal cost. The
Agency's own analyses, however, do not support that conclusion. Rather, they
tend to show that you got the safety benefits you paid for during the Ice Age.
B. Lives Saved in the Ice Age
The same year that NHTSA published its cost and weight findings, it
released a second study covering the period 1960 to 2002, entitled Lives Saved
by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and Other Vehicle Safety
Technologies.43 The report covered virtually all the life-saving technologies
introduced in passenger cars and in LTVs (light trucks and vans, i.e., pickup
trucks, sport utility vehicles, minivans, and full-size vans) from about 1960
through the late 1990s. The technologies at issue included both voluntary
industry measures and measures "associated" with the Agency's safety
standards, or, in NHTSA's rendering, both "safety equipment installed to meet
specific FMVSS" and "lives saved by installations in advance of FMVSS.' 44
The Agency estimated that between 1960 and 2002, a total of 328,551
lives had been saved by the mandatory and voluntary safety technologies
covered in the report. However, the study showed that the vast majority of
NHTSA rules originating after 1974 had essentially no demonstrable impact in
saving lives, and that the few standards that did save lives all had their
provenance in the Agency's heyday of rulemaking, from 1968 to 1974.
In 2002, forty-three active standards applied to cars, light trucks, vans,
and SUVs. The Agency, after nearly forty years of rulemaking, could identify
only ten-less than a quarter of its inventory-that were demonstrably
associated with saving saved lives.45 Moreover, of the lives saved (22,999)46
during the last year of the study (2002) by technologies associated with safety
standards (as opposed to voluntary measures), 16,886 (73.4%) were attributed
to a single standard: FMVSS 208.4 7 Together with Standard 208, six other
standards,4 8 all of them originating in the early 1970s or before,4 9 accounted for
a whopping 97.5% of the total lives saved in 2002 attributed to NHTSA's rules.
43. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT-HS-809-833, LIVES SAVED
BY FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS AND OTHER VEHICLE SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES
1960-2002 (2004).
44. Id. at x.
45. Id. at ix.
46. Id. at 186 tbl.2-3.
47. Id. at 198 tbl.2-7. The figures shown in Table 2-7 (14,570 lives saved in 2002
attributable to seat belts and 2,473 lives attributable to air bags) were adjusted downward by 157 lives
that the agency attributed to voluntary measures. See id. at 209-26 tbls.2-12 to 2-22 (passenger cars); id.
at 232-43 tbls.2-25 to 2-33 (LTVs).
48. Id. at 200-03 tbls.2-8 & 2-9. The six standards are FMVSS 105A (provision on
dual master cylinder brakes, associated with 379 lives saved in 2002), FMVSS 203 (steering assemblies,
2,634 lives saved), FMVSS 206 (door locks, 1,396 lives saved), FMVSS 212 (windshield bonding, 347
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Moreover, these data can be misleading as a measure of lives saved by
NHTSA regulations adopted during the Ice Age. Of the total lives saved
(328,551) for the period covered by the study, the agency credited only 44,483
lives to industry's "voluntary improvements.'5 ° Yet all of the eighteen safety
technologies5' associated with the Agency's standards and identified by
NHTSA as saving lives in passenger cars were first voluntarily introduced
before- sometimes years before-the standard that later mandated them.52
Indeed, fourteen of the eighteen technologies were already being equipped in
fifty percent or more of new passenger cars by the time the respective standards
mandating them took effect.53 To the extent industry would have continued to
install these technologies irrespective of NHTSA's efforts, it is at the very least
peculiar to attribute the resulting lives saved to the standard.54
In any event, considering the vanishingly small number of lives saved that
could be shown to have resulted from most of NHTSA's rules issued or taking
effect in the Ice Age, it is hardly a stretch to conclude that during that fifteen-
year period, most of the Agency's rulemaking efforts contributed little to motor
vehicle safety. But not so fast.
lives saved), FMVSS 214A (provision on side door beams, 626 lives saved), and FMVSS 216 (roof
crush strength, 161 lives saved). The lives saved in 2002 by these standards were adjusted downward
where appropriate to account for measures characterized by the Agency as voluntary. See id. at 209-226
tbls.2-12 to 2-22 (passenger cars); id. at 230-43 this. 2-25 to 2-33 (LTVs). As adjusted, the total lives
saved in 2002 by technologies associated with these six standards was 5,543.
49. Standards 203 and 206 had effective dates of September 1, 1968, as did the dual
master cylinder requirements of Standard 105 relevant to this analysis. They were among the agency's
initial set of standards. The effective dates of Standards 212 and 216 were January 1, 1970 and
September 1, 1973, respectively. The side door beam requirements of Standard 214 relevant to this
analysis took effect on January 1, 1973. Id. at 178 tbl.2-1.
The foregoing effective dates are for passenger cars. Most of the standards also applied to
LTVs, but they were often extended to LTVs only after they had been in effect for cars for several years.
Hence the chronology of LTV implementation is somewhat different. Id. at 180; see also id. at 178-80
tbls.2-1 & 2-2 (comparing implementation dates for cars and LTVs). The key point is that the
overwhelming proportion of lives saved in both passenger cars and LTVs arose in connection with
Standard 208 or standards that had their origin in the early 1970s and before.
50. Id. at 186 tbl.2-3. The remaining 284,069 lives saved were attributed to "FMVSS
in effect."
51. The study speaks of twenty-two technologies, but two (child safety seats and
heavy trailer conspicuity tape) do not apply to cars themselves, and two others (those relating to
Standards 201 and 214B) are voluntary. Id. at 179 & 178 tbl.2-1.
52. Id. at 178 tbl.2-1. The same appears to be true of most, if not all, of the LTV
technologies. Id. at 181 tbl.2-2.
53. Id. at 178 tbl.2-1. Moreover, nine of the fourteen technologies were associated
with the initial set of standards that Congress had required the Agency in the MVSA to issue by January
31, 1967 "based upon existing safety standards." MVSA, § 103(h). Thus, these initial safety standards
were intended by Congress to be codifications of existing practice. In this respect, they are
distinguishable from the standards that NHTSA issued much later in the post-Glacial Rebound, as
discussed in infra, Part V.
54. The agency's analysis is animated by another peculiar assumption. In describing
the baseline against which it measured lives saved, the agency states, "The sum of the actual fatalities
and the lives saved is the number of fatalities that potentially would have happened if cars and LTVs
still had 1960 safety technology and nobody used safety belts." Id. at xiv. The proposition hardly seems
plausible that automobile technology would have remained static for some forty years and that no one
would buckle up in the meantime.
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C. Risk in the Ice Age
The absolute number of lives saved is not the only, or even necessarily the
best, way to measure the benefits of NHTSA's safety rules. One might imagine,
for example, that the absolute number of fatalities could remain constant or
even increase, but hat the fatality rate (defined as fatalities per 100 million
miles travelled) might go down as an increasingly mobile society drives more.
The fatality rate, a measure of driving risk, is, however, heavily affected by a
huge number of variables that have nothing to do with vehicular features, and
the challenge of disaggregating them is daunting. In the 2004 Lives Saved
study, NHTSA took a crack at the issue, and seemed to conclude that much of
the reduction in the fatality rate that occurred during the Ice Age had little to do
with its standards.
NHTSA acknowledged that a detailed analysis of the fatality rate involved
behavioral, environmental, and demographic factors that were beyond the
scope of its study. Still, the Agency did offer several observations about the
trend in the fatality rate for vehicle occupants. NHTSA noted that the actual
occupant fatality rate for car and LTV occupants had fallen from 4.57 fatalities
per 100 million miles driven in 1966, when the MVSA was passed, to 1.25 in
2002. However, it also estimated that without any of the safety technologies
discussed in the study, the rate still would have fallen from 4.61 in 1960 to 2.18
in 2002.55 In other words, nearly three quarters of the reduction in the occupant
fatality rate did not depend on the technologies related to safety standards. Only
the remaining quarter, according to NHTSA, would not have occurred but for
the handful of standards discussed above.
Indeed, it was only from 1983 onward, NHTSA asserted, that "the
paradigm shifts" and the reduction in the occupant fatality rate could be
attributed to safety technologies tied in some way to non-voluntary actions
taken by industry in connection with the ten standards identified in the Lives
Saved study.56 Even then, however, much of the credit belonged not to
technological improvements in seat belt efficacy but to behavioral changes in
occupants' actual use of seat belts, a technology that was introduced a decade
before the enactment of the 1966 Act. With respect to the annual totals of all
lives saved by the safety technologies covered in the study, the Agency
reported "the largest gains in both absolute and relative terms came with the
buckle up laws .. .
Between 1983 and 2002, the fatality rate decreased from 1.92 fatalities per
100 million miles driven to 1.25 fatalities per 100 million miles driven,
representing about one fifth of the total reduction in the fatality rate from 1966
55. Id. at 194-95 tbl.26.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 187.
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to 2002.58 From 1983 to 2002, the agency attributed 255,935 lives saved to
safety standards in effect, and 26,890 lives saved to voluntary industry
measures.59 Of the lives saved in connection with standards, the agency tied
about 60% to the seat belt provisions of Standard 208 (especially occupants'
increased use of seat belts), 4.6% to the air bag provisions of the same
Standard, and 31.6% to the six standards previously discussed, all of them
arising in the early 1970s or before.60 Thus, according to NHTSA, Standard 208
and the six pre-1974 standards account for approximately 96.4% of all lives
saved from 1983 to 2002 tied to standards. To the extent the risks of driving
decreased in the Ice Age, it appears the vast majority of NHTSA's rulemaking
efforts during that period had little to do with it.
61
III. Understanding the Ice Age
Judicial review of NHTSA rulemaking is comparatively rare after 1986.62
To be sure, the overhang of the Agency's experience on judicial review of its
rules was still much in force. But to illuminate the regulatory choices that
NHTSA made during and after the Ice Age, we must examine more closely the
actions of the Agency's other two constitutionally empowered overseers: the
President and Congress. As we shall see, the Ice Age of rulemaking was in
many ways over-determined. Both political overseers, albeit for different
reasons, seemed to be sending the same message: the Great Society's vision of
automobile safety was defunct. Their message was sent, however, not by de
jure amendment of the 1966 Act, but rather by oversight activities that
encouraged a de facto disregard of its implementation. This approach has been
sanctioned by a legal culture that, for reasons of separation of powers, largely
insulates agency inaction from judicial review and, for reasons of electoral
accountability, embraces a broad role for political intervention in administrative
policymaking.
58. See id. at 195 tbl.2-6.
59. See id. at 186 tbl.2-3.
60. See id. at 198-201 tbls.2-7 & 2-8. Our estimates are based on extracting data from
the tables for the period 1983 to 2002. We adjusted the totals to exclude voluntary measures, and we
included only those provisions of Standards 105 and 214 that took effect prior to 1974.
61. We recognize that it may take six to eight years after a standard takes effect before
its benefits begin to be significantly felt, as the safety features it requires are only gradually introduced
to the fleet and pre-standard cars are retired. Full penetration in all registered vehicles takes much longer
(decades) as the fleet turnover rate is slow. See infra note 363. That said, the period of Agency activity
covered in the study-some thirty-five years-is surely adequate to assess standards taking effect at
least as late as the mid-1990s, should they have had any demonstrable effect. See infra Part VI for a
discussion of the 2015 sequel to the 2004 Lives Saved study.
62. See infra Part VII.
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A. Executive Action
Ronald Reagan was swept into power in January 1981 promising
economic recovery. A central plank of his platform was regulatory relief,
especially relief for the beleaguered automobile industry. Reagan certainly had
a point when he portrayed auto manufacturers as the poster children for
economic deterioration. At the time he took office, domestic auto producers
were hemorrhaging sales, profits, and jobs on an unprecedented scale.
63
NHTSA, nonetheless, must have felt it was the victim of mistaken identity
when the new Administration singled it out in the lineup of suspects as the
main culprit, along with EPA, responsible for industry's misfortunes. Reagan
claimed that "strangling regulation," including safety regulation, was the root
cause of the auto industry's dire straits.64 In fact, as we have seen, NHTSA had
not implemented any significant safety rules since 1974 and would not do so
for another several years (until the ultimate implementation of Standard 208).
The facts notwithstanding, Reagan's team proceeded to shower its
attentions on NHTSA within days of taking office. In rapid succession, the
Administration suspended various "midnight" rules that NHTSA had
promulgated in the waning days of the Carter Administration;65 formed a
special cabinet-level task force on the auto industry to tend to its wounds; and
promulgated a comprehensive package of regulatory relief measures for auto
companies, which the President personally announced.66 The auto package was
thought to be "[p]robably the most significant single regulatory 'event' during
63. See Stephen D. Cohen, The Route to Japan's Voluntary Export Restraints on
Automobiles: An Analysis of the U.S. Government's Decision-Making Process in 1981 (Am. Univ. Sch.
Int'l Serv., Working Paper No. 20, 1983), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/japan/scohenwp.htm.
64. MARISSA M. GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 43 (2000).
65. See Memorandum from Ronald Reagan to the Secretaries of Twelve Agencies,
Postponing Pending Federal Regulations, 1 PUB. PAPERS 63 (Jan. 29, 1981)
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=44134; see also Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory
Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REV. 253, 263-64 (1986). Of the thirty-six "frozen" rules,
approximately four were Department of Transportation regulations aimed at the auto industry. Loretta S.
Dunn, Administrative Law-A Look at Judicial Review of the Department of Transportation's
Rescission of the Passive Restraint Standard-Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 11 N. KY. L. REV. 455,457 n.8 (1984).
66. The Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief established a specific Auto
Industry Task Force aimed at reducing regulations and costs to the industry. McGarity, supra note 65, at
263. On April 6, 1981, the EPA and NHTSA submitted to the White House their intent to rescind or
modify thirty-four regulations affecting the auto industry. Dunn, supra note 65, at 459. The NHTSA
relief package entailed rescinding, terminating, delaying, or relaxing safety rules on passive restraints,
fields of view, tire grading, seat belt comfort, multi-piece rims, hydraulic brakes, low tire pressure
warning systems, testing and labeling of batteries, and vehicle identification numbers. The Role of OMB
in Regulation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong. 457-65 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 OMB Hearing]. For all the whoopla,
the NHTSA package was estimated to save the industry only $600 million in capital expenditures over
five years. The Administration said it would save consumers $5 billion over five years. Id. at 423.
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",67 fisSitemotsoththe [Reagan] Administration's first year. In the first sixteen months of the
Administration, NHTSA rescinded or relaxed existing rules, terminated
pending rulemaking proceedings in twenty-one instances, and proposed similar
68actions in nineteen more.
A program of "regulatory reform" accompanied Reagan's program of
"regulatory relief." In tandem with the Administration's suspension, delay,
withdrawal, and rescission of numerous regulatory initiatives and proposals at
NHTSA, Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291. That Order imposed on many
agencies, including NHTSA, the most extensive and rigorous standards for
regulatory cost-benefit analysis theretofore ever applied in the United States.6 9
Executive Order 12,291 was greeted with outright hostility in Congress,
specifically the Democrat-controlled House, where it was seen as heavy-handed
encroachment on the jurisdiction and prerogatives of the legislature.7 °
Reagan's appointees at OMB, charged with overseeing implementation of
the Order, vigorously disagreed, noting that the Order expressly applied only to
the evaluation of regulations "to the extent permitted by law."71 As an effort to
"increase agency accountability" and "insure well-reasoned regulations,"
Executive Order 12,291 was grounded, they asserted, in the President's
constitutional obligation under Article II, Section 3 to "take care that the laws
shall be faithfully executed.72 Referring to the operations of the Task Force
responsible for administering Executive Order 12,291, its Executive Director
testified, "We think that the appropriate characterization of what is going on is
that the President is seeing to it that the laws are faithfully executed. Now there
is a Constitution. The President does have the authority and the responsibility
to see that the laws are faithfully executed.73
There was, however, an uncomfortable disjunction between Reagan's
regulatory relief and regulatory reform programs. Very few, if any, of
NHTSA's decisions to suspend, withdraw, or rescind regulatory initiatives at
the urging of its new executive overseers seem to have been accompanied by
analysis satisfying the rigorous standards of rationality contemplated by
67. GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY
DILEMMA 125 (1984); see also Teresa M. Schwartz, A Product Safety Agenda for the 1990s, 45 WASH.
& LEEL. REV. 1355, 1357 (1988).
68. Oversight of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 97th Cong. 50-53
(1982) (statement of Clarence Ditlow, Director, Center for Auto Safety).
69. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 at 431-34 (1982) (suspended by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993)).
70. See generally 1981 OMB Hearing, supra note 66 (recording that representatives
raised multiple objections to the Order). A researcher at the Congressional Research Service quickly
weighed in with a scholarly article attacking the Order's constitutionality. See Morten Rosenberg,
Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive
Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981).
71. Exec. Order No. 12,291,3 C.F.R. § 127.
72. 1981 OMB Hearing, supra note 66, at 55-56.
73. Id. at 56 (statement of James C. Miller III, Administrator for Information and
Regulatory Affairs, OMB, and Executive Director, Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief).
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Executive Order 12,291. Exhibit one for this proposition was NHTSA's order
rescinding Standard 208,74 which the Supreme Court in 1983 unanimously
found was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in
accordance with law.75 Shortly after the decision, Reagan dismantled his Task
Force on Regulatory Relief, and the pace of deregulation throughout
government slowed considerably.76
B. Inside NHTSA
The Court's invalidation of NHTSA's passive restraints rule rescission in
1983 was not, however, the end of the deregulation story at NHTSA. Five more
years remained in the Reagan Presidency, to be followed by four years of the
Presidency of George H.W. Bush, who had chaired Reagan's Task Force on
Regulatory Relief. During much of this period, the Executive deployed its
formidable arsenal of weaponry to deactivate the 1966 regulatory regime. A
primary weapon in the arsenal was the presidential power of appointment,
specifically the power to appoint NHTSA administrators who either had no
expertise in auto safety, were openly hostile to its rulemaking mission, or both.
Reagan's first choice to run NHTSA was Raymond Peck, a coal industry
lobbyist, who served as NHTSA Administrator from 1981 to 1983. Peck
presented few, if any, qualifications for the position, apart from his steadfast
commitment to the deregulatory ambitions of the Reagan Administration. At
his confirmation hearing, Peck articulated his regulatory philosophy in these
terms:
I fully subscribe to the sharp focus of this Administration on regulatory
responsibility. I share the view that the Federal Government should
regulate only where regulation can be shown to be cost effective and there
is no practicable alternative to regulation . . . . Some of the regulations
issued by the agency in the past may be found not to be effective under the
74. See 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (Oct. 29, 1981) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571). Although
NHTSA did determine that the rescission was a "major rule" and thus required a Regulatory Impact
Analysis under Executive Order 12,291, the Agency found it "difficult to provide a reliable estimate of
any adverse safety effects of rescinding the automatic restraint requirements." Id. at 53,426. The Agency
noted the "lack of any directly relevant data on the most important issue" and other difficulties in
determining a reliable indication of the benefits of the rule. Id. at 53,420. Thus, the rescission was
predicated on "uncertainty about the public acceptability and probable usage rate of ... automatic
restraints" as well as a concern that "adverse public reaction to the cost and presence of automatic
restraints could have a significant adverse effect on present and future public acceptance of highway
safety efforts." Id. at 53,419.
75. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56
(1983).
76. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT'S
FINAL REPORT ON REGULATORY RELIEF (1983) (claiming that the Task Force "rationalized the
rulemaking process and slowed the growth of new rules").
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application of these criteria. These should and will be considered for
revocation.77
Peck's standard for regulation was striking. He embraced a kind of least
restrictive means test under which auto safety standards were to be avoided if
there were any "practicable" alternative. Because "driver error" was fingered as
the cause of most accidents, it was possible to argue that persuading people to
drive more safely-an approach historically left primarily to the states-was a
"practicable alternative" to regulating vehicle safety. Peck's approach could be
understood as a prescription for returning regulation to the decentralized
behavioral modification strategies of the 1950s and shutting down the Agency's
standard-setting program altogether. That, in effect, is what Peck and his
successor, Diane Steed (a former OMB regulatory analyst), proceeded to do.78
An account by Professor Marissa Golden of the Agency's internal
workings during this period makes clear that both Steed and Peck brought
rulemaking to a grinding halt by requiring NHTSA staff to study and restudy
regulatory proposals without ever acting on them.79 For example, as Professor
Golden writes:
In the mid-1980s, the agency was considering a proposal for a rule
requiring child-resistant hooks in the rear seats of automobiles. Although
the estimated cost was one dollar per car, Peck kept sending the proposal
back and requesting a hook that could be installed for ninety-seven cents
per car. The engineer who related this story to me added, "Ray never said,
'I just don't want to do it."' Yet it was clear to this engineer that Peck did
not want to issue this regulation; he just did not want to go on record as
opposing it.
80
77. Nomination-Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:
Hearing before the S. Comm, on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 97th Cong. 3, 12 (1981) (statement of
Raymond A. Peck, Jr., Administrator, NHTSA).
78. NHTSA policy under Peck's successor, Diane Steed, focused on behavioral
modification strategies to the virtual exclusion of motor vehicle safety standards. Under Steed, apart
from passive restraints, the Agency promulgated a single new standard, dealing with center-mounted
rear brake lights. The lion's share of agency activity was devoted to such issues as drunk driving, seat
belt use, and driver training. See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 1357 n.15 (citing NHTSA Authorization
and Oversight: Hearings on H.R. 2248 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Consumer Prot. & Fin. of
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 99th Cong. 31 (1985) (statement of Sen. Timothy Wirth)
(testifying that NHTSA had focused almost exclusively on modifying consumer behavior and had
"largely ignored" safety standards)); see also Hearing on NHTSA Authorization Act of 1989 Before the
Subcomm. on the Consumer of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 101st Cong. 94 (1989)
(statement of Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen) (stating that during Reagan years, NHTSA
issued only one new safety standard, which had been proposed by the prior administration); Phil Frame,
NHTSA Made Inroads Despite Politics, Fireworks, AUTO. NEWS (Sept. 9, 1996),
http://www.autonews.com/article/19960909/ANA/609090742/nhtsa-made-inroads-despite-politics-
fireworks (noting that apart from conditional reinstatement of Standard 208 following the Court's State
Farm decision, the Agency's output under Steed included drunk driving programs, CAFE cuts, and a
standard on center high-mounted tail lights).
79. GOLDEN, supra note 64.
80. Id. at 46.
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The ninety-seven cents gambit was by no means an outlier.8 And the
legacy of judicial reversal in the 1970s infused NHTSA's administrative culture
in the 1980s in other ways that served the deregulatory purposes of the Reagan
Administration. Professor Golden reported that the Agency's defeats in court
on major rulemaking initiatives, as well as the interlock political fiasco, were
still fresh in the minds of agency staff. The desire to avoid additional judicial
setbacks, in her words, "was echoed by the careerists I interviewed a decade
later."82
The net result of this judicially inspired trauma was an exceedingly
cautious mindset among the professional staff that elevated "the avoidance of
future embarrassments like the ones experienced in the past," a goal that was
even "more important than expanding the agency's budget or engaging in high-
volume regulatory activity.83 A risk-averse staff was unlikely to swim against
the deregulatory tide.
Research without end was by no means the only source of demoralization
for NHTSA rulemakers during the Reagan years. The staff also faced the
prospect of being fired in one of the many "reductions in force" (RIFs) that
punctuated this period. The result was the mass exodus of mid-level engineers
whose talents were essential to rulemaking, coupled with the marginalization of
those who stayed because they had nowhere else to go.84
The RIF-inspired "voluntary" downsizing-nearly a third of the entire
professional staff-was accompanied by corresponding cuts in other agency
resources. NHTSA's overall operating budget fell from $259 million in 1979 to
$211 million in 1988.85 And, of course, these cuts in manpower and money
81. Professor Golden writes:
[A] telling aspect of the appointees' management style was the manner in which the
Reagan appointees handled rule-making activity. Both Peck and Steed ran the
agency in a way that agency careerists felt slowed productivity without directly
challenging the agency's mission. For example, career recommendations were rarely
rejected outright. Instead, Peck and Steed would send proposals back to the lower
levels of the agency and requested more research without ever directly commenting
on the merits of the proposals or vetoing them. The interviewees' comments in this
regard are revealing:
* "No one ever straight-out said deregulation."
* "In most cases, the decision was long delay but not rejection."
* "Everything was researched to death.
* "They just called for more research."
* "Under Reagan, decisions just were not made but were sent back to
generate more information. Things were left hanging."
Id.
82. Id. at 57.
83. Id. at 59-60.
84. See id. at 50-51.
85. Id. at 44.
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came at a time when the Administration was imposing significant new analytic
and documentary burdens in ostensible pursuit of rationalizing regulation.
Amidst this turmoil, only one constituency at the Agency truly prospered. The
research and development staff gained new autonomy because Reagan's
political appointees had no rulemaking action plan. Researchers were free to
pursue whatever interested them .86
Thus did the Reagan Administration prolong by many years the collapse
of rulemaking at NHTSA that a skeptical judiciary had precipitated a decade
before. The Administration's objection to regulation was grounded above all in
ideology- ideology that the electorate had endorsed-not he legal analytics of
the courts. And, to be sure, some of the tactics employed by the Reagan
Administration -budget cutbacks, staff downsizing, increased DOT secretarial
control of agency decision making-were well within the comfort zone of the
Executive's discretionary power to faithfully execute the laws. After all,
Reagan had run precisely on a platform of deregulation, specifically citing the
automobile industry. Ideas matter, and elections have consequences.
But law also matters. Murray Wiedenbaum, a principal architect of
Reagan's regulatory strategy, stressed the importance of seeking changes to
agencies' organic statutes in pursuing the President's regulatory objectives.
87
The Administration promised to do just that, but never followed through in
NHTSA's case. Considered as a whole, it is hard to see Reagan's assault on
NHTSA as the faithful execution of its extant statutory mandate. But NHTSA's
political leadership under Reagan well understood one of legal culture's most
fundamental lessons. Administrative agencies are usually on high legal ground
when they do nothing. Separation of powers provides the protective buffer that
permits the judiciary to redress the excesses of other branches when those
excesses take the form of positive action. But at the same time, absent
statutorily imposed rulemaking deadlines, that same doctrine limits the
judiciary's perceived authority to address executive inaction, whatever its
motives may be.88
Steed, the longest-serving Administrator in NHTSA's history, had little to
fear from the courts in pursuing a do-nothing course of perpetual research and
deep-sixed regulatory proposals. In a system of separated powers, courts do not
see themselves as having authority to set or force the agendas of the political
86. Id. at 53.
87. See Murray L. Wiedenbaum, Regulatory Reform Under the Reagan
Administration, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT 16, 19-20 (George C. Eads
& Michael Fix eds., 1984).
88. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Law and Engineering: In Search of the Law-Science
Problem, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 147 (2003) ("Most other cases during the last decade
involving NHTSA related to the non-safety aspects of its jurisdiction, particularly its power to adopt
mileage standards for automobile fleets. The agency won all of these cases, but its posture was
revealing. Almost all were suits attempting to force the agency to exercise regulatory authority that it
declined to use. In short, when subjected to substantive review, NHTSA still seems to do no better than
chance in the courts of appeals. Unless it does not do anything. Then it always wins.").
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branches. But a tripartite separation of powers system provides opportunities as
well as constraints. For NHTSA, the open question was whether the legislative
branch would ride to its rescue to reenergize regulation notwithstanding an
executive branch determined to do nothing, except deregulate. The
congressional cavalry did indeed arrive, but its renegade commander implicitly
declared allegiance to NHTSA's executive antagonists.
C. The People's House
Reagan's deregulatory agenda, in particular the issuance of Executive
Order 12,291 and its accompanying administration by OMB, provoked outrage
in Congress. While the Republican-controlled Senate was comparatively
acquiescent, ground zero for opposition was the Democrat-controlled House,
and, in particular, the highly influential House Energy and Commerce
Committee. Congressman John Dingell, the committee's immensely powerful
Chair,89 set the tone in opening hearings on June 18, 1981, before the
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations to consider "the role
of OMB in regulation."90 In most cases, Dingell, who had been appointed
Committee Chair within days of Reagan's oath of office, was furious at the
Reagan Administration's approach to regulation.
Dingell stressed that the President's initiatives were not only an
encroachment on congressional jurisdiction, but also an act of sabotage of the
rule of law itself:
Regulatory reform is a subject that should command all our attention. It is
needed. The Chair and this Subcommittee have been and will continue to
work hard toward that end. The Chair and this Subcommittee, however,
will not participate in a process that circumvents existing law and tramples
on procedural protections in the name of reform. We are, after all, a nation
of laws and not of men.
9 1
For most issues, executive attempts to constrain the implementation of
liberal legislation were especially likely to provoke Dingell's ire. He was an
old-school New Deal Democrat. One news account put it succinctly: "Dingell
has left his mark on nearly every significant piece of legislation in the last fifty
years, from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the creation of Medicare the
following year, to his strong support of a series of environmental bills in the
1970s and 80s."'92 Dingell wrote the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act
89. Speaker Sam Rayburn first appointed Dingell to the House Energy and Commerce
Committee in 1957. He served on the Committee until his retirement in 2015.
90. 1981 OMB Hearing, supra note 66.
91. Id. at 2.
92. Barbara Maranzani, 57 Years, 177 Days, and Counting: John Dingell Jr. Makes
History, HISTORY (June 7, 2013), http://www.history.com/news/57-years-177-days-and-counting-john-
dingell-jr-makes-history.
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and the 1973 Endangered Species Act. He was a strong proponent of national
health insurance, introducing legislation on that subject every term he served up
to the passage of the Affordable Care Act, in which he played an active role.
However, Dingell parted company with his liberal colleagues on the
regulation of the automobile industry.93 Dingell's ties to auto manufacturers
were professional, personal, and long standing. Ford's world headquarters was
located in Dingell's congressional district. Two of Dingell's sons worked for
the automobile industry. His second wife, Debbie, was a lobbyist for General
Motors and an heir to the Fisher Brothers' fortune.94 When it came to Dingell's
ties to the industry, Ralph Nader was apoplectic, calling Dingell "a mean-
tempered legislator long indentured to the Big Three auto companies."95 Nader
added, "Given his position, his drive, his corporate allies, and his
Machiavellian skills, Dingell can now be considered the No. 1 enemy of
consumers on Capitol Hill. 96
Simply stated, when it came to auto safety regulation, Dingell regarded
congressional oversight as a constituent service, the important constituent being
the auto industry. Consider columnist Jack Anderson's account in 1989:
Dingell has championed the cause of consumers on many issues, but when
it comes to auto safety, he has a blind spot. As one auto safety expert put
it, "Dingell is the congressman from Detroit, not the congressman for the
United States." Since 1981, Dingell has used his powerful position as
chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee to stall almost
every important piece of proposed auto safety legislation. The Center for
Auto Safety, a private group that lobbies for stronger legislation, estimates
that 100,000 lives could have been saved had all the safety measures
Dingell has opposed gone into effect when they were first put on the
table.
97
The membership of the House Energy and Commerce Committee
contained many champions of NHTSA's mission and the implementation of its
93. One other notable area in which Dingell differed from his liberal peers was gun
control. David Maraniss, John Dingell Calls an End to His Legendary House Career, WASH. POST (Feb.
24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/John-dingell-calls-an-end-to-his-legendary-house-
career/2014/02/24/566fae50-9dae- 11e3-9ba6-800d 1192dO8b-story.html.
94. See Ben Terris, For Debbie Dingell, A Life Primed for Politics, WASH. POST (Feb.
25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/for-debbie-dingell-a-life-primed-for-
politics/2014/02/25/2062465e-9e6e-Ile3-9ba6-800d1192d08b-story.html. In anticipation of Dingell's
retirement in January 2015, his wife ran successfully to fill his seat. The Dingell family (John Sr., John
Jr., and Mrs. Dingell) have held Michigan's twelfth congressional district (and its predecessor districts)
for over eighty years.
95. Nader Unleashes Attack Against Airbag Opponent, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS,
Aug. 28, 1980, at 7.
96. Id. Nader had tried to prevent Dingell's appointment to the House Energy and
Commerce Chair in 1981, disseminating a highly unusual personal attack in the form of a twenty-five
page diatribe focusing on Dingell's well-known opposition to the airbag.
97. Jack Anderson, Auto Industry Has a Friend in Congress, FREE LANCE STAR, Dec.
12, 1989, at 17.
Yale Journal on Regulation
rulemaking powers: Al Gore of Tennessee, Tim Wirth of Colorado, Ed Markey
of Massachusetts, James Scheurer of New York, and Henry Waxman of
California, among others. "The Truck," as Dingell was known, simply flattened
them. For example, when Scheurer came to the defense of the air bag (at the
top of Dingell's hit list), Scheurer found that he lost his subcommittee
chairmanship in a "reorganization."98
D. Bad Luck, Checks and Balances, and the Rule of Law
Although there are other candidates-1974 for example-1981 was, no
doubt, annus horribilis for the rulemaking office at NHTSA. Surveying the
wreckage wrought a decade earlier by judicial reversals, the rulemakers could
be forgiven for feeling cursed by the simultaneous appearance in 1981 of a
newly elected President who seldom met a regulation he liked and a newly
appointed House Energy and Commerce Chair who regarded congressional
oversight as a golden opportunity to protect the very industry NHTSA was
supposed to regulate. This was random bad luck, plain and simple. But legal
culture has much to say about how bad the bad luck is, the duration of its
impact, and the prospect of palliatives to soothe the misfortunes it brings.
At one end of Pennsylvania Avenue, the Reagan Administration was in a
hurry to do nothing at NHTSA. To be sure, it did not get everything it wanted.
NHTSA's rescission of its most important safety rule, FMVSS 208 on passive
restraints, was overturned by the Supreme Court in the State Farm case after the
Agency's failure to offer a plausible explanation for its action.99 From the
Administration's perspective, State Farm's application of "hard look" judicial
review to the rescission of rules was hardly good news. But the Reagan team
could take comfort in that opinion's reminder that regulators who never make
up their minds have little to fear from the judiciary. Although the Court
affirmed the proposition that courts should review rescissions of rules with the
same intensity as they review a new rule's promulgation, it implicitly agreed
that, had the rule not been promulgated in the first place, judicial review would
be extremely deferential, bordering on non-justiciability. Safety partisans
wishing to provoke more aggressive rulemaking were unlikely to receive much
assistance from the judiciary.'
98. Id.
99. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
100. That said, NHTSA's perfectionist strategy during the Reagan Administration was
sometimes sufficiently transparent that safety partisans were able to get a reviewing court to force
continued regulation-at least where, as in State Farm, the agency was "suspending" an existing rule
rather than merely failing to act. See Pub. Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting as
arbitrary, capricious, and "silly" NHTSA's suspension of treadwear grading requirements of FMVSS
210). At the end of its ruling, the Court in Steed made clear that it was exasperated with the Agency's
failure faithfully to execute the law:
NHTSA's rationale for suspending the treadwear grading requirements read like a
"how to" manual for the compulsive perfectionist. No grading procedure could meet
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The interplay of NHTSA's cumbersome, judicially driven, internal
rulemaking procedures and the Reagan Administration's rescission of FMVSS
208, at issue in State Farm, illuminate another dynamic of legal culture in the
Ice Age. Rescission of Standard 208 prior to its implementation was available
to the Reagan Administration because of procedural delays inside NHTSA.
Moreover, the "midnight rules" that were delayed and then cancelled had a
similar history. NHTSA may never have had an administrator more committed
to the 1966 vision of auto safety than Carter's appointee, Joan Claybrook. A
Nader prot6gd, Claybrook was present at the creation of the original Act (as a
congressional staffer working on the issue) and served as an assistant to
NHTSA's first administrator in the earliest days of the Agency's operations.
Rulemaking activity at NHTSA was frenetic during her 1976-1980 term.
But activity is not output, and many of Claybrook's initiatives were still
pending at the time Reagan took office. As a practical matter, the internal
rulemaking process made it difficult for even the most ardent regulator to
complete rules within a single presidential term. And the protective shield of
State Farm's hard look approach to regulatory rescissions applied only to final
rules, not pending proposals. Much of Claybrook's legacy was thus easy prey
for her successors.
On Capitol Hill, what might be called the "internal law" of Congress
provided support for the Administration's policies. Legislative oversight is a
core element of legal culture's system of checks and balances, a principal
means by which Congress holds executive officials accountable for the
implementation of delegated authority. It is an implied constitutional power:
"[T]he power to make laws implie[s] the power to see whether they are
faithfully executed."'1 But legislative oversight is largely operationalized
through the congressional system of standing committees. That system is
governed by an obscure body of internal standards and practices, a sort of
subculture of legal culture, which in many respects does not fit comfortably
with majoritarian values. There is no "Due Process of Lawmaking,"'0 2 and
congressional failure to follow even the procedures prescribed in the
the standards now embraced by the agency commanded by Congress to provide
consumers with useful information on the performance of tires. NHTSA's approach
to fulfilling an undisputed statutory mandate is to withhold any regulation until
every i is dotted and t is crossed. That is not what Congress commanded the agency
to do, nor is it reasonable behavior by an agency established to execute policy, rather
than achieve quantitative perfection in its execution. The agency itself, as well as a
reviewing court, have given an altogether different reading than the one now
advanced in defense of the agency's do-nothing administration of section 203 of the
Act. We cannot imagine a more complete flouting of the statutory scheme.
Id.
101. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41079, CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT: AN OVERVIEW 5 n.15 (2010).
102. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
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Constitution will not be judicially scrutinized unless a statute reveals a
procedural failure on its face.1° 3
Each house creates its own rules governing the seniority system, the
chair's prerogatives, committee organization and appointments, allocations of
jurisdiction, and conflicts of interest. Longstanding unwritten internal norms
presume the legitimacy of partisan and electoral self-interest. The committee
process thus runs a high risk of capture by special or parochial interests; a risk
that is in tension with oversight's grand role in the constitutional framework.
Any corrective mechanisms for these potential distortions of the will of the
legislature lay almost exclusively in the political, not the legal realm.
Dingell was surely not the first or last elected official to treat a
congressional committee chairmanship as an exercise in constituent service.
Nor was he unique in mastering the inner workings of the legislative world for
this purpose. At the same time, Dingell's leadership of the subcommittee on
oversight, as it relates to oversight of NHTSA, can hardly be characterized as
an effort to determine whether officials were obeying the law and complying
with legislative intent. Nor, as head of the Energy and Commerce Committee,
was he prepared to go to the whole House with proposed or Senate-approved
legislation designed to re-energize NHTSA's rulemaking. That may have been
his approach to other health and safety topics, but not to auto safety regulation.
Dingell was, of course, but one extreme example of the autocracy of the
chair that pervades congressional decision making. And autocrats can
eventually be unseated. The Gingrich revolution of 1995 ended Dingell's
fourteen-year reign. And although his influence over automobile safety
regulation continued in one form or another until he was dislodged once again
from the chairmanship of the House Energy and Commerce Committee in
2008, the times were changing. The legal and political environment that
produced the Ice Age appeared to be abating. Thaw was in the air. How would
NHTSA respond? Could it turn a new page, or would the Agency continue to
be haunted by it past?
IV. Climate Change: An Ambivalent Congress Acts
Paralysis of rulemaking was not an unavoidable consequence of judicial
review or the broader legal culture in which NHTSA found itself. Although
Dingell blocked virtually all of the agency-forcing legislation directed at
NHTSA during his tenure as chairman,°4 Congress could act when the Truck's
103. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
104. See S. REP. No. 102-83, at 2 (1991) (noting that in the past nine years, the Senate
approved without opposition three reauthorization packages containing numerous agency-forcing
provisions that all died in House). By contrast, the reauthorization measure introduced by Dingell
contained no agency-forcing provisions whatsoever. See H.R 1497, 100th Cong. (1987); see also
Reauthorization of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Consumer of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 102d Cong. 26 (1991) (statement of
Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen) (stating that House Energy and Commerce Committee
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vetogate was finally removed. Moreover, congressional choices generally do
not require rational justification before the judiciary. As a court reviewing and
partially invalidating NHTSA's rule on tire retread labeling commented, "No
administrative procedure test applies to an Act of Congress" when upholding
the only parts of the rule that were legislatively mandated.0 5 If Congress
required action on particular performance or equipment standards, industry
would be hard pressed to mount a successful assault against them. During
NHTSA's first two decades, Congress had, albeit on rare occasions, mandated
the adoption of specific motor vehicle safety standards.0 6 Beginning in 1991
but especially after 2000, Congress seemed to have had a change of heart. Its
efforts to revitalize NHTSA's rulemaking mandate through legislative direction
appear far more consistently pro-rulemaking and far more ambitious than those
adopted during NHTSA's earlier years.
A. Overview of Agency-Forcing Statutes: 1991-2012
NHTSA's hibernation during the Ice Age did not go unnoticed on Capitol
Hill. Between 1991 and 2012-and especially after Dingell lost his
chairmanship in 1995-Congress enacted eight statutes directing NHTSA to
adopt a wide variety of safety standards in specific areas. Not only did the
statutes collectively mandate action on a long and detailed list of items, they
also typically required the Agency to commence rulemaking proceedings
within a tight timetable.
Broadly speaking, agency-forcing statutes enacted during this period
conformed to one of two models. The first template could be called the
omnibus directive, and appeared, at least on its face, to be aimed at
reenergizing NHTSA's technology-forcing mission. The omnibus directive
model, adopted in three statutes, featured multiple rulemaking mandates often
involving some of the most complex and promising safety technologies that
NHTSA had ever considered: side impact protection, electronic stability
leadership had prevented reauthorization of NHTSA since 1982, creating "almost a decade of neglect
and obfuscation"); Paula Dwyer, Fearless Crusader or Self-Serving Kingpin?, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 28,
1991), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1991-10-27/fearless-crusader-or-self-serving-kingpin
(reporting that Dingell prevented debate on safety standards, blocked long-term reauthorization of
NHTSA, and stymied measures to require air bags and improve fuel economy); Anderson, supra note 97
(reporting that since 1981, Dingell had used his position as chairman of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee to stall almost every important piece of proposed auto safety legislation).
105. Nat'l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Assoc. v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 37 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
106. For example, the 1966 Act directed the Agency to issue its first generation of
rules "based upon existing safety standards," which were understood to be the GSA standards then in
effect for government vehicles, not later than January 31, 1967. MVSA, § 103(h). Similarly, the 1974
amendments required the Agency to promulgate safety standards in eight areas of school bus safety
design. Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492, § 202, 88 Stat.
1,470 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1,392 (2012)).
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control, ejection mitigation, anti-lock brakes, improved passive restraints, and
others.107
The second template could be called the single-purpose directive. The five
agency-forcing statutes0 8 conforming to this model were more modest in their
ambition. Single-purpose measures tended to be narrowly drawn and typically
contemplated the protection of a special population -children, the elderly,
short-statured women, and the sight impaired and other disabled persons.
Single-purpose measures rarely, if ever, envisioned the development of novel
technologies. The means of complying with them were usually well within
industry's reach and often already available as options on many models. Single-
purpose directives fell squarely within the tradition of the 1974 school bus
amendments mandating safety rules for the protection of school children and,
more broadly, the equal protection legacy of the 1966 Act.
1. Omnibus Directives
a. ISTEA (1991)
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA)
was the first and in some respects most sweeping of the period's agency-
forcing statutes.10 9 Enacted by a Democratically controlled House and Senate in
the second half of George H.W. Bush's Presidency, ISTEA required NHTSA to
conduct rulemaking proceedings in eight specific areas: (1) rollover prevention
in passenger cars, light trucks, and multipurpose vehicles (MPVs); (2) the
extension of side impact protection from passenger cars to light trucks and
MPVs; (3) improved child booster seat design; (4) improved seat belt design
for children and other short people; (5) improved head impact protection from
interior components; (6) mandatory air bags; (7) improved brake performance
in passenger cars, including anti-lock brakes; and (8) improved brake
performance for heavy trucks, also including anti-lock brakes.11 0 For each of
107. See Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), Pub. L.
No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 2,083, 2,083-87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1,392 (2012));
Transportation Recall, Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1,800 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30170 (2012)); Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat.
1,144, 10,301-10 (2005) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,128 (2012)).
108. Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), Pub. L. No. 105-178,
112 Stat. 107, 7,103 (1998) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30,127 (2012)); Anton's Law, Pub. L.
No. 107-318, 116 Stat. 2,772 (2002) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30,127 (2012)); Cameron
Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.1 10-189, 122 Stat. 639 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30,111 (2012)); Pedestrian Safety Enhancement Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.111-
373, 124 Stat. 4,086 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30,111 (2012)); Moving Ahead for Progress in
the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 757 (2012) (codified in scattered
sections of 23 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C, and 49 U.S.C. (2012)).
109. See ISTEA, 105 Stat. at 2,081-87.
110. Id. at 2,083-87, 2,157.
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these areas, ISTEA specified when the Agency should commence rulemaking
proceedings and how long they should last.
ISTEA's treatment of air bags and anti-lock brakes was especially
noteworthy. At the time of ISTEA's passage, Standard 208 required passive
restraints but not air bags. Manufacturers could comply with the regulation by
installing automatic belts or passive interiors as alternatives. While the Senate
version of ISTEA had contemplated a legislative mandate directly requiring
airbags,"' the conference committee for ISTEA stopped short of that approach.
Still, the committee otherwise left little maneuvering room respecting
NHTSA's statutory obligation to require air bags by rule in both front outboard
positions.112
ISTEA spoke with similar clarity on antilock brakes for heavy trucks and
buses.113
Congress demanded that the Agency resume rulemaking on antilock
brakes for commercial trucks, a proceeding that had been stymied by judicial
invalidation of NHTSA's stopping distance performance standard thirteen years
earlier. From a technological perspective there was, of course, nothing new
here. Air bags and antilock brakes were the two great technology-forcing
initiatives of the 1970s. And although both technologies were in widespread
use, requiring them in all vehicles had been mired in controversy and litigation
for nearly two decades. Now it appeared Congress was determined to break the
logjam. And yet, ISTEA was not a critical inflection point in Congress's
approach to auto safety regulation. Its next major piece of omnibus legislation
did not appear until nearly a decade later.
b. TREAD (2000)
The Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and
Documentation (TREAD) Act of 2000 was passed by a Republican-controlled
Congress and signed by President Clinton in the final days of his
Administration. 4 TREAD directed NHTSA to take regulatory action in five
areas: (1) tire endurance and resistance; (2) tire labeling, (3) dynamic testing on
rollover resistance; (4) tire monitoring to alert drivers of underinflated tires;
and (5) improved child restraints.115 Political support for TREAD was
overwhelming. It passed by voice vote without opposition.
Ill. See S.REP. NO. 102-83, at6(1991).
112. ISTEA directed NHTSA to amend Standard 208 no later than September 1, 1993,
to require airbags in front positions in accordance with a fixed timetable: ninety-five percent of new cars
by Model Year (MY) 1997, and all new cars thereafter; and eighty percent of light trucks and other
multipurpose vehicles by MY 1998 and all thereafter. ISTEA, 105 Stat. at 2,084-85.
113. See id. at 2,157.
114. TREAD Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1,800 (2000) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 30,101 (2012)).
115. TREAD Act, 114 Stat. at 1,805-06.
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c. SAFETEA-LU (2005)
Provisions of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), enacted in 2005, comprised
Congress's third and final omnibus agency-forcing directive. 6 SAFETEA-LU
was passed by a Republican-controlled House and Senate and signed by
President G.W. Bush in the first half of his second term. The provisions
applicable to NHTSA were part of a massive funding and authorization bill that
allocated $286.4 billion to improve and maintain the surface transportation
system of the United States.
SAFETEA-LU contained three sets of provisions requiring NHTSA to
issue new safety standards."7 The first set addressed rollover crashes and
instructed the Agency to issue standards to (1) reduce the incidence of
rollovers; (2) reduce the ejection of vehicle occupants taking into account
"various ejection mitigation systems"; (3) strengthen door locks and door
retention; and (4) improve roof strength."8 The second set of provisions
directed NHTSA to enhance side impact protection, and the third set mandated
that the Agency to require switches for power windows that raise the window
only when the switch is pulled up or out."9 All of the provisions set specific
deadlines for final agency action.
2. Special Purpose Directives
Congress passed five statutes aimed at fairly particularized targets
between 1998 and 2012. Their eclectic subject matter required NHTSA to
mandate advanced airbag technology to minimize risks to children and small
passengers; develop performance standards for restraints for children weighing
more than fifty pounds; consider standards requiring power windows that
automatically reverse if they detected an obstruction; and assess the imposition
of minimum sound requirements for hybrid and electric cars. The Agency was
also required to undertake rulemaking proceedings within a prescribed
timetable to address child safety seats and child restraint anchorage systems, as
well as the provision of seat belt warning systems for designated seating
positions in the rear seat.z°
116. SAFETEA-LU, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144, 1939-43 (2005) (codified at
23 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
117. SAFETEA-LU, 119 Stat. at 1,939-40, 1,942.
118. (d.
119. Id.
120. See session laws cited in supra note 108.
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B. Deciphering the Message
Imagine you are the NHTSA Administrator in 2012 contemplating the
torrent of agency-forcing legislation that has engulfed your agency over the
past twenty years. What was the legislative bottom line? Do these statutes
constitute a message that he Agency should return to the technology-forcing
vision of 1966?
Your first thought might be recognition that the statutes were enacted over
a period during which the pendulum of American regulatory politics swung
wildly. 2 ' The statutes spanned four presidencies: George H.W. Bush, Bill
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama-not an era distinguished by
bipartisan consensus on regulatory policy. The prospect that NHTSA's
legislative and executive overseers had reached a unified vision of auto safety
over such a prolonged and polarized period, let alone a vision resurrecting the
Great Society, seems dim. In that case, the search for coherence might be a
fool's errand. Perhaps the statues comprised little more than a grab bag of
compromises occasioned by contingencies unique to each statute. On the other
hand, the lavish use of deadlines was a common thread unifying the statutes.
Seen in this light, they did seem to convey at least a basic, if vague, pro-
regulatory message: "do something, and do it soon."
Much of the congressional debate surrounding the statutes tended to
reinforce this impression. For example, several provisions of the omnibus
agency-forcing statutes were explicitly directed at reviving rulemaking
proceedings that had commenced many years before, but had then been
abandoned during the Reagan years. This was obviously an exercise in
resuscitating, not repudiating, initiatives begun in the Agency's rulemaking
heyday.22 Similarly, an implicit theme in the legislative history was that,
absent congressional intervention -more specifically, without legislative
mandates accompanied by explicit deadlines-NHTSA could not be relied
upon to deliver on the promise of the 1966 Act.123 The tone of such discussions
121. At the beginning, Democrats were firmly in control of both the House and
Senate; four years later, the "Gingrich Revolution" swept the Republicans into control of the House for
the first time since 1952. Instability reached the Senate not much later. In the 107th Congress (2001-
2003), control of the Senate switched parties three times.
122. Examples of agency-forcing provisions that sought to revive or strengthen
rulemaking initiatives from the 1970s that had been dropped or neglected during the Reagan
Administration include: the TREAD Act's tire labeling provision, see Firestone Tire Recall: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Tech., 106th Cong. 88 (2000) (statement of Joan Claybrook,
President, Public Citizen), the TREAD Act's tire pressure monitoring rule, see The Recent Firestone
Tire Recall Action, Focusing on the Action as It Pertains to Relevant Ford Vehicles: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade & Consumer Prot. & the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong. 54 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 House Firestone Tire
Recall Hearing] (statement of Sue Bailey, Administrator, NHTSA), and ISTEA's provision on side
impact protection, see S. REP. No. 101-49, at 2 (1989). ISTEA's air bag mandate was perhaps the most
dramatic affirmation in the agency-forcing statutes of the 1966 vision of auto safety.
123. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 102d
Cong. 31 (1991) (statement of Clarence Ditlow, Director, Center for Auto Safety) (arguing that
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suggested that the original vision of auto safety regulation was not an historical
relic.
Upon closer examination, however, a different picture emerges.
Considered in the contextual circumstances of each legislative command, many
of the implicit messages embedded in the statutes were far more ambivalent,
tentative, opaque, nuanced, and even conflicted than the simple statutory texts
or the tone of congressional discourse conveyed.
1. Message One: You're on Your Own
While imposing numerous and varied rulemaking deadlines on the
Agency, Congress did nothing to increase the Agency's capacity to deal with
them. The problem was not just limited NHTSA resources, a lament echoed by
virtually every federal regulatory agency that has ever existed. The more
fundamental issue was that Congress did not revise-in fact, it did not even
consider revising-the statutory criteria that had tormented NHTSA in court.
Congress demanded action but it did not relax or supplement in any way the
statutory commands of "reasonableness," "practicability," and "objectivity"
that inhabited the original act and had proven so troublesome earlier on judicial
review.
In fact, some of the agency-forcing statutes made the problem of
legislative indeterminacy considerably worse. The statutes imposed deadlines
for their implementation that could short-circuit the elaborate fact finding and
analysis that the Agency believed essential to sustain its rules on judicial
review. At the same time, Congress did nothing to equip the Agency with new
tools to deal with the burdens the courts had imposed in construing these
criteria, to exempt its safety rules from any of the congressionally or
presidentially imposed analytic requirements, or to rethink the timing of
judicial review that had made the industry's full court press so effective.
NHTSA's standards adopted pursuant to the agency-forcing statutes remained
subject to immediate legal challenge for "impracticability," "inappropriateness"
for the covered vehicles, or "unreasonableness" (usually meaning excessive
cost) before anyone even attempted to comply. As NHTSA had learned in its
early years, safety technologies that had not been subjected to considerable on-
the-road experience had great difficulty passing these tests.
In addition, these mandates were agency-forcing but not responsibility-
taking. Congress rarely specified exactly what it wanted the Agency to do or
congressional mandates imposing rulemaking deadlines were vital "to get NHTSA to do the right
thing"); NHTSA Authorization Request: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp., Tourism &
Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong. 478 (1987) (statement of
Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen) (stating that statutory deadlines were needed to "force" the
agency to "behave"); Reauthorization of the National Highway Safety Administration: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 102d Cong. 89-90
(1991) (statement of Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen) (noting that statutory deadlines were
"essential" to enable parties outside the Agency to sue and to limit interference from OMB).
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what technologies it sought to have the Agency compel. Apart from the air bag
mandate, and possibly the power windows up-or-out switch, the only exception
was a provision directly requiring a brake transmission system interlock
(BTSI). But it was difficult to see BTSI as a model for more generalized
rulemaking, let alone technology forcing. BTSI was the subject of a pre-
existing voluntary agreement between the Agency and industry. By the time of
the Act's passage, eighty percent of all cars already incorporated BTSI
technology, and ninety-eight percent were expected to include it before the
Act's legislative mandate took effect.124 Every other rulemaking mandate
imposed by Congress left NHTSA to its own devices to determine whether
there were technologies that could "reasonably," "appropriately," and
"practicably" be deployed to satisfy its statutory commands.
Moreover, whatever the congressional rhetoric surrounding their passage,
not all of these mandates were really mandatory. Critically, a number of
provisions in the agency-forcing statutes explicitly preserved the Agency's
discretion to conclude, after due deliberation in accordance with a prescribed
timetable, that a final rule was not warranted. Hence, if NHTSA did adopt a
rule in these areas, it would not be protected by a legislative mandate that
eliminated "hard look" judicial review, as such a mandate had done in the Tire
Retreaders case.
Perhaps sensing the exposed position in which Congress thrust it, NHTSA
opposed many of the agency-forcing provisions. 25 It argued, among other
124. S. REP. No. 110-275, at 4 (2008). The BTSI statutory requirement merely
codified a voluntary agreement reached by NHTSA with the automobile industry a year and a half
earlier in August 2006. Ninety-eight per cent of all MY 2009 cars were expected to have BTSI before
the statutory requirement even took effect in 2010. Id.
125. See, e.g., NHTSA Reauthorization Request: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Transp., Tourism & Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong. 30
(1989) (statement of Diane Steed, Administrator, NHTSA) (noting that NHTSA deemed the Senate-
passed provision imposing a one year time limit for side impact rulemaking to be "impractical");
NHTSA Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp., Tourism & Hazardous Materials of the H.
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 102d Cong. 9, 20 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 House ISTEA Hearing]
(statements of Jerry Ralph Curry, Administrator, NHTSA) (opposing air bag mandate and other
proposed deadlines for agency action as "micromanagement legislation" and noting that rules via
legislation may cause "irreparable damage"); Reauthorization of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm.
on Energy & Commerce 109th Cong. 11, 15, 18 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 House SAFETEA-LU Hearing]
(statement of Jeffrey W. Runge, Administrator, NHTSA) (noting that the Agency opposes "legislatively
mandated rulemaking actions that displace d liberative research," that the Agency's flexibility is
"severely impaired" by Congressional mandates, and that NHTSA has "bigger fish to fry than worrying
about those deadlines"); see also discussion of ARS power windows infra notes 276-285 and
accompanying text.
Unsurprisingly, industry also opposed rulemaking mandates. Reauthorization of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade &
Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce 109th Cong. 37 (2005). Id. at 37 (statement of
Frederick L. Webber, President, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers) (stating that as a matter of
policy the auto industry opposed rulemaking mandates "requiring that final rules must be issued
regardless of information provided to the Agency through its public notice and comment process").
More recently, the industry has affirmed its opposition to legislative rulemaking mandates. See
Improving Highway and Vehicle Safety: Reauthorization of the National Highway Traffic Safety
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things, that it could not fulfill its procedural obligations under the APA and still
meet the deadlines imposed by Congress; that it needed more time to develop
testing criteria (especially in relation to various kinds of dummies) that would
meet reviewing courts' earlier demands for objectivity and repeatability; and
that rulemaking actions taken prematurely would produce wasteful, time-
consuming litigation. 26 The Agency pleaded with Congress not to drive it back
into the arms of a hostile legal culture. To a significant extent,i27 those pleas
fell on deaf ears.
2. Message Two: Think Small (Less Is More)
Even in areas where Congress demanded that NHTSA act-air bags,
antilock brakes for trucks, and head impact protection from interior
components-the statutory commands, understood in context, seemed cautious
to the point of timidity. For example, at the time of the enactment of ISTEA in
1991, its two most consequential mandates were already forgone conclusions.
Industry was already planning to install airbags in both front outboard positions
in ninety percent of all passenger vehicles by MY 1995, and the Agency had
announced it would extend Standard 208 to light trucks and vans.28 With
respect to head-impact protection, Congress shied away in ISTEA from the
more stringent approach requiring dynamic testing contemplated by the Senate.
Instead, ISTEA only directed NHTSA to issue a rule to improve head
protection from interior components. Compliance with this measure required
little more than the addition of some padding, a low-tech approach that industry
had been pursuing for decades.29
Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety & Ins. of the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 112th Cong. 47 (2011) (statement of Robert Strassburger, Vice President,
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers) (expressing concern over process of legislatively mandated
rules).
126. See 1991 House ISTEA Hearing, supra note 125, at 44 (statement of Jerry Curry,
Administrator, NHTSA); NHTSA Authorizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the
S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 100th Cong. 238, 251 (1987) (statement of Erika Jones, Chief
Counsel, NHTSA); NHTSA Authorization Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer
of the Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 101st Cong. 34, 40, 82-83 (statement of Barry Felrice,
Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, NHTSA).
127. It is also true, however, that many of the agency-forcing provisions required
rulemaking proceedings, but not necessarily final rules. A recurring pattern was that that the Senate
proposed strong mandates and the House watered them down. In the House, Dingell strongly opposed
mandates with deadlines, arguing that "every time Congress mandates that NHTSA promulgate a rule on
a specific subject, there are fewer resources for NHTSA to spend on other safety priorities." 2005 House
SAFETEA-LU Hearing, supra note 125, at 19 (statement of Rep. John Dingell). Dingell argued that
mandates should be written in a way that required only consideration of a rule, not its promulgation. Id.
at 20.
128. See 1991 House ISTEA Hearing, supra note 125, at 9 (statement of Jerry Curry,
Administrator, NHTSA); Laurie McGinley, U.S. Will Toughen Safety Standards for Vans, Trucks,
WALL ST. J., May 21,1991, at A4.
129. See S. REP. No. 102-83, at 5, 7 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-404, at 394-97,403-04
(1991) (Conf. Rep.).
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As for antilock brakes, by the time of ISTEA's passage, Europe and Japan
already required them in all heavy trucks.3 ° In effect, ISTEA was only
requiring NHTSA to mandate technologies that were already in widespread use
elsewhere in the world. Moreover, when it came to antilock brakes in passenger
cars, Congress struck an even more cautionary note. It merely required the
Agency to consider the issue, not necessarily issue a final rule, in proceedings
that were allowed to drag on for four years or more. And if NHTSA did decide
to issue a rule on antilock brakes for cars, ISTEA instructed that the Agency
must "as part of the rulemaking, consider any such brake system adopted by a
manufacturer."'13' Congress expected NHTSA to base any rule on systems
already in use. A repeat of the Agency's earlier technology-forcing adventure
on truck braking distances, invalidated in the PACCAR decision, was not
wanted. In sum, while ISTEA might be characterized as instructing NHTSA to
resume its 1966 technology-forcing mission, when viewed in the context of
1991's technological environment and industry practices, it was a pretty mild
version of that strategy.
The provisions of the TREAD Act cast further doubt on the depth of
Congress's commitment to re-invigorate the technology-forcing vision of auto
safety. Three of the TREAD Act's five agency-forcing provisions addressed
only the narrow area of tire safety.'32 Collectively, they set an extremely low
bar for rulemaking. For example, Section 10 required the Agency to upgrade its
standards on tire endurance and resistance. ' 33 At the time of TREAD's passage,
NHTSA's passenger car tire standards had not been updated for over thirty
years, and its standard for tires used on light trucks had not been updated for
over twenty-five years.'
34
During this period, tire design had evolved dramatically (from bias belted
tires to radials). At the time of the TREAD Act's passage, the existing standard
arguably was incoherent when applied to the now universal tire technology, and
industry itself supported an upgrade.'35 In fact, FMVSS 109 was so obviously
obsolete that NHTSA declined to enforce it and withdrew the only action ever
brought to do So. 136 The TREAD Act's mandate that the standard be updated
was the functional equivalent of requiring NHTSA to adapt to existing industry
technology and cease committing regulatory malpractice.
130. See Reauthorization of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 102d
Cong. 28 (1991) (statement of Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen).
131. ISTEA, Pub. L. No. 102-240, § 2,507, 105 Stat. 2,082 (1991) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1,392 (2012)).
132. See TREAD Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, §§ 10-11, 13, 114 Stat. 1,800, 1,805-06
(2000) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,123 (2012)).
133. Id. § 10.
134. 2000 House Firestone Tire Recall Hearing, supra note 122, at 7, 123 (statement
of Sue Bailey, Administrator, NHTSA).
135. See id. at 124.
136. See id. at 197 (statement of Clarence Ditlow, Director, Center for Auto Safety).
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The TREAD Act's provision requiring new tire-labeling rules was no
more ambitious. The TREAD Act required the placement of the tire
identification number on the outside tire sidewall rather than inside, as the
existing standard contemplated.137 The purpose of mounting the ID number
outside was to make it easier for consumers to see the number and thus to
determine whether the tire was subject to recall.138 This was the recall-tail
wagging the rulemaking-dog. And the dog was not being wagged very
vigorously. When Congress, inspired by NASA's success, conceived NHTSA's
technology-forcing mission in 1966, it had asked, if we can get a man to the
moon, why can we not make motor vehicles safer-not why can we not
relocate the tire ID number from the inside to the outside of the tire sidewall.
The only TREAD Act provision contemplating that the industry be
required to do something remotely novel was the section mandating action on a
warning system for under-inflated tires. In fact, NHTSA had been investigating
such a system since the 1970s,'139 and by the time of the TREAD Act's
enactment, Toyota had incorporated an "indirect" system of tire under-inflation
warning in some models.4 ° The tire companies were also working on the issue.
The architects of the TREAD provision made clear that they wanted to see
more progress, but not at a pace that might prove disruptive or uncongenial to
industry. Congressman Ed Markey, the Democratic sponsor of the provision in
the House, stated that Congress intended to allow the cheaper indirect
monitoring systems as an interim measure, given that they were already
available on the market, but that safer, albeit more expensive, direct systems in
development should be used eventually.'4' Presumably that meant when the
industry was ready.
SAFETEA-LU, the third and final omnibus agency-forcing directive, also
seemed an odd prescription for the paralysis that Congress had diagnosed.
Except for the rulemaking on power windows, SAFETEA-LU authorized
unlimited extensions of the deadlines for all the other proceedings it mandated,
provided the relevant congressional oversight committees were notified and
new deadlines were set.4 2 None of these provisions specified a timetable for
actually implementing the contemplated requirements. In some cases, the
deadlines for rulemaking were considerably more generous than the Agency's
own internal schedules. For example, SAFETEA-LU required NHTSA to adopt
final rules on roof strength and improved side impact protection by 2008; the
137. TREAD Act, 114 Stat. at 1806.
138. See 2000 House Firestone Tire Recall Hearing, supra note 122, at 204 (2000)
(statement of Clarence Ditlow, Director, Center for Auto Safety).
139. Id. at 54 (statement of Sue Bailey, Administrator, NHTSA).
140. Id. at 1,278.
141. The Implementation of the TREAD Act: One Year Later: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th
Cong. 44 (2002) [hereinafter TREAD Implementation Hearing] (statement of Rep. Ed Markey).
142. SAFETEA-LU, Pub. L. No. 109-59, §§ 10,301-02, 119 Stat. 1144, 1939-40
(2005) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,128 (2012)).
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Agency was already planning to do so by 2006.14 1 SAFETEA-LU seemed to be
inviting the Agency to slow down, not speed up. When asked about the
proposed timetables, the Agency's administrator reported that with one
exception, the deadlines were "certainly workable."'" When the legislation was
finalized, the troublesome deadline was relaxed.
45
The lack of urgency underlying the statutory deadlines was especially
perplexing because NHTSA had been procrastinating for decades on many of
the key issues addressed by SAFETEA-LU. In some cases, this delay involved
explicitly promising to take action and then repeatedly failing to do so. The
standards on door locks and door retention and on roof strength had not been
upgraded for well over thirty years.46 NHTSA first announced it would
consider a rollover-prevention standard in 1973. 4 No action was taken until
1991, when Congress ordered NHTSA to resume work on the issue in ISTEA.
But rollover prevention was one of the issues on which ISTEA left NHTSA
discretion not to act. In due course, the Agency invoked that discretion,
terminating the rulemaking and finding that no single standard could prevent
rollovers and might lead to the elimination of popular (but rollover-prone)
compact SUVs. 48 NHTSA subsequently promised to move ahead on roof
strength and door lock standards, but it did not carry through on those promises
either.
49
The overall structure of SAFETEA-LU differed from that of ISTEA and
the TREAD Act in one key respect. SAFETEA-LU was far more research
oriented than those earlier statutes. On a wide variety of issues, SAFETEA-LU
directed the Agency not to engage in rulemaking, but to study the issue further
and report back to Congress. NHTSA was directed to (1) study technologies to
reduce injuries and deaths caused by cars and trucks backing up; (2) prepare
reports to Congress on tire aging and the risks associated with glare; (3)
examine new systems for reminding passengers to wear seat belts; and (4)
undertake a study of front impact crash protection, with a particular emphasis
143. Id. §§ 10,301(d), 10,302(2); 2005 House SAFETEA-LU Hearing, supra note 125,
at 61-62 (statement of Janette Fennell, President, Kids and Cars); id. at 11 (statement of Jeffrey Runge,
Administrator, NHTSA).
144. Id. at 18 (statement of Jeffrey Runge, Administrator, NHTSA).
145. Id. at 18 (statement of Jeffrey Runge, Administrator, NHTSA); H.R. REP. No.
109-203, at 1,105 (2005) (Conf. Rep.). The relaxed deadline concerned disclosure of safety ratings
rather than vehicle safety standards.
146. 2005 House SAFETEA-LU Hearing, supra note 125, at 61 (statement of Janette
Fennell, President, Kids and Cars); Reauthorization of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. 47 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 SAFETEA-LU House Hearing]
(statement of R. David Pittle, Senior Vice President & Technical Director, Consumers Union).
147. 2004 SAFETEA-LU House Hearing, supra note 146, at 48 (statement of R. David
Pittle, Senior Vice President, Technical Policy, Consumers Union).
148. Why Not a Standard?, NHTSA (2004),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/rulings/rollover/Chapt06.html.
149. 2004 SAFETEA-LU House Hearing, supra note 146, at 87 (statement of Joan
Claybrook, President, Public Citizen).
Yale Journal on Regulation
on vehicle compatibility issues.5 ° Shades of the Reagan Administration; these
provisions could have been written by Diane Steed.
The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), the
most recent of the agency-forcing statutes, strongly reinforced the emphasis in
SAFETEA-LU on the need for further research to support rulemaking. MAP-
21's rulemaking mandate, typical of the single purpose agency-forcing
measures, was very modest in its ambitions. It addressed only improvements in
child seating and anchorage systems, and safety belt use warning systems for
rear seating positions.15" ' In preference to specific rulemaking, MAP-21
emphasized the importance of NHTSA conducting longer-term research on
new and emerging technologies that impact or may impact motor vehicle
safety. Towards this end, MAP-21 directed the Agency to establish a "Council
for Vehicle Electronics, Vehicle Software, and Emerging Technologies" to
"build, integrate, and aggregate the Administration's expertise in passenger
motor vehicle electronics and other new and emerging technologies.'' 52 If
lawyers and economists had wrested control of the Agency from safety
engineers in the 1970s, maybe the future belonged again to the engineers-so
long as they were in the research and development branch. It was almost as if
NHTSA was being asked to develop safety technologies, or merely to report on
what was available, not to adopt performance standards demanding that
automakers come up with engineering solutions that would ensure compliance.
3. Message Three: Beware the Perils of Force
Unlike statutes providing that NHTSA only consider certain requirements
or do further research, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-
21) demanded action. TEA-21 directed NHTSA to (1) issue new rules requiring
advanced air bags that would improve occupant protection for occupants of
different sizes; (2) conclude the rulemaking not later than March 1, 2000; and
(3) fully implement its mandate as rapidly as practicable, but not later than
September 1, 2006.
TEA-21 sounded as if Congress was determined to compel NHTSA to
force further innovation in passive protection. As in other cases of the agency-
forcing statutes, however, appearances were deceiving. In fact, the discussions
leading to TEA-21 contemplated that NHTSA should consider revising its
passive protection rule in a manner that could actually weaken it and reduce the
security of many passengers. Moreover, far from reaffirming the Agency's
technology-forcing mission, TEA-21 signaled deep disquiet in Congress as to
150. SAFETEA-LU, Pub. L. No. 109-59, §§ 10,303-04, 10,306, 119 Stat. 1144, 1,940-
41 (2005) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 30,128 (2012)); H.R. REP. NO. 109-203, at 404 (2005) (Conf.
Rep.).
151. MAP-21, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 31,501-03, 126 Stat. 757, 773-75 (2012)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,127 (2012)).
152. Id. §§ 31,401-02.
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how far it or the Agency should go in deploying the law to compel auto safety
innovation.
To understand how Congress and NHTSA arrived at this point, we flash
back to ISTEA's mandate seven years earlier that the Agency require full front
airbags for both the driver and passenger sides. The Agency and industry had
long been aware of the risks that air bags could present to infants, children, and
other "out of position" occupants, such as short-statured women and the
elderly, who tend to sit close to the steering wheel. The fundamental problem
for small people is their proximity to airbags when the airbags deploy, because
they do so with monumental speed and force. Before 1990, the risk from airbag
deployment had been largely theoretical, but in the early 1990s, industry began
in large numbers to install air bags rather than automatic belts as the preferred
means of complying with Standard 208's passive restraint requirements. Even
then, however, most manufacturers were installing air bags mainly on the
driver side, not the passenger side.
At about that moment, Congress jumped on the bandwagon and enacted
ISTEA, requiring NHTSA to amend Standard 208 to require airbags not only
on the driver's side but also on the passenger side, where many parents placed
their small children (often unrestrained or inadequately restrained). This meant
that infants and children, as they moved about, were often less than ten inches
away from the dashboard and the airbag, the minimum safe distance advised by
experts. The Agency nonetheless followed Congress's instructions and
amended Standard 208 in accordance with ISTEA in September 1993.'
By 1994 reports began to flow in of infants, children, and other small
people being crushed by airbags. The mechanisms of injury were vivid and
gave rise to compelling imagery in congressional testimony.54 By the time of
congressional hearings leading to TEA-21, NHTSA reported that air bags had
been associated with fifty-two deaths, including thirty-two infants and
children.55 Needless to say, NHTSA's critics were outraged and used
congressional hearings to vent their anger.
56
153. Occupant Crash Protection, 58 Fed. Reg. 46,551,46,563 (Sept. 2, 1993) (codified
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571,585).
154. An especially gruesome incident, recognized to be a catalyst for the hearings,
was reported by a Boise, Idaho newspaper: "Air Bag Kills Baby Girl." Air Bag Safety: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 105th Cong. 16 (1997)) [hereinafter Air Bag Safety
Hearing]. The accompanying story reported that a one-year old girl in the front passenger seat was
decapitated when an air bag deployed in a "fender bender." Id. (statement of Sen. Dirk Kempthome).
155. Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Bryan). By the time of the rulemaking proceedings
contemplated in TEA-21, the Agency had identified 158 fatalities induced by air bags, including ninety-
two children, sixty drivers, and six adult passengers. An additional thirty-eight fatalities were under
review. 65 Fed. Reg. 30,681 (May 12, 2000).
156. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade & Consumer Prot., H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 105th Cong. 32-36 (1997) (statement of Sam Kazman, General Counsel, Competitive
Enterprise Institute); James Bovard, Killing and Lying for Safety: Airbags and the Salvation State,
FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOUND. (Dec. 1, 1997), http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/killing-lying-safety-
airbags-salvation-state.
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The perception was widespread that the Agency's standard was to blame,
even though, as NHTSA pointed out, the industry had known of the problem
for decades and Standard 208 had long given manufacturers "significant
freedom" to "develop and install means of protecting the wide variety of
occupants under a broad range of conditions.' 57 But the standard did not
require attention to subpopulations, and industry fingered the performance
demands of Standard 208 as the culprit, arguing that it required excessive and
unjustified air bag inflator power. '58 Other testimony reinforced the impression
of regulatory malfeasance. Senator Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho (the state in
which a one-year-old girl had been decapitated by an airbag) was especially
outspoken. He asked: "Is Alexandra's death a tragedy? Yes. Is this tragedy the
result of government regulation? Yes. Is this regulation killing children?
Yes. 159 In short, Congress reverted easily to its standard practice of blaming
the implementer, not the congressional decision. The hearings on TEA-21
morphed into an occasion for sober reflection on the hazards of forcing
technology. A key member of the House put it simply: "Manufacturers need
time to design and produce new equipment, and we need to be cautious about
new technology so we do not end up in the same situation we are in today
because we have prematurely forced a new technology on the American people
without fully understanding some of the consequence." 
60
4. Message Four: Blessed Are the Information Providers
While none of the agency-forcing statutes strengthened NHTSA's
capacity to deal with the new rulemaking mandates being imposed upon it, the
same was not true of its recall powers. Two of the eight agency-forcing
statutes-TREAD in 2000 and MAP-21 in 2012-might be better described as
recall-empowering statutes. TREAD, for example, imposed stringent new
reporting requirements on manufacturers with respect to recalls conducted
abroad; directed the Agency to establish an "early warning system" under
157. Occupant Crash Protection, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,741 (May 12, 2000). The Agency
noted that the provisions of Standard 208 mandated by ISTEA "permitted but did not require vehicle
manufacturers to develop and use advanced air bag technologies in designing their air bags to minimize
the risks from air bags, in particular, the risks of serious injury to unbelted, out-of-position occupants,
including children and small drivers." Id.
158. See Air Bag, Car Seats and Child Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm., Trade & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 105th Cong. 79-80
(1997) [hereinafter Child Safety Hearing] (statement of Andrew Card, President, American Automobile
Manufacturers Association).
159. Air Bag Safety Hearing, supra note 154, at 16 (statement of Sen. Dirk
Kempthorne).
160. Child Safety Hearing, supra note 158, at 2 (statement of Rep. WJ. Billy Tauzin,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade & Consumer Prot.); see also Air Bag Safety Hearing, supra
note 154, at 13-14 (1997) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham) (suggesting that the root of the air bag
problem was the "very specific" performance standard that auto companies were "forced to meet," and
arguing that the executive branch and Congress must be careful not to draft laws and regulations so rigid
that they do not give manufacturers flexibility).
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which manufacturers were obliged to provide extensive information at periodic
intervals to assist the agency in identifying defects as promptly as possible;
increased the cap on civil penalties to fifteen million dollars; lengthened the
period of consumers' entitlement to free repair of auto defects from eight to ten
years; and imposed criminal penalties (including terms of imprisonment up to
fifteen years) for falsifying or withholding information relating to suspected
defects.'
61
MAP-21 further upped the recall ante. Among other measures, it increased
the cap on civil penalties to thirty-five million dollars; extended the prohibition
on importing defective vehicles; required the Agency to disseminate recall
information on the Internet in a manner that is searchable; and empowered the
Agency to require senior corporate officials responsible for safety to certify the
accuracy and completeness of information on safety defects submitted to it.
MAP-21 also protected whistleblowers from being penalized by their
employers for submitting information to regulators concerning motor vehicle
defects; gave priority to manufacturers' recall obligations in bankruptcy
proceedings; and directed the Agency to require manufacturers to affix a label
to the glove compartment or other accessible location explaining how to submit
a defect complaint.'
62
The legislative appetite for strengthening NHTSA's recall powers-while
doing nothing to enhance its rulemaking authority (even when imposing
sweeping new rulemaking mandates) -cannot have been lost on the Agency. In
terms of regulatory technique, recalls are a form of information disclosure.
Recalls are coercive with respect to the disclosures manufacturers must make
and the corrective action they must take if consumers elect to return their
vehicles for repair. But that election is entirely up to the consumer. Unlike
safety standards, recalls do not require anyone to provide or purchase safety
technology that they would not have installed or bought absent safety
regulation.
5. Message Five: Equal Protection Triumphant
NHTSA could hardly have overlooked another major theme of the
agency-forcing era. Equal protection emerged as the prevalent, even dominant
ideology of congressional intervention from 1991 to 2012. Recall that five of
the eight agency-forcing statutes enacted in this twenty-year period were
basically single purpose measures aimed at ensuring that especially vulnerable
populations were no less protected than the general population.
161. TREAD Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, §§ 3-5, 114 Stat. 1,800, 1,800-04 (2000)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,170 (2012)).
162. MAP-21, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 31,203, 31,207, 31,301, 31,304, 31,306-7,
31,312, 126 Stat. 405,758-72 (2012) (codified at49 U.S.C. §§ 30,165, 30,12, 30,166, 30,203, 30,171,
30,120 (2012)).
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In fact, even the three omnibus measures-seemingly designed to revive
technology forcing-contained provisions resembling the special purpose
statutes' equality focus. Section 2503 of ISTEA, for example, contained a
general mandate to improve booster seats and seat belt design for children.
Section 14 of the TREAD Act directed NHTSA to initiate the rulemaking
process to improve child restraints in various respects not covered by ISTEA.'63
Like its counterpart in ISTEA, the TREAD Act provision sailed through
Congress without opposition. The power window provisions of Section 10308
of SAFETEA-LU were also directed at protecting children. Indeed, when it
came to protecting children, legislative infatuation with equal protection as a
rationale for auto safety sometimes produced puzzling results. For example,
Anton's Law (2002) required NHTSA to undertake rulemaking proceedings
that were already underway and that had been mandated in the TREAD Act
(2000), enacted only two years earlier.
1 64
Congressional concern with vulnerable populations demanded action
almost irrespective of either costs or the extent of the problem. Section 2(b) of
The Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007 (KTSA) required NHTSA to
undertake a rulemaking to improve rear visibility through the addition of
mirrors, cameras, sensors, and other similar technologies. The purpose of the
provision was to "enable the driver of a motor vehicle to detect areas behind the
motor vehicle to reduce death and injury resulting from backing incidents,
particularly incidents involving small children and disabled persons.'
' 65
Advocacy for the "back-over bill" was driven by the poignant account of a
Long Island parent who had backed over his own son.166
When NHTSA finally issued a rule in 2014 implementing the mandate, it
found that back-over protection (to be provided by rear video systems) would
save some thirteen to fifteen lives a year, principally children under the age of
five and adults over the age of seventy, once the systems were installed in the
entire fleet. The cost was $132 to $142 per car for an overall fleet cost of $546
million to $620 million. Simple division yields an estimated net cost per life
saved of $15.9 million to $26.3 million, three to four times the Agency's
standard value of life when conducting rulemaking cost-benefit analyses.'
67
163. TREAD Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 14, 114 Stat. 1,800, 1,806-08 (2000)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,170 (2012)).
164. Anton's Law, Pub. L. No. 107-318, § 3, 116 Stat. 2,772, 2,772-73 (2002)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30,127 (2012)); Booster Seats and the Forgotten Child: Closing A
Safety Gap: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce & Tourism of the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 107th Cong. 5 (2001) (statement of L. Robert Shelton, Executive
Director, NHTSA) (describing NHTSA's implementation of child passenger safety improvements under
the TREAD Act).
165. KTSA, Pub. L. No. 110-189, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 639, 639-40 (2008) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30,111 (2012)).
166. See 153 CONG. REC. H16873 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Schakowsky).
167. Rear Visibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 19,178, 19,191 (Apr. 7,2014) (codified at 49 C.F.R.
pt. 571).
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Here, as in other circumstances, NHTSA received signals from Congress that
contradicted its instructions from its overseers in the executive branch. A rule
with that cost-benefit ratio would never have satisfied the regulatory review
analysts at OMB. 6 8
6. Message Six: Don't Call Us, We'll Call You
One peculiarity of the agency-forcing era is especially striking: its
prolonged duration and the frequency with which Congress felt it necessary to
set the Agency's agenda. One might reasonably assume, after all, that NHTSA
would at some point take notice, perhaps within the first decade after the
passage of ISTEA, TEA-21, and the TREAD Act, such that further prodding
for another twelve years and five more statutes would be unnecessary. Taken at
face value, the agency-forcing era seemed to depict NHTSA as something of a
dim-witted pupil, its learning curve so flat that even after twenty years it still
needed to be reminded at regular intervals that its main mission was issuing
rules. But legislative mandates may have had an entirely different political
dynamic. Rather than a general message of "do something," the interpretation
of these interventions should perhaps have been "agencies are to be seen, not
heard-adopt rules only when asked."
Some flavor of this sort of inter-institutional understanding appears in the
testimony of NHTSA Administrator Sue Bailey in the context of the TREAD
Act. She testified that the Agency welcomed "legislative support" to upgrade
its tire resistance and endurance standards69 _support that was wholly
gratuitous given the Agency's obvious legislative authority to undertake the
upgrade without congressional involvement. Equally suggestive was the
testimony of Representative Shimkus, again in the context of the TREAD Act's
passage, warning NHTSA not to regulate motorcycle helmets or equipment,
something that was well within the Agency's statutory authority. Shimkus
advised, "[W]hen Congress has an intent to do that we will pass legislation to
direct that." 1
70
Given Congress's proclivity for abruptly reversing course with little or no
explanation, waiting for instructions may well have been the path of prudence.
Both in 1978 and 1979, for example, Congress included language in DOT
168. NHTSA has made it clear that it hears the congressional message on equal
protection loud and clear, however dissonant it may be with the executive's insistence on cost-benefit
analysis. Only a few years ago, the NHTSA Administrator told Congress, "We develop our research and
rulemaking priorities by focusing on the most significant safety risks, particularly vulnerable
populations and high occupancy vehicle issues." Improving Highway and Vehicle Safety:
Reauthorization of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, and Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 112th Cong. 7
(2011) (statement of David L. Strickland, Administrator, NHTSA) (emphasis added).
169. 2000 House Firestone Tire Recall Hearing, supra note 122, at 1,277 (statement
of Sue Bailey, Administrator, NHTSA).
170. TREAD Implementation Hearing, supra note 141, at 7 (statement of Rep. John
Shimkus).
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appropriations bills that barred the Agency from using appropriated funds to
enforce Standard 208.171 From a technology standpoint, little had changed
when, roughly twelve years later, Congress demanded that NHTSA amend
Standard 208 to require air bags in both front positions.
Rollover protection presented a similar case of congressional flip-
flopping. Following its 1994 abandonment of rulemaking to establish a
performance standard on the issue, the Agency shifted its attention to gathering
data on the rollover tendencies of various models for dissemination to
prospective vehicle purchasers under the NCAP program. Congress promptly
responded by adopting an appropriations rider barring the Agency from using
appropriated funds for this purpose until the National Academy of Sciences had
studied the issue.72 Then in 2000, Congress enacted the TREAD Act, directing
NHTSA to develop "a dynamic test on rollovers by motor vehicles for the
purposes of a consumer information program" within two years and promptly
to determine "how best to disseminate test results to the public."'73 In the
period of about five years, NHTSA had effectively gone from being prohibited
from disseminating information on rollover tendencies to being ordered to do
so.
Looking back, the Agency undoubtedly understood that the political
winds could shift at any time. After all, this had been the lesson of 1974. Now,
as the Ice Age drew to a close, the Agency faced an even starker contrast: the
shift from the do-nothing zeitgeist of the Reagan-Dingell era to multiple
demands for action of the agency-forcing era. But NHTSA was making its way
up legal culture's learning curve. The Agency would take steps to protect itself
from the political and legal hazards that potentially lay ahead in implementing
the mandates of a fickle Congress while simultaneously being subject to a cost-
conscious OMB and the demands for scientific certainty of a skeptical
judiciary.
V. The Post-Glacial, Co-Regulatory Rebound
Prodded by legislative demands to rule quickly, the Agency adopted eight
"major" rules between 2003 and 2013. All eight rules largely codified
technology that industry had already implemented, was in the process of
implementing, had voluntarily promised to implement in the near future, or
could implement easily based on existing technologies. In effect, faced with
repeated congressional demands to act, NHTSA pivoted to demand that
171. See DOT and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-335, § 317,
92 Stat. 435,450 (1978); DOT and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-131, § 317(a),
93 Stat. 1,023, 1,039 (1980).
172. See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Rulemaking History, U.S. DEP'T
TRANSP., http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/rulings/rollover/ChaptO3.html (last visited Nov. 6,2016).
173. TREAD, Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 12, 114 Stat. 1,800, 1,806 (2000) (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 30,117(c)(1)(A) (2012)).
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industry do what it had already done, was in the process of doing, or had
promised to do to a greater extent. From the perspective of 1966, this strategy is
a form of illusory rulemaking that betrays MVSA's technology-forcing
purposes. More fundamentally, it suggests that the Agency's rulemaking
activities may at this point have become largely superfluous. Apart from
possible accelerative effects, the gains being made in auto safety may have
occurred whether or not NHTSA had adopted these rules.
Nudging the status quo forward in this way was, however, an adroit move
in the Agency's long quest for "public acceptability" and conflict avoidance
with its overseers. It also plugged directly into the historic egalitarian rationale
for auto safety regulation. For many years, safety innovations have tended to be
introduced first in luxury cars and then to spread slowly into lower priced lines.
By accelerating this process, NHTSA was able to place itself on the side of the
angels, ensuring that persons of modest or middling means would enjoy some
of the same protections initially afforded only to their more affluent
compatriots.
Neither the public, nor Congress, nor the executive branch was likely to
object. In effect, the Agency combined technology forcing and equal protection
into a new hybrid regulatory strategy of technology diffusion that was well
suited to survival in its turbulent legal and political environment. This strategy
also proved to be an effective adaptation to the challenges of pre-enforcement
judicial review. How could a company plausibly complain that NHTSA's
measures were impractical or unreasonable when much of the industry was
already implementing them? Rules codifying widespread industry practice
might come at the cost of more ambitious innovation, but they provided a safe
harbor from courts' disruptive interference.
That is the story in broad outline, but details matter. Counting an agency's
major rules does not reveal much about regulatory ambitions or effects.
Strangely enough, neither does attention to general reports calculating the costs
and benefits of rules nor the number of lives supposedly saved by their
adoption. Without looking at the substance of the rules and the technological
and market contexts in which they were adopted, analysts can easily
misinterpret how much is being accomplished when an agency adds "Final
Rule" pages to the Federal Register.
A. Overview
In 2013, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released a report
to Congress covering the "major" rules issued by NHTSA during the period
October 1, 2002 to September 30, 201 1. 74 It reported (based on NHTSA's
174. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES (2013),
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estimates) that the eight major safety rules promulgated by the Agency in that
period had in the aggregate imposed annual costs between $3.687 to $7.261
billion and yielded annual benefits in the range of $11.158 to $19.086 billion.175
OMB reported precisely the same data with respect to NHTSA's major safety
rules in its 2014 and 2015 reports. No new major rules were issued in those
subsequent years; hence the cost and benefit data on NHTSA's major safety
rules reported in 2013 apply to the period from October 1, 2002 to September
30, 2013.176
Taken at face value, these numbers suggest that NHTSA today is an
energetic rulemaking agency generating standards that might impress even the
most ardent proponents of cost-benefit analysis. A closer look at the data
chronicled in the OMB report, however, suggests a different conclusion. It is
hardly an exaggeration to suggest that the technology of vehicle safety in
America in the second decade of the twenty-first century might have looked
almost the same had the rebound never occurred.
Seven of the eight standards were in direct response to congressional
mandates. An eighth (the tightening of braking distances for trucks) was closely
tied to an agency-forcing statute. And as noted, all of the standards largely
codified technology that industry had implemented, was in the process of
implementing, or had voluntarily promised to implement in the near future. In
some cases, the rulemaking record only makes clear that the technology was,
according to NHTSA, "mature" and already in widespread use. In other cases,
the record is specific as to the degree of penetration already being achieved or
promised, occasionally approaching one hundred percent.
We are doubtful that many of the costs and benefits attributed to the rules
in the OMB report meet a "but-for" test of causation. Two standard practices by
OMB and NHTSA explain why these numbers are almost certainly grossly
inflated. First, OMB in its yearly reports on regulatory actions, as required by
the Unfunded Mandates Act, simply reports agency cost-benefit estimates,
without further analysis, provided the Agency monetizes them in its regulatory
analysis. Second, NHTSA declines to predict voluntary behavior in the future
for which it has no direct evidence. It thus ignores what industry might have
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2013_cb/2013 cost-benefit-report-
updated.pdf
175. Id. at 101-02 tbl.A-2. The cost and benefit estimates are expressed in 2001
dollars.
176. The data on NHTSA's major safety rules in the 2014 OMB report can be found at
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND
TRIBAL ENTITIES 100 tbl.A-2 (2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2014-cb/2014-cost-benefit-report.pdf.
The data on HNTSA's major safety rules in the 2015 OMB report can be found at OFFICE
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE 91 tbl.A-2 (2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2015-cb/2015-cost-benefit-report.pdf
[hereinafter 2015 OMB REPORT].
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done absent its rules. In short, without a closer look, these numbers cannot be
taken as reflecting vigorous rulemaking at NHTSA, and certainly not as
demonstrating that the Agency was back in the technology-forcing business. A
more granular inquiry is required.
B. Survival of the Meekest-Some Case Studies
Properly understood, the major rules cited by OMB reflect an agency
energetically and imaginatively adapting by developing a form of rulemaking
that was modest in its safety impact but exquisitely responsive both to
congressional commands and potential legal risks. Mandating what the status
quo has established as a practicable, even dominant, addition to vehicle safety
design or equipment is a strategy for the meek, but it was also one that enabled
NHTSA to avoid judicial review and inherit the earth in the post-Glacial
period. Moreover, a closer look at the rules reveals that the Agency's adaptive
mechanisms were multifaceted. NHTSA developed several variations on the
theme of litigation avoidance and evasion of conflict with its legislative and
executive supervisors.
1. Variation One: Codifying Industry Practice
a. Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
The predominant form of NHTSA's low-to-no-risk rulemaking model was
the codification of existing industry practice. The standard on electronic
stability control (ESC), FMVSS 126, provides a case study in the development
of this model. FMVSS 126 was mandated by Section 10301 of SAFETEA-
LU.177 In its final form, the standard required the installation of automatic
computer-controlled braking of individual wheels, which would assist drivers
when they were at risk of losing directional stability and control. The standard
applied to all passenger cars, multiple purpose vehicles, trucks, and buses
weighing 10,000 pounds or less ("light vehicles" in auto-safety speak). FMVSS
126 accounted for over half of the benefits ($5.987-$11.282 billion per year)
claimed by NHTSA for the entire decade from 2003 to 2013, but only a modest
portion of the costs ($913-$917 million per year).
FMVSS 216 made it seem as if NHTSA had at last found the Holy Grail
of rulemaking. The standard was completed in record time. The Agency issued
its notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in September 2006178 and its final
177. SAFETEA-LU, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 10,301, 119 Stat. 1,144, 1,939-40 (2005)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,128 (2012)).
178. Electronic Stability Control Systems, 71 Fed. Reg. 54,712 (Sept. 18, 2006)
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585).
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rule in April 2007, only seven months later.1 79 The anticipated safety benefits of
the standard were breathtaking. The installation of ESC systems in all light
vehicles would save 5,300 to 9,600 lives and prevent 156,000 to 238,000
injuries in all types of crashes annually.
Even better, FMVSS 126 was among the most cost-effective rules
NHTSA had ever issued. The Agency estimated that the production-weighted
average cost per vehicle to meet the proposed requirements was only fifty-eight
dollars ($90.3 per passenger car and $29.2 per light truck). Most impressive of
all was the tight three-year phase-in implementation schedule that NHTSA
demanded: fifty-five percent compliance by 2009; seventy-five percent
compliance by 2010; and ninety-five percent compliance by 2011. After 2011,
all light vehicles produced by manufacturers for sale in the United States were
required to include ESC.
While scattered opposition existed, NHTSA noted cheerfully that "the
overwhelming majority of the commenters supported establishing a safety
standard for ESC systems as required equipment on new light vehicles.'8 ° One
reason for the nearly universal popularity of the standard might have been that
it required very little, if any, improvement in the "mature and effective
technology" that industry was already deploying.1 8 As NHTSA noted, at the
time of the rule's preparation, manufacturers had already installed ESC in
twenty-nine percent of MY 2006 light vehicles sold in the United States, and
they intended to increase that proportion to seventy-one percent by MY 2011,
the final year of the rule's phase-in period.
FMVSS 126 modestly accelerated the schedule by requiring installation of
ESC in all light vehicles by MY 2012, albeit with exceptions for some vehicles
manufactured in stages or by small volume manufacturers. But this deadline
was unlikely to cause any inconvenience. As the agency noted, the phase-in
matched the normal manufacturers' production cycle. 82 Moreover, the
definition of an ESC system was taken from the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) Surface Vehicle Information Report J2564,183 while the
performance test was based on the actual performance of ESC systems already
installed in MY 2006 vehicles.84 Using the industry's own voluntary standards
and ratifying its almost uniform practice is unlikely to be controversial-at
least with the "regulated" parties.
Of course, this meant that the lives-to-be-saved attributable to the rule
were far fewer than the lives that were being saved anyway due to industry
practice and plans. NHTSA stated that it "would attribute 1,547 to 2,534
179. Electronic Stability Control Systems; Controls and Displays, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,236
(Apr. 6, 2007) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571,585).
180. Id. at 17,250.
181. Id. at 17,242.
182. Id. at 17,251-52.
183. Id. at 17,238, 17,248.
184. Id. at 17,239 n.9.
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prevented fatalities ... to this rulemaking, in addition to the prevention of
46,896 to 65,801 injuries," apparently on the rationale that it was increasing the
percentage of light vehicles with ESC from 71% to 100%. 185 But, of course,
even this pro rata attribution involved a peculiar assumption.
The Agency could only claim ongoing annual credit if it assumed that
industry would have stopped at seventy-one percent implementation forever,
absent the intervention of FMVSS 126. In fact, the record clearly establishes
that would not be the case. Ford, for example, announced well before the
standard was issued that it was proceeding to one hundred percent installation
of ESC in its fleet.'86 Given ESC's extremely modest cost and the possibility of
design defect liability for not installing a technology that would be the
overwhelming industry standard, it is hard to construct a scenario in which
manufacturers would not have followed Ford's lead. In fact, simply
extrapolating the trend line from the industry's past uptake of ESC from 2003
through 2006, through the estimated penetration rate of seventy-one percent by
2011, suggests that industry would have reached full adoption anyway
sometime between 2012 and 2015 without regulation.187
NHTSA could, however, be certain of one thing concerning its ESC rule.
Manufacturers were unlikely to sue the Agency for requiring them to do what
they were already doing. Under the rule it framed, ninety-eight percent of
existing stability control systems met the Agency's technical standards.
88
Clearly, courts were unlikely to find a rule that was based on an industry
consensus standard and codified such widespread industry practice arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, or impracticable. And the cost-benefit numbers made
the rule a poster child for "efficient" regulation. OMB could hardly object. Nor
could Congress-it asked for a rule and got one. NHTSA had found the perfect
formula for avoiding trouble with political or judicial overseers: responding to
a specific legislative mandate with insistence on the status quo in a way that
drained industry of any motive to sue and drastically reduced the prospect of
success if it did. It was a formula that NHTSA would use more than once.
185. Id. at 17,236.
186. Id. at 17,251 n.38.
187. It is difficult to reach this conclusion with certainty because manufacturers'
production plans submitted to NHTSA are treated as trade secrets, and the Agency has not divulged
them to us, notwithstanding the passage of time. We would note that the final rule actually accelerated
the implementation schedule that the Agency initially had proposed; the Agency itself acknowledged
that this was due to the production plans submitted by six manufacturers. While the NPRM proposed
thirty percent compliance in MY 2009, sixty percent in MY 2010, ninety percent in MY 2011, and full
adoption in MY 2012, the updated rule required fifty-five percent compliance in MY 2009, seventy-five
percent in MY 2010, ninety-five percent in MY 2011, and full adoption in MY 2012. Id. at 17,239-
40240; see also NHTSA, Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, FMVSS No. 126 Electronic Stability
Control Systems, at V-22 to V-23 & n.49 (March 2007) (listing the proposed phase in schedule).
188. Electronic Stability Control Systems, 71 Fed. Reg. 54,722 (Sept. 18, 2006)
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585).
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b. Ejection Mitigation
The efficacy, from NHTSA's perspective, of demanding the existing or
anticipated status quo is also demonstrated by the second-most beneficial
measure cited by OMB, FMVSS 226, which regulates side impact protection.189
The Agency was frank that compliance would probably be achieved using
"existing technology" that had been introduced in 2002, initially by Ford, and
that FMVSS 214 now required on-side impact protection. The Agency stated
that it "anticipat[ed] that manufacturers [would] meet the standard by
modifying existing side impact airbag curtains and possibly supplementing
them with advanced glazing."'9 ° Under FMVSS 226, manufacturers would be
given seven more years (until September 2017) to make necessary
improvements to their side curtains (principally by making them larger,
extending inflation times, and tethering them more tightly to the vehicle's
pillars) and install them in all cars.'91
To be sure, the ejection mitigation rule was not an exact rerun of the ESC
rule, where ninety-eight percent of existing systems already met the standard
NHTSA was imposing. The ejection mitigation rule did require industry to up
its game, modestly. NHTSA provided data indicating the number of vehicles
that industry already planned to equip with certain elements of the rule. For
example, by MY 2011, fifty-five percent of manufacturers vehicles would be
equipped with combination air bags, perhaps the most expensive part of the
cost of meeting the ejection mitigation test. In MY 2007, rollover sensors were
available on sixty-five percent of models.9 And NHTSA significantly relaxed
the final rule specifically to accommodate "existing designs.'93 It also dropped
plans to apply the rule to convertibles, following what might reasonably have
been interpreted as a threat of litigation. 94
During the comment period on the rule, certain glazing manufacturers and
consumer groups commented that NHTSA was not satisfying the congressional
189. Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,212 (Jan.
19, 2011) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585) [hereinafter 76 Fed. Reg. 3,212]. NHTSA estimated that
the Ejection Mitigation rule would generate benefits in the range of $1.5 billion to $2.375 billion per
year at a cost of $419 million to 1.373 billion per year. See 2015 OMB REPORT, supra note 176, at 91
tbl.A-2.
190. 76Fed. Reg. 3,212, supranote 189, at3,212.
191. Office of Regulatory Analysis & Evaluation, Final Regulatory Impact Analysis,
FMVSS No. 226, Ejection Mitigation, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, 4-7 (2011),
http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2011-0004-0003.
192. Jd. at iii, 2.
193. 76 Fed. Reg. 3,221, 3,287 (Jan. 19, 2011) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585)
(concluding that lowering the speed test for the 1.5 second impact from 24 km/h to 20 km/h would
require "fewer changes" to "existing designs").
194. Scott Schmidt, Director, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Comment Letter
on Proposed Rule for Ejection Mitigation at 10 (Feb. 1,2010) (citing Chrysler v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.,
472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972)), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2009-0183-0029
(urging that convertibles could not meet ejection mitigation standard and noting Chrysler court's finding
that standards must not be used to bring about the extinction of classes of vehicles like convertibles).
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direction in SAFETEA-LU because the rulemaking did not address ejections
through sun roofs, moon roofs, and rear windows. The Agency responded by
reminding the commentators that the Act's reasonableness, practicability, and
appropriateness standards had not been relaxed, and that NHTSA lacked real
world data concerning the injuries and deaths that are associated with ejections
from vehicles other than through the side windows.9 5 Whether or not
persuaded by these observations, no consumer group, or anyone else, sued.
c. Side Impact Protection
The upgrade of FMVSS 214, yet another "major" rule,96 took the model
of codifying industry practice and plans to new heights. In December 2003, the
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (industry's principal trade association)
and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety announced a "new voluntary
industry safety commitment to meet new performance criteria designed to
enhance occupant protection in front- and side-impact crashes."'' 97 The
participating companies promised that by September 1, 2007, at least half of the
vehicles offered by them for the U.S. domestic market would meet the front-to-
side performance criteria, and that by September 1, 2009, all such vehicles
would do so.
Industry's voluntary agreement precipitated a race between Congress and
the Agency to see who would be first to order industry to do what it was
already promising to do voluntarily. Six months after industry's voluntary
undertaking, NHTSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking,98 stating its
intention to upgrade FMVSS 214 to improve protection in side impact crashes.
Fourteen months later, Congress adopted SAFETEA-LU. Section 10302
required the Agency to complete a rulemaking no later than July 1, 2008 that
would "establish a standard designed to enhance passenger motor vehicle
occupant protection, in all seating positions, in side impact crashes."1 99
In September 2007, the Agency published its revision of FMVSS 214,
which added a pole test that, in practical terms, required the deployment of air
bag curtains, torso airbags, and other similar devices.00 In announcing its final
rule, NHTSA was careful to assure industry that nothing in the rule would upset
195. 76 Fed. Reg. 3,218-19 (Jan. 19, 2011) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571,585).
196. NHTSA estimated that the benefits of the side impact protection rule would
range from $736 million to $1.058 billion per year, and cost from $401 million to $1.051 billion per
year. 2015 OMB REPORT, supra note 176, at 91 tbl.A-2.
197. Automakers Enhance Occupant Safety with New Voluntary Commitment,
PRNEWSWIRE (Dec. 4, 2003), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/automakers-enhance-
occupant-safety-with-new-voluntary-commitment-73209802.html.
198. Side Impact Protection; Side Impact Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 69 Fed.
Reg. 27,990, 27,992 (May 17, 2004) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571,598).
199. SAFETEA-LU, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 10,302, 119 Stat. 1,144, 1,940 (2005)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 3,010 (2012)).
200. Reporting Requirements, 72 Fed. Reg. 51,908 (Sept. 11, 2007) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 571,585).
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what industry was already doing. The rule would "broaden and fortify"
industry's voluntary efforts.20 NHTSA's own analysis indicates that it was not
really bringing much to the party.
To be sure, the rule did somewhat more than simply codify what industry
had already promised to do. The prescribed test dummy was a new model
developed by European vehicle safety agencies and the industry's 2003
commitment concerned only the driver's seating position and head injuries.
NHTSA's new rule applied to the front seat passenger position and measured
forces exerted on the thoracic and abdominal regions as well. But again, it is
difficult to imagine manufacturers only installing driver protections given
obvious liability issues and a market in which they seemed to be competing to
see how many airbags they could cram into a vehicle. Thirty-eight percent of
passenger cars had side airbags that would protect the thoracic and abdominal
regions as early as 2002.
NHTSA's preamble to the side impact protection rule seemed also to
advance this cooperative regulatory model as the preferred approach to setting
vehicle safety standards. Industry would be in the lead, picking the safety
technology targets, with NHTSA providing standardized testing procedures and
regulatory incentives to diffuse safety technologies more broadly or on a
somewhat faster timetable. The preamble explained:
Through voluntary efforts, manufacturers are able to begin equipping
vehicles with advanced technologies and are able to advance safety more
quickly than through the regulatory process. In formulating this regulation,
we have been mindful to remain consistent with the technological
advances upon which the industry's voluntary commitments were based so
as not to discourage further implementation while manufacturers develop
designs and technologies that are able to comply with this regulation. This
regulation builds on the same technologies that will be used by the
industry to meet its voluntary commitment, and takes them even
further.
203
Indeed, events were moving so quickly that the Agency decided to shorten
the lead time by half, to two years. Ordinarily, halving the compliance period
and making it shorter than the normal design period for introducing new
models would have caused an industry uproar. Not here. After making multiple
technical objections to many aspects of the rule and questioning its
"practicability, 20 4 the industry then generally supported the phase-in
schedule.205
201. Id. at 51,910.
202. 69 Fed. Reg. at 27,993 n.10.
203. 72 Fed. Reg. at 51,910.
204. Id. at 51,938.
205. See id. at 51,945. The manufacturers subsequently rethought their acquiescence
and were granted a year's delay in starting the phase-in and additional year to complete compliance.
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2. Variation Two: Codifying Foreign Rules
The revision of FMVSS 121, another of the eight major rules cited by
OMB in the post-Glacial period, was estimated to have generated benefits of
$1.25 to $1.52 billion at a cost of $23 to $164 million.2°6 FMVSS 121 was
among NHTSA's most ambitious technology-forcing standards of early 1970s.
Its supposed "upgrade" thirty years later to require a thirty percent
improvement in the mandatory stopping distances of heavy vehicles was the
culmination of one of the most tortured proceedings in NHTSA history.
The saga of FMVSS 121 goes back to 1967, when the Agency grew
concerned about accidents involving large trucks and other heavy vehicles. In
1970, the Agency announced its intention to require manufacturers to equip
heavy vehicles with brakes (air brakes or hydraulic brakes) that were capable of
stopping from a speed of sixty miles per hour within a distance of 216 feet,
without locking. The Agency anticipated that that compliance would be
achieved by means of antilock braking systems (ABS), a new and evolving
technology. ABS was widely used on commercial aircraft, but not on motor
vehicles.
From the very start, the Agency encountered stiff industry resistance,
which it sought to address by weakening requirements and extending the
compliance deadline.20 7 Notwithstanding NHTSA's concessions, on January 1,
1975, PACCAR, a heavy vehicle manufacturer, and others sued the NHTSA in
the Ninth Circuit, arguing that various provisions of the standard were not
objective, reasonable, or practicable. In its judgment, rendered three years later,
the court agreed with the plaintiffs.20 8 It wrote, "We hold only that more
probative and convincing data evidencing the reliability and safety of vehicles
that are equipped with antilock and in use must be available before the agency
can enforce a standard requiring its installation."2°9
The Court may have thought this was a limited ruling, but in context it left
NHTSA in an evidentiary black hole. As NHTSA later remarked, "As a result
of the PACCAR decision, U.S. manufacturers chose to halt development and
production of ABS for heavy vehicles. For instance, before the 1978 ruling, A-
C Sparkplug, a domestic manufacturer of ABS, produced about 180,000 units
per year. By 1984, it was producing only about 500 units annually.
21
1
The court's demand for real-world proof of the standard's practicability
removed industry's incentive to produce the very technologies that could
Safety equipment that some manufacturers had begun installing in 1996 would be in the entire fleet by
2015.
206. 2015 OMB REPORT, supra note 176, at 91 tbl.A-2.
207. See Stability and Control of Medium and Heavy Vehicles During Braking, 60
Fed. Reg. 13,216, 13,219 (Mar. 10, 1995) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
208. PACCAR v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978).
209. Id. at 643.
210. 60 Fed. Reg. at 13,219.
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ultimately generate the proof the court required. All was not lost however. The
court's judgment did not apply beyond the United States, and manufacturers in
the rest of the world, most notably in Europe and Australia, continued to
develop ABS technology. By 1991, thirteen years after PACCAR, the Agency
informed Congress that it was now able to evaluate in-use experience with ABS
in Europe (1.5 million units deployed) and Australia (900,000 units deployed).
Manufacturers were reporting that the systems were "generally reliable." ''
Congress responded by mandating that NHTSA revisit the issue.
In March 1995, pursuant to ISTEA, NHTSA adopted an ABS standard for
air brakes and hydraulic brakes that effectively mandated the ABS technology
required by an European Economic Community (EEC) Directive.212 Stopping
distances were again relaxed, and the Agency assured industry that the new
requirements could be distinguished from those invalidated in PACCAR
because manufacturers would not need to significantly redesign the brakes in
use or use overly aggressive brakes to comply with the rule.
Nearly fifteen more years passed. Then, in 2009, NHTSA decided to
tweak the distance stopping requirements further in a rulemaking cited in the
OMB report as one of the eight "major" rules adopted by NHTSA from 2003 to
2013.23 The new requirements applied only to air brakes on tractor trailers, and
provided for a thirty percent reduction of the stopping distances adopted in
1995. Thus, under the new rule, ninety-nine percent of the tractor-trailer fleet
would be required to meet the stopping distance it had first effectively proposed
in 1971.214
The Agency again reassured industry that there was no need to fret about
the new requirements because "[t]here are a number of simple and effective
manufacturing solutions that vehicle manufacturers can use to meet the
requirements of this final rule." 215 No new technology would be required.
NHTSA "tentatively concluded that truck tractors are capable of achieving a
reduction in stopping distance within this range [250 feet from a speed of sixty
miles per hour] with existing technologies.2 6 Industry was generally
supportive of the upgrade and tended to agree it would not be disruptive.2' 7 The
regulation gave manufacturers until 2011 or 2013 (depending on the number of
211. Id. at 13,220.
212. See id. at 13,216.
213. 74 Fed. Reg. 51,910 (July27, 2009).
214. The tortured history of the early standard is recounted in detail in Paccar v.
NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (1978). The agency initially proposed a stopping distance of 217 feet, which was
extended to 245 feet in 1971, to 258 feet in 1974, to 277 feet in 1975, and then to 293 feet in 1976. This
last rendition of the standard was the one challenged in the PACCAR case.
215. Air Brake Systems, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,122 (July 27, 2009) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 571).
216. Air Brake Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,270, 74,270 (Dec. 15, 2005) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 571 ).
217. See, e.g., Jim Tipka, Vice President, American Trucking Associations, Inc,
Comment Letter on Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 121, (Apr. 14, 2006),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2005-21462-0028.
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axles on their vehicles) to comply, almost forty years after NHTSA had first
proposed effectively the same stopping distance.
3. Variation Three: Take a Page from State Farm
To understand NHTSA's next innovation in adapting to legal culture, we
need to step back once again to the Supreme Court's State Farm decision218 as
a reference point. Some readers will remember that State Farm was brought by
safety proponents seeking implementation of Standard 208 (the lead plaintiff
was State Farm Mutual Insurance Company), rather than manufacturers
resisting regulation. The version of Standard 208 at issue had required passive
protection of vehicle occupants, but left the choice of technology to
manufacturers.
When manufacturers opted for passive seat belts with a buckle release
mechanism much like manual seat belts, the Reagan Administration kept its
campaign promise to provide regulatory relief to the automobile industry and
rescinded the rule. The articulated rationale was that the same vehicle drivers
who had hated the ignition interlock and failed to use the manual belts already
in their cars would likely disable the passive belts by simply unbuckling them.
At that point, they effectively became manual belts. The Agency reasoned that
there was thus no clearly predictable safety gain from requiring passive
restraints and therefore no reason to go forward with the passive restraints rule.
As the plaintiffs in State Farm pointed out, however, an available passive
technology already existed-the air bag-that imposed no visible restrictions to
infuriate drivers. Even better, air bags were virtually indefeasible. Moreover,
the Agency, acting at the direction of its political overseers, never explained
why it had to live with the manufacturers' choice. Both airbags and continuous
spool belts were available technologies that would avoid the unbuckled,
automatic-belt problem. The Court therefore invalidated the rescission in part
because the Agency had given no reason why the standard should not require
either of these technologies.
With this background, we now turn to another of the rules cited by OMB
as "major," the tire pressure warning rule.219 To see how this rule tracks the
State Farm experience, fast forward to November 2000. The TREAD Act
required NHTSA to commence a rulemaking requiring tire inflation warning
systems. NHTSA was thus back in business on a topic it had dropped nearly
218. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
219. NHTSA estimated that the benefits of the rule on tire pressure warning would run
from $1.012 billion to $1.316 billion per year and would cost from $938 million to $2.282 billion per
year. 2015 OMB REPORT, supra note 176, at 91 tbl.A-2.
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two decades earlier because systems then available were considered either
unreliable or too expensive.2 °
In response to the TREAD Act, NHTSA issued an NPRM in July 2001.221
By then, NHTSA had evidence that motorists seldom checked the pressure of
their tires and that perhaps twenty percent of passenger vehicles and light
trucks had at least one tire that was under-inflated. Conspicuously absent was
any data on the contribution of under-inflated tires to vehicular deaths and
injuries. NHTSA's research center, however, had issued a report in May 2001
which found that during the two decades following the termination of
NHTSA's earlier rulemaking proceedings, the technology of tire pressure
warning devices had substantially improved.22 Whether or not there was a
problem, there was a solution, now coupled with a congressional mandate to do
something.
The final rule, issued in June 2002, contemplated the use of two different
technological approaches.2 23 The so-called "direct technology" option relied on
sensors in the tires themselves. The "indirect" method worked in conjunction
with ABS braking systems, already installed in sixty-seven percent of
passenger vehicles and light trucks. 24 From a safety perspective, the direct
alternative was obviously superior. It provided warnings in all circumstances
and was estimated to save 124 lives and reduce the severity of 8,722 injuries
annually.25 The indirect system would provide warnings in only about fifty
percent of cases of under-inflation226 and would save only seventy-nine lives
and reduce the severity of only 5,176 injuries.27 But the indirect system had an
advantage: it was cheaper.
2 28
In the final rule, as it had done in the version of FMVSS 208 whose
rescission was under review in State Farm, NHTSA gave manufacturers the
discretion to choose between the two options during the first three years of
implementation. After that initial period, NHTSA believed that the direct
technology was superior and should be required, but it promised to revisit the
issue in 2005 on the basis of further real-world experience with the two
systems. Meanwhile, if manufacturers chose the indirect route, they were
220. Low Tire Pressure Warning Devices, 46 Fed. Reg. 43,721 (Aug. 31, 1981)
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
221. Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,982 (July 26, 2001) (codified
at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
222. Id. at 38,987 n.9.
223. See Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,704 (June 5, 2002)
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571,590).
224. 66 Fed. Reg. 38,997 (data reported as of July 2001).
225. 67 Fed. Reg. 38,740.
226. Id. at 38,718-19.
227. Id. at 38,740.
228. Id. at 38,741.
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required to put a warning in the owner's manual that the system might not work
fifty percent of the time .229
Safety activists, consumer groups, and tire manufacturers objected to the
prospect of a compliance option that, whatever its cost virtues, worked only
half the time.2 30 Disappointed by the final rule, they sued. In an August 2003
ruling, the Second Circuit struck down the indirect option as arbitrary,
capricious, and in violation of the TREAD Act.231 Among other things, the
court noted that it was not NHTSA's job only to consider costs and embrace the
cheapest solution.232 The Agency was to consider costs in relation to benefits.
By saving more lives at relatively modest cost, the four-tire/twenty-five percent
approach was more cost effective, and hence to be preferred as the only
compliance option.
Superficially, this holding looked like another judicial loss reminiscent of
the 1970s, but in fact, it was nothing of the kind. This decision was more like
State Farm's invalidation of the rescission of FMVSS 208. Indeed, it was a
more constraining decision concerning the Agency's duty on remand. The
Second Circuit held that the TREAD Act required a system that could
determine when "a tire" was underinflated. A system that could do so only fifty
percent of the time did not comply with the Act. Once the court found that the
statute required the costlier and more stringent option, the agency had to adopt
it. Under the TREAD Act's mandate, inaction was not an option. And there was
no chance industry could then successfully sue to overturn it. 233 The Agency's
task on remand could not have been simpler. All it needed to do was excise the
indirect option and reissue the rule, which is essentially what it did.234
229. Id. at 38,705-6.
230. See id. at 38,709-10.
231. See Pub. Citizen v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2003).
232. Id. at 58.
233. To be sure, industry had some reasonable arguments. The Agency's information
suggesting that there was a safety problem was quite sketchy. In the end, it relied on a single study by
Indiana University for evidence of how often tire under-inflation caused accidents while admitting that it
had no accident data linking accidents to under-inflated tires. Moreover, even on the expectation that
manufacturers would use the most cost-effective means of compliance with the rule, the expected costs
per life saved outweighed the benefits. In short, the Agency might be charged with regulating a risk that
was not, in the statute's term, an "unreasonable risk," and doing so in a manner that was impracticable
because unreasonably costly. It had lost a suit back in the 1970s on precisely these grounds. See Nat'l
Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But the manufacturers did
not raise these sorts of claims concerning the tire pressure monitoring rule for good reason. While the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 1974 had struck down parts of the Agency's tire labeling rules
concerning retreaded tires on the grounds just suggested, it left in effect two congressionally mandated
parts of the rule. As was mentioned earlier, the court somewhat laconically opined, "No administrative
procedure test applies to an act of Congress." Id. at 37. The TREAD Act mandated rules concerning tire
pressure monitoring systems. That the rule might solve a non-problem at significant expense was
irrelevant so long as Congress required it.
234. But rulemaking is never really simple. It took two years and forty-eight pages in
the Federal Register to get the job done. See Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,136
(Apr. 8, 2005) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571,585).
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One constituency however remained discontented. Perhaps emboldened
by its success in overturning significant portions of the original rule, Public
Citizen (joined by tire companies and their trade association) challenged the
revised version as well.235 The plaintiffs urged that the revised rule was not as
strong as it could be, or as strong as the TREAD Act purportedly required.
Among other features, the plaintiffs challenged the revised rule's criterion for
determining "significant" under-inflation, the time permitted (twenty minutes)
to activate the warning, and the absence of requirements applicable to
replacement ires.
Now it was the safety activists' turn to be reminded of some of legal
culture's most basic lessons. The Court never reached the merits of the
plaintiffs' claims; instead it focused on standing. The Court first noted that
"standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers" and
was instrumental in helping "ensure that the Judicial Branch does not perform
functions assigned to the Legislative or Executive Branch.2 36 Noting that the
standard regulated the conduct of auto companies, who had not challenged it,
rather than tire companies, who had, the court in due course found the tire
companies' claims of injury (the prospect of increased warranty and product
liability claims) far too attenuated to satisfy the requirements for standing to
seek judicial review of the rule.
The Court then turned to the petition of Public Citizen, which had based its
claim to organizational standing on the assertion that the revised standard
placed its members at "higher risk of injury" than the version of the standard
that Public Citizen preferred. The Court was deeply skeptical that such risks
constituted "actual or imminent harm" sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
Article III standing. If accepted the court feared that "increased-risk-of-harm
claims" would pave the way for challenging virtually any agency rule
perceived by someone to be less rigorous than desired. The Court permitted
Public Citizen to submit an affidavit and additional briefing to seek to establish
its members' injury in fact. These submissions failed to make the requisite
showing. When dismissing Public Citizen's complaint the court emphasized
anew the broader institutional issues at stake:
remote and speculative claims of possible future harm ... are properly left
to the policymaking Branches, not the Article III courts . . . . Allowing
such claims . . . would expand the proper-and properly limited-
constitutional role of the Judicial Branch beyond deciding actual cases or
controversies; and would entail the Judiciary exercising some part of the
235. Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
236. Id. at 1289.
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Executive's responsibility to take care that the law be faithfully
executed ."
VI. Evaluating the Co-Regulatory Rebound
238
The five rules discussed above account for ninety-two to ninety-four
percent of the benefits reported by OMB as attributable to NHTSA's "major"
rules during all of the post-Glacial rebound (2003 to 2013). Taken together, the
rules are most notable for what they did not accomplish or even try to
accomplish. They did not force technology but, rather, inched it forward at a
pace sufficiently congenial to industry that, after the usual fog of objections in
the rulemaking proceedings, it simply complied. Judged by the ambitious
standards of the original Act, NHTSA's rulemaking strategy in the post-Glacial
rebound has something of an illusory quality.
Labeling NHTSA's rulemaking efforts in the post-Glacial period
"illusory" may seem harsh. We readily acknowledge that the Agency adopted a
handful of post-Glacial rules that modestly accelerated the diffusion of
technologies in areas where industry had, at home or abroad, already made
considerable progress. That said, rules that codify existing industry practice or
plans, mandate proven technologies that are required in other jurisdictions, and
give manufacturers a choice of existing technologies even when some of them
are demonstrably inadequate, seem vastly less ambitious than the objectives
contemplated by the 1966 Act. And it may well be that many of these
technologies would have diffused anyway, due to product liability concerns and
market pressures.
NHTSA's new, more deferential approach to setting safety standards has
certainly allowed the Agency to move beyond its rulemaking torpor in the late-
twentieth century. But the Agency's adaptive strategy raises an obvious
question. Are the rules adopted in the post-Glacial rebound accomplishing
something with respect to safety that otherwise would not occur but for
NHTSA's intervention? Do these standards "force technology" by requiring
safety features that manufacturers would not have supplied voluntarily? The
answer to both questions seems to be "probably not." Technology forcing in the
context of the enactment of the 1966 Act meant mandating vehicle safety
performance that would force manufacturers to develop and deploy
technologies that they otherwise would not have brought to market. NHTSA's
rebound rules at most mandate diffusion of existing technologies, but it is
237. Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 513 F.3d 234, 237 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
238. Co-regulation or cooperative regulation are terms that encompass a series of
differing techniques for sharing regulatory authority between regulators and the regulated. For a general
overview, see Edward J. Balleisen, The Prospects for Effective Coregulation in the United States: A
Historian's View from the Early Twenty-First Century, in EDWARD BALLEISEN & DAVID MOSS,
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 443 (Edward Balleisen &
David Moss eds., 2010).
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unclear the extent to which they do even that, and what reductions in the
fatality rate can be said to have occurred "but for" NHTSA's efforts. Let's take
a look at some recent numbers.
A. Quantitative Perspectives
In 2015, NHTSA issued an update of its 2004 "Lives Saved" study.2 39 The
new study examines lives saved in motor vehicle accidents through 2012 by
safety technologies in some way "associated with" NHTSA's safety
standards.24° It confirms the findings of the 2004 study in all material respects,
both with respect to the overall quantum of lives saved through 2002 and the
attribution of those lives to specific technologies associated with the Agency's
standards .24 ' The 2015 study then picks up where the 2004 study left off,
assessing the additional lives saved from 2003 to 2012, both by the
technologies evaluated in the 2004 study and by new technologies adopted
thereafter.242
Consistent with the 2004 report, the conclusion of the 2015 update seems
to be that nearly seventy-five percent of the reduction in the risk of driving
would have occurred without NHTSA's standards.243 Further, about sixty
percent of the reduced fatalities that NHTSA ties to technologies associated
with its standards really should be ascribed to one standard, Standard 208,
mostly because it requires a rudimentary technology, seat belts, albeit with
subsequent improvements, that all states now require motorists to use.244 This
239. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT-HS-812-069, LIVES SAVED BY
VEHICLE SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES AND ASSOCIATED FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS,
1960 TO 2012 (2015).
240. Id. at xvii.
241. The 2015 Study presents a slight upward revision of the lives saved as reported in
the 2004 study (from 328,551 to 332,495) to account for technologies that began to appear in production
vehicles in 2002 (the last year covered in the 2004 study) but had not yet been evaluated. Id. at xvii.
242. The Study reports an additional 281,042 lives saved from 2003 through 2012,
either by technologies implemented "post FMVSS" or voluntarily, for a grand total of 613,501 lives
saved for the period 1960 through 2012. See id. at xvii.
243. Id. at 240 tbl.2-6 (noting a reduction in the fatality rate from 4.57 per 100 million
miles in 1966, to 0.82 in 2012; without safety technologies, however NHTSA estimated that the rate
would have fallen in the same period from 4.61 to 1.96, meaning that 73% of the reduction would have
occurred, by NHTSA's calculation, without any of the safety technologies). The report identifies a broad
range of factors apart from vehicle technologies that contribute to reducing the fatality rate: safer roads;
behavioral programs, such as initiatives to reduce drunk driving; better medicine, for example, improved
trauma care; and demographic shifts, such as trends toward urbanization and suburbanization with a
corresponding increase in lower risk commuting, as well as an increase in the proportion of female
drivers with lower fatal crash rates. Id. at x, 239-243. In effect, the study finds that a large number of
lives saved by safety technologies, whether or not associated with NHTSA's standards, would have been
saved anyway as a result of non-technological factors.
244. The study reports that a total of 329,715 lives saved from 1960 to 2012 can be
tied to seat belts and an additional 42,856 lives saved can be tied to air bags, id. at 245 tbl.2-7,
representing 60.7% of the total lives saved (613,501) during the period. These figures have not been
adjusted to account for voluntary measures; we estimate that doing so would marginally increase the
estimated impact of Standard 208.
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suggests that only about ten percent of the overall risk reduction can be
attributed on a "but for" basis to safety standards other than Standard 208.
Of course, had other developments-improved roads, better medicine, less
drunk driving, and the like-not occurred to reduce the fatality rate, NHTSA
could reasonably argue that its standards were there to save the day. But it is
surprising how few of those standard can be shown, even today, to have had
any demonstrable, significant effect. The 2015 study makes clear that, together
with Standard 208, the same six pre-1974 standards discussed earlier
245
continue to account for the lion's share of lives saved (that can be tied to
standards at all) in the post-Glacial period. Of all the lives saved in the last year
(2012) of the study and attributed to standards (25,370) as opposed to voluntary
measures, the study suggests that some ninety percent are attributable to
Standard 208 and the pre-1974 standards.246 That said, the 2015 report indicates
that help-of a sort-may be on the way.
The report addresses four of the eight rules issued during the rebound that
OMB and NHTSA deemed "major. 247 They are (1) Standard 126 on ESC; (2)
Standard 226 on ejection mitigation; (3) Standard 214 on the upgrade of side
impact protection; and (4) Standard 208, as amended to require rear center lap
and shoulder belts. In each case, the technologies contemplated by these
standards were available on vehicles years before the standards took effect.
More telling, in almost every case, the "median" installation date (the date by
which fifty percent of new cars are equipped with the technology) also
preceded the effective dates of the standards.248 In order to believe that
NHTSA's recent standards are doing much work, one has to assume that
diffusion of these technologies in new motor vehicles would have stopped just
at the point that NHTSA intervened to adopt a rule.
NHTSA can indulge that assumption because of two critical features of its
accounting methodology. First, NHTSA is careful to characterize safety
benefits from the new technologies canvassed in its study as benefits from
technologies "associated with," not produced by, its standards.249 Lives saved
by pre-standard, voluntary installation of those technologies generally are not
245. See supra Section IL.B .
246. See id. at 228 tbl.2-3; id. at 245-47 tbls.2-7 to 2-9. We adjusted these data to
account for voluntary measures using the same approach we employed with respect to the 2004 study.
See supra note 49.
247. With respect to the other rules classified by OMB as major, the 2015 Lives Saved
Study does not include (1) the reduced braking distances set forth in the "upgrade" of Standard 121,
because the Agency could not establish any statistical correlation between that standard and fatality
reduction; (2) the upgrade of Standard 202 on head restraints, because that standard essentially addresses
whiplash injures which are generally not life threatening, and the Agency found no evidence of fatality
reduction; (3) the upgrade of roof crush resistance in Standard 216a, because the Agency has not yet
conducted a safety assessment of the effectiveness of that standard; or (4) the TPMS standard, because
the Agency has not yet conducted a safety assessment of that standard either, although it notes "on the
road performance augurs well for the future safety evaluation." Id. at 53.
248. See id. at 220 tbl.2-1 (passenger cars); id. at 225 tbl.2-2 (LTVs).
249. See, e.g., id. at I, xvii.
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treated as "associated with" NHTSA's efforts. But, second, because vehicles
that contained these technologies prior to the standards' effective dates will
slowly disappear from the roads, ultimately all the lives saved and injuries
avoided by these technologies will be "associated with," i.e., post-date,
NHTSA's new standards. As with the 2004 study, industry voluntarism will
disappear from the accounting.
250
We have no independent data that permits a confident projection of what
automobile manufacturers would have done absent NHTSA's return to standard
setting in the past decade. We can only note that motorists have come to expect
safety and other featuros that are widespread in the motor vehicle fleet.
Vehicles that fail to provide these features lose their attractiveness in the
marketplace. Moreover, where safety features plausibly save lives and prevent
serious injury, manufacturers risk tort liability-including punitive damages-
for failure to include them in their new motor vehicles. Design defect litigation
uses industry practice as the standard by which to determine whether a
particular design is reasonable. Failure to provide safety features that are
prevalent in competitor's models is risky business.
B. Qualitative Perspectives
1. Peace in Our Time
NHTSA's venture into cooperative rulemaking may seem disappointing
from the standpoint of the 1966 Act. But from a variety of other perspectives,
illusory rules have been a resounding success. Industry could hardly complain.
There was the usual carping in the notice-and-comment period, but the Agency
was not requiring industry to go much further or faster than it wished. Apart
from the usual posturing, Congress had little to complain about, either. The
Agency appeared to be complying with the lion's share of its commands and
was doing little that Congress had not mandated. The Executive treated the
Agency gently as well. After all, OMB reported the Agency's rules were
generating benefits nearly three times their costs. With one exception,
discussed below, OMB did not return any of NHTSA's post-Glacial rules for a
rethink.
Safety activists-some of them, anyway-had victories as well.
Consumer and parents' groups could point to multiple legislative victories
compelling NHTSA to secure the equal protection of especially vulnerable
cohorts -toddlers, short-statured women, the aged, and the disabled. The
250. Standard 126 on electronic stability control, which the 2015 study highlights as a
major life-saving technology coming online, illustrates this accounting approach. ESC was first
introduced in passenger cars in 1998 and reached fifty percent penetration in new cars in 2010. See id. at
220 tbl.2-1. The standard was phased in from 2009 to 2012. As this occurred, the Agency increasingly
allocated ESC installations to the standard rather than to voluntary industry action. See id. at 282 tbl.2-
26.
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number of lives saved by those measures might be extremely modest, but they
responded to irresistible political demands. To be sure, other activists might be
restive, but they had limited resources to do much about it, and faced an uphill
legal battle petitioning courts to force the Agency to act more aggressively. In
short, relative calm appeared to have descended on the rulemaking battlefield
after the sound and fury of the Agency's early rulemaking efforts.
2. Restoration Prospects
But what about the Great Society vision of 1966? Were the forces that
assembled then forever defeated, or simply awaiting reinforcement? From what
we have seen so far, it is hard to imagine the post-Glacial rebound merely as an
interlude before a resurgence of more ambitious rulemaking at some future
point. The effects on NHTSA's internal culture caused by judicial skepticism,
executive obstruction, and legislative neglect were long in the making. The
bureaucratic pathologies that Professor Golden and we diagnosed inside
NHTSA were chronic and deeply embedded. The agency-forcing statutes-
with their ambivalent, opaque, nuanced, and sometimes even conflicting
subtext-hardly seemed up to the task of restoring the Agency's rulemaking
vigor.
Whether the public desires NHTSA to engage in ambitious technology
forcing is surely an open question. But if we were to want the Agency to go
beyond nudging industry to do more of what it is doing-or if you prefer,
beyond the co-regulatory practice of modestly diffusing safety technologies
that industry selects- something fundamental would need to change in the way
the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature interact with it. Judging by the
safety goals of the still-intact 1966 Act, oversight of the Agency by legal and
political monitors has been dysfunctional. It has limited rather than enhanced
NHTSA's capacity to make vehicular travel safer, and agency-forcing statutes
have done little to speed progress toward those goals. In fact, as NHTSA has
embarked on implementing the agency-forcing statutes, it has continued to
encounter many of the same dynamic forces that gave rise to the Ice Age. Let
us consider a few cases in point.
3. The Clash of Legal and Political Logics
While industry, Congress, and the executive may have settled comfortably
into the safety world defined by the Agency's policy of accommodation,
NHTSA's bureaucratic life has not been so tranquil. And to the extent NHTSA
has been found to be "arbitrary and capricious," or to have pursued peculiar
regulatory objectives, the reasons can often be traced back to Congress or the
Executive. Neither the public health perspective of the 1966 Act nor the
demands of reviewing courts for scientific rigor, as internalized by NHTSA's
own bureaucratic culture, necessarily bind the agency's political overseers.
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a. Bumbling OMB Review
As we have seen, only one "major" post-Glacial rule was challenged in
court: the TREAD Act's mandated standard on tire pressure monitoring
systems (TPMSs). The reviewing court bluntly reported that it had "searched
the rulemaking record in vain for some 'rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made.""'2 5 What the court did not say, and perhaps did not
fully appreciate, was that the champion of the indirect option was not NHTSA,
but none other than the guardian of regulatory rationality itself, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) at OMB.
OIRA's rationale for favoring that option featured prominently in hearings
before a subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee to
consider the TREAD Act's implementation a year after its passage.25 2 At the
time of the hearing, the TPMS rule was still pending, and was the subject of a
dispute between OMB and the Agency. In its original proposal in July 2001 ,253
NHTSA had been pushing for standards that many of the less efficacious
indirect monitoring methods did not meet. 4 After taking public comment, the
Agency then prepared a final rule that was even more restrictive and sent it to
OMB for review. The draft final rule permitted only direct systems after a four-
year phase-in period.255 OMB disagreed. OMB saw two reasons to favor the
indirect method. First, it was cheaper, since it relied on ABS systems, which
were then installed in only about two-thirds of new passenger cars. Second,
allowing it as a compliance option would induce manufacturers to improve
safety by equipping more vehicles with anti-lock brakes.256
The compromise position was the short-term option that the Second
Circuit invalidated.257 But NHTSA did not leave the OMB position
unchallenged. Explaining in its rulemaking notice why it allowed the indirect
method as only a short-run solution, the Agency first observed that the TPMS
251. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39, 58 (2d Cir. 2003).
252. See The Implementation of the TREAD Act: One Year Later: Hearing Before the




253. Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,982 (July 26, 2001) (codified
at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
254. The Agency proposed two alternative sets of criteria. Only direct TMP systems
could meet the first set, and only direct or upgraded indirect TPM systems could meet the second. The
Agency reported that it had tested four different ABS-based indirect systems and that none of them met
either set of its proposed criteria. See id. at 38,989, 38,996-97.
255. TREAD Implementation Hearing, supra note 141, at 10 (statement of Rep. Billy
Tauzin, Chairman, H. Energy & Commerce Comm.).
256. See id. at 19 (statement of John D. Graham, Administrator, OIRA) (arguing that a
standard that permits indirect systems "encourages vehicle manufacturers to install anti-lock braking
systems in vehicles that currently do not have them"); id. at 46-48 (letter from John D. Graham,
Administrator, OIRA to K.K. Van Tine, General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Transp., dated Feb. 12, 2002)
(returning for reconsideration NHTSA draft final TPMS rule on the grounds that the Agency had not
shown it had selected the best regulatory method to achieve the statutory goal).
257. Pub. Citizen v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2003).
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rule did not mandate installation of anti-lock brakes and that the Agency had
"analyzed ABS and determined that there is currently no statistically reliable
basis for concluding that ABS reduces fatalities in light vehicles."25 8 In short,
there was no evidence that OMB's goal of increasing the installation of ABS in
light vehicles had any safety payoff. But, even if there were such evidence,
OMB's position made no sense.
The Agency patiently reviewed the basics of auto safety economics,
explaining why using the TPMS rule to leverage greater industry acceptance of
ABS brakes was unlikely to be effective:
[Il]t is not economically reasonable for manufacturers to install ABS
voluntarily on significantly more vehicles in response to being permitted
to install current indirect TPMSs ... . NHTSA may not simply assume
that manufacturers will elect to spend $240 per vehicle to install ABS to
save $53, the difference between the cost of a direct TPMS ($66) and an
indirect TPMS ($13). The market for ABS has been static for several
years, with the installation rate of about 63 percent. Absent a market
demand for more installations, a manufacturer would not gain a market
advantage by increasing the percentage of its vehicles with ABS. 259
Asked about the TPMS litigation at a congressional hearing not long after
the suit was brought, NHTSA's Administrator glumly commented, if the
original proposal "had gone through, all vehicles would have TPMS's in them
now, and we wouldn't be having this conversation.26 °
The TPMS episode is perhaps best seen as a conflict between the political
demands of the executive (dressed here in the garb of economic/analytic
arguments) and the legal demands of the judiciary. In effect, NHTSA was
caught in the crossfire between a judiciary that required sensible xplanations, a
Congress that demanded action on what may have been a vanishingly small
problem, and an executive overseer fixated on a form of microeconomic
analysis that tended to conflate abstractly imagined incentives with real-world
behaviors. Just around the corner loomed another struggle, this one between
Congress and the Executive for control of the Agency's agenda, priorities, and
allocation of resources. NHTSA would again be caught in the vice of its
overseers' conflicting demands.
b. Congressional Agenda Setting: Act One
Congress labored long and hard over its mandate in the Cameron
Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety (KTSA) Act of 2007 that NHTSA
258. Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,704, 38,719 (June 5, 2002)
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 590).
259. Id.
260. 2005 House SAFETEA-LU Hearing, supra note 125, at 26 (testimony of Jeffrey
Runge, Administrator, NHTSA).
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adopt a standard to prevent back-over accidents .261 For some four years up to
and including the passage of KTSA, Congress visited and revisited the issue.262
NHTSA over and again endeavored to persuade Congress that back-over
accidents were a relatively infrequent occurrence with no readily available cost
effective solution.263
In hearings before a House subcommittee in 2005, NHTSA Administrator
Jeffrey Runge, fully attuned to the delicacy of opposing a law to protect
toddlers and wheelchair occupants from being inadvertently backed over, often
by other family members, began by explaining that "unfortunately" the Agency
had to "give a lower priority to proposals not inspired by sound data, or that
involve large costs to consumers with minimal impact on the safety
numbers.' 264 Runge concluded, perhaps mindful of the unhappy conversations
he was likely to have with OMB analysts: "So you know, when you look at
costs and benefits here, it gets a little tough to justify. ' 265 Runge also reminded
Congress of prior instances in which congressional mandates had produced
limited safety gains at enormous cost, or unintended side effects, as in the
passenger-side airbags episode.266
Neither the Administrator's lessons from the history of congressional
mandates, nor his facts and figures, were, however, a match for the small
platoon of grieving parents. They came before Congress armed with images of
ice cream trucks crushing five-year-olds and seventeen children crouching
undetected behind a SUV, illustrating its expansive blind spot for all viewers of
Good Morning America to see.267 In due course, KTSA passed, leaving
NHTSA to ponder how it should formulate a rule that it could defend to OMB.
The Agency issued an ANPRM in March 2009, but then failed to meet the
2011 statutory deadline for final action. Further action was delayed five
261. See Pub. L. No. 110-189, 639 Stat. 122 (2007) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,111
(2012)).
262. The legislation was first introduced in 2003 in response to advocacy by a Long
Island parent who backed over his son. 153 CONG. REC. H16873 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007) (statement of
Rep. Schakowsky).
263. In 2006, responding to a Congressional request, NHTSA issued a report that was
critical of back-over avoidance technologies. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., VEHICLE
BACKOVER AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGY STUDY, REPORT TO CONGRESS (2006). The Congressional
Budget Office estimated that the cost of implementing a mandate would be $350 per car. S. REP. No.
110-275, at 5 (2008). NHTSA wanted to leave the issue to market forces, reasoning that people without
kids should not be made to purchase the camera equipment. 2005 House SAFETEA-LU Hearing, supra
note 125, at 15 (statement of Jeffrey Runge, Administrator, NHTSA).
264. Id. at 9.
265. Id. at 15-16.
266. Id. at 10.
267. See "Big Vehicle Blind Spots Leaving Kids Dead," ABC NEWS,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=128111 (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (noting an ABC affiliate's
demonstration that a "whopping" seventeen children were not visible from the driver's seat when they
were standing in the blind spot of one vehicle.)
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separate times; in 2014, consumer groups sued to force NHTSA to implement
KTSA' s mandate.268
The Agency's announcement of the final rule came a day before the
Second Circuit was scheduled to hear that lawsuit. The rule269 was almost
certainly among the most cost-inefficient safety standards ever issued by
NHTSA.270 But procrastination had its virtues. In 2005, when the back-over
debate began in earnest, only five percent of cars could be purchased with a
rearview camera built in; by 2014, when the final rule was belatedly adopted,
rear cameras were standard or optional on eighty-five percent of vehicles.27I
Consumers wanted the technology to help them reverse out of their driveways
and successfully parallel park their vehicles. The Agency anticipated that back-
up cameras would be installed voluntarily in seventy-three percent of the fleet
by MY 2018, even if it took no action.272 As a result, in issuing the final rule,
the Agency would not be adding much cost to what the industry would do
anyway and could report that "we anticipate that many manufacturers will be
able to meet the phase-in schedule with little adjustment to their current
manufacturing plans .,,73
c. Congressional Agenda Setting: Act Two
Meanwhile, back on the Hill, rear visibility was not the only issue on
Congress's mind as it pondered what to order NHTSA to do next. If the back-
over mandate illustrated Congress's determination to address a marginal
problem, KTSA's mandate to install power window automatic reversal systems
(ARS) showed it was prepared to insist that NHTSA address an issue that
presented essentially no safety problem at all.
Power windows were not a new preoccupation for Congress or for
NHTSA. In SAFETEA-LU, Congress had already directed NHTSA to mandate
268. See Pete Bigelow, After Years of Delays, NHTSA Issues Backup Cameras Rule,
AUTOBLOG (Mar. 31, 2014, 3:03 PM), http://www.autoblog.com/2014/03/31/nhtsa-issues-backup-
camera-rules; Gabe Nelson, DOT Sued Over Delayed Backup Camera Mandate, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS
(Sept. 25, 2013, 12:09 PM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20130925/OEMII/130929952/dot-sued-
over-delayed-backup-camera-mandate.
269. See 79 Fed. Reg. 19,178 (April 7, 2014).
270. NHTSA estimated that cameras would cost between $15.9 and $26.3 million per
life saved, substantially in excess of the value of life of $6.1 million that the Agency was then using in
its cost-benefit analyses. Id. at 19,181. The Agency noted, however, that the rule was required to address
"a safety risk identified by Congress." Id. at 19,178. The Agency then reasoned that back-over victims
were among "the most vulnerable members of our society" (children, the elderly, and the disabled); that
"most people place a high value on the lives of children"; and that "as back-over crash victims are often
struck by immediate family members or caretakers, an exceptionally high emotional cost," not easily
monetized, "is often inflicted on the families of crash victims." Id. at 19,180-81.
271. Cheryl Jensen, Rearview Cameras by 2018 for Cars and Light Trucks, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/20l4/04/01/automobiles/us-to-require-rearview-
cameras-in-new-cars-by-2018.html.
272. 79 Fed. Reg. 19,180.
273. Rear Visibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 19,718, 19,181 n.14 (Apr. 7, 2014) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 571).
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up-or-out switches for power windows, so that a child could not step on a
window switch and crush herself in the closing window. Even before
SAFETEA-LU, two years earlier, NHTSA had acted on that very concern by
finalizing a rule requiring that power window activation switches be
recessed. 27 4 The agency considered up-or-out switches as unnecessary given its
earlier rule, but Congress demanded a final rule requiring them by April 1,
2007. NHTSA duly obliged, adopting the up-or-out rule in April 2006, even
though its own studies indicated that child fatalities involving power windows
were an "extremely rare occurrence," involving between one and two children
each year. 5
NHTSA also used the occasion of that rulemaking to reject a petition filed
in 2004 by consumer associations (mainly parents' groups) urging the Agency,
among other things, to require ARSs for power windows. Given the fatality
data, and the steps the Agency had already taken-first to recess the activation
switch and then to mandate an up-or-out design-the Agency concluded it
simply could not justify an ARS requirement on cost-benefit grounds.
276
Congress nonetheless mandated in KTSA that the Agency revisit the
power window issue once again. The political dynamics of ARS were
essentially the same as those of the back-over issue. NHTSA's arguments about
cost-benefit analysis went nowhere. On September 1, 2009, the Agency
published its proposal, which was in many ways a thread-the-needle classic.
277
NHTSA's notice reflects in exquisite detail the complexity of the Agency's
effort to mediate between the rational demands of the executive and the
emotive demands of its legislative overseer, in search of a rule that the Agency,
not just a reviewing court, might view as directed towards an "unreasonable
risk."
The Agency began by noting, with a whiff of exhaustion, that it had
already addressed the issue of power windows and child safety "numerous
times," and reviewed once more the steps it had taken in 2004 and 2006 to
require recessed activation switches and up-or-out switch design. Once again,
the Agency pointed out that the "data indicate that there are few if any fatalities
and serious injuries remaining.278 NHTSA nonetheless pressed ahead in what
can only be described as a heroic search-and-rescue mission-all it needed was
a victim. The Agency acknowledged that its customary databases might not
274. Power-Operated Window, Partition, and Roof Panel Systems, 69 Fed. Reg.
55,517, 55,517 (Oct. 21,2004) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
275. Vehicle Safety for Children: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs,
Ins. & Auto. Safety of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 110th Cong. 6 (2007) (statement of
Ronald Medford, Senior Administrator for Vehicle Safety, NHTSA). This point was repeated in the
preamble to the agency's final rule. 71 Fed. Reg. 18,673-83 (Apr. 12, 2006) (codified at 49 C.F.R. 571).
276. Power-Operated Window, Partition, and Roof Panel Systems, 71 Fed. Reg.
18,679 (Apr. 12,2006) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
277. Power-Operated Window, Partition, and Roof Panel Systems, 74 Fed. Reg.
45,143 (Sept. 1,2009) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
278. Id. at 45,144.
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have captured the full extent of the problem because power window incidents
are typically non-crash events often taking place on private property
(driveways) and hence not captured by its fatal accident reporting system. The
Agency thus scoured death certificates, emergency room admissions, and other
mortality data, reporting that power windows were now thought to be involved
in six fatalities and 1,953 injuries annually.
Based on its now more refined analysis, the Agency distinguished
between two types of power window accidents. The first was the one that had
bedeviled Congress: "inadvertent actuation," the source of most fatalities and
serious injuries. Inadvertent actuation typically involved a child's accidental
trigger of the window closure. The evidence was overwhelming that the
Agency had already dealt with this problem through the rules adopted in 2004
and 2006.279
The second injury scenario involved "obstructed closing," in which the
operator of a power window activates it intentionally, unaware that another
person's body (most often a hand or finger) is obstructing the window. Safer
switches of the kind already required were obviously not protective in these
cases, because the operator intentionally activated them. However, the Agency
found that incidents of obstructed closing, while far more common, also
involved, overwhelmingly, very minor injuries, most often pinched fingers.280
Moreover, because all "one-touch" or "express up" power windows,
windows that rolled all the way up or down with one flick of the power switch,
already had ARS that complied with the European ARS standard-ECE R21,
NHTSA could not identify a single injury resulting from an express up power
window. That left the improbable scenario in which a victim or someone else
continued to activate a manual switch notwithstanding the fact that fingers,
necks, or torsos were being trapped or crushed by the window. The Agency
was staring at a non-problem and a congressional demand to fix it.
NHTSA thus proposed to require ECE-compliant ARS on all power
windows with express functionality. Because this was what industry-and by
"industry" we mean effectively all of industry-was already doing, the Agency
reported that both the costs and benefits of its proposal were zero.28' Public
comment poured in from industry associations, suppliers, safety advocacy
organizations, members of Congress, and individuals. Only industry supported
the proposal. Safety organizations wanted ARS to apply to all power windows.
Members of Congress complained that the Agency's proposal to require the
279. Id. at 45,146-47 (suggesting that the problem of inadvertent actuation was
"largely alleviated" by prior rulemakings).
280. Id. at 45,148.
281. Id. at 45,155. Some ARS systems then on the market might not have met ECE
specifications, but NHTSA did not seem to think this was much of an issue since the effectiveness of
ARS in preventing serious injury did not seem to turn on "the exact specifications." Id. at 45,151.
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status quo "would not sufficiently achieve the Congressional intent" underlying
KTSA. 82
Congressional outrage took center stage at an oversight hearing before a
subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, shortly after the
close of the comment period and before the Agency had finalized its rule. As
Congresswoman Schakowsky put the matter:
So the preferred alternative to protect children was a no-cost, no-benefit
solution. I would have thought it embarrassing actually not only to put that
in writing but to choose that as the preferred option. I would hope that
nothing like that happens again.
2 83
An indignant Congress may have been exasperated by a rule that seemed
to be a cavalier implementation of its mandate. But what options did NHTSA
really have in the ARS proceeding? All the alternatives it considered to the
zero-cost, zero-benefit option had a cost of lives saved and injuries avoided
many multiples greater than the values prescribed by OMB's cost-benefit
guidance and NHTSA's standard practice when doing such analyses. When the
benefit number is zero, the cost-benefit ratio is infinity to nothing. Nor was a
reviewing court likely to find reasonable a rule that imposed costs without
conferring any benefit. The problem was not NHTSA's solution, but
Congress's choice of problem.
In early 2011, NHTSA withdrew its proposed ARS rule and terminated
the rulemaking on the ground that there was not sufficient information to
conclude that an ARS mandate would be reasonable, practicable, or
appropriate.284 Among other things, the Agency noted it did not know how to
assess the costs and benefits of avoiding pinched fingers. Tossing Congress a
bone, the Agency announced it would soon be using its five-star NCAP
program to inform the public what particular models and makes have ARS. The
bone was a bit short on food value, of course. So far as the Agency could
determine, all vehicles with windows featuring express functionality already
had ARS systems.
NHTSA thus narrowly avoided regulatory farce, but no one spoke of the
costs that the proceeding had inflicted on the Agency-the thousands of staff
hours futilely spent, the painstaking review of death certificates, emergency
room admissions, and mountains of other data, the preparation for and
attendance at multiple congressional hearings, the review and analysis of stacks
and stacks of public comments, the distraction from other more pressing issues,
282. Power-Operated Window, Partition, and Roof Panel Systems, 76 Fed. Reg.
11,415 (Mar. 2,2011) (codified at49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
283. NHTSA Oversight: The Road Ahead: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111 th Cong. 25 (2010)
(statement of Rep. Jan Shakowsky).
284. 76 Fed. Reg. at 11,415.
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the effects of such a trivial pursuit on staff morale. The Agency quietly entered
the safe harbor of inaction. Although agencies that have done a great deal of
work on a rule and then abandoned it are somewhat more vulnerable to judicial
285review than agencies who simply do nothing, no one sued NHTSA to try to
force it to do the useless.
VII. Judicial Review of Rulemaking: 1985-2015
An account of NHTSA in court over the past thirty years is a short story.
The Ice Age, having produced no significant rules, produced almost no court
cases. There wasn't much to litigate. Then came the post-Glacial rebound. For
reasons we have explained, cooperative regulation featuring largely illusory
rules-the distinguishing innovation of the period-virtually guaranteed that
NHTSA would not be dragged back into court very often. And it was not. The
Agency's strategic shift from technology forcing to diffusion nudging paid off
handsomely in avoiding legal challenge or embarrassment.
During its first twenty years from 1966 to 1986, NHTSA was sued a total
of seventeen times in cases challenging its rulemaking decisions on the
merits.*86 Twelve of those challenges came from industry (individual
companies or trade associations) seeking to invalidate all or part of a rule.287 A
thirteenth challenge came from a conservative foundation also seeking
invalidation.288 The Agency lost six of those thirteen challenges.289 Apart from
the passive restraints issue, there were only two cases reaching the merits
brought by a public interest group seeking stronger agency action.290
285. Compare Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reviewing
abandonment of a proceeding after extensive research and consultation with affected interests), with
Conservancy of S.W. Fla. v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 677 F.3d 1073 (11th Cir. 2012) (refusing to review
simple denial of petitions for a rule).
286. See Justice Denied Hearing, supra note 3, at 88 tbl.3 (testimony of Cary
Coglianese, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania) (indicating NHTSA's rulemaking record
comprising cases in which the courts reached the merits). To Professor Coglianese's list, we have added
an additional case: Pub. Citizen v. Steed, 733 F. 2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (striking down NHTSA's
suspension of tire treadwear grading requirements).
287. The twelve cases were (1) Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); (2) B.F. Goodrich v. United States Department
of Transportation, 592 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1979); (3) PACCAR v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978);
(4) Goodrich v. United States Department of Transportation, 541 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1976); (5)
Chrysler Corp. v. United States Department of Transportation, 515 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1975); (6)
National Tire Dealers and Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974); (7) Ford Motor
Co. v NHTSA, 473 F.2d 1241(6th Cir. 1973); (8) Chrysler Corp. v. United States Department of
Transportation, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972); (9) H&H Tire Co. v. United States Department of
Transportation, 471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972); (10) Wagner Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d
Cir. 1972); (11) Boating Industry Ass'n v. Boyd, 409 F.2d 408 (7th Cit. 1969); and (12) Automobile
Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cit. 1968).
288. See Pac. Legal Found. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cit. 1979).
289. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
290. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (challenging
NHTSA's revision of bumper standard, FMVSS 215, in part on safety grounds); Pub. Citizen v. Steed
733 F. 2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984). A third challenge brought by safety activists to strengthen a standard was
dismissed on standing grounds. See discussions in supra notes 235-237. The passive restraints litigation
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In the most recent thirty years, NHTSA has been sued only seven times in
rulemaking challenges, the equivalent of more than a seventy percent caseload
reduction.291 Not one of those cases involved a major manufacturer or its trade
association.92 A majority of cases (four out of seven) involved public interest
groups or individuals seeking stronger agency action293 _-not the result one
would expect of an agency portrayed by OMB, based on NHTSA's regulatory
impact analyses, as imposing billions of dollars of costs on industry each year.
The suggestion that NHTSA's ability to adopt rules could not have been
significantly inhibited by judicial review because it was seldom sued is facially
plausible.294 But it masks the regulatory transformation produced by the
Agency's adaptation to its early court experiences. After virtually abandoning
rulemaking, NHTSA responded to congressional agitation to act by
reimagining the regulatory process as one in which industry plays the dominant
role in determining which safety measures to advance.
Of course, there was still the possibility that consumer groups could sue to
force NHTSA to fulfill the aspirations of the original Act. Something remotely
of that sort occurred in the case involving TPMS. But that was an isolated
incident that was legally distinguishable from efforts to force the Agency to act.
There, as in State Farm, the Agency had acted. The claim was that the Agency
had chosen the wrong alternative.295 In the other three cases, the courts rejected
litigants' efforts to force NHTSA to take stronger action.296
went both ways, embracing an attempt by the auto industry to secure the rescission of Standard 208 and
an attempt by the insurance industry to advance its protection. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474
(D.C. Cir. 1986). The last of the Struggle rulemaking cases involved a challenge by a state compact
seeking to invalidate NHTSA's safety rule on vehicle identification numbers. See Vehicle Equip. Safety
Comm'n v. NHTSA, 611 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1979).
291. See Nat'l Truck Equip. Ass'n v. NHTSA, 711 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2013); Pub.
Citizen v. NHTSA, 374 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Pub. Citizen v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2003);
Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 84 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996); Simms v. NHTSA, 45 F.3d 999 (6th Cir.
1995); Pub. Citizen v. Steed, 851 F.2d. 444 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Nat'l Truck Equip. Ass'n v. NHTSA, 919
F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1990).
292. Two cases were brought by the National Truck Equipment Association, a trade
group representing small case producers of customized trucks. As mentioned in one of the cases,
240,000 such trucks were manufactured in the United States in 1987.
293. See Pub. Citizen v. NHTSA, 374 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Pub. Citizen v.
Mineta, 340 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2003); Simms v. NHTSA, 45 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 1995); Pub. Citizen v.
Steed, 851 F.2d. 444 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
294. See Justice Denied Hearing, supra note 3, at 80-81 (testimony of Cary
Coglianese, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania) (claiming that judicial review cannot have
suppressed NHTSA rulemaking because the risk of a rule being subject to such review was only two
percent, and noting twenty-three cases challenging NHTSA rules from 1967 to present).
295. See Mashaw, Law and Engineering, supra note 88, at 147 (discussing litigation
to force NHTSA to exercise its statutory authority to adopt mileage standards for automobile fleets, and
noting that when the Agency does nothing, "it always wins").
296. See Pub. Citizen v. NHTSA, 374 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Simms v. NIHTSA,
45 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 1995); Pub. Citizen v. Steed, 851 F.2d. 444 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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VIII. Recalls Today
A. The Orgy Rumbles On
As NHTSA has groped to adapt its fragile rulemaking powers to the
turbulent forces surrounding it during and after the Ice Age, its recall apparatus
has displayed all the stamina and evolutionary resilience of a crocodile. During
the Agency's first two decades (1966-1985), the industry recalled some 162
million defective vehicles and related equipment items; in the three decades
thereafter (1986-2015), it recalled nearly four times that number, some 641
297million defective vehicles and equipment items.
The explosion of recalls in the post-Struggle period cannot be explained
by the increase in the number of vehicles on the road. From 1966 to 1985, the
average number of state motor vehicle registrations for private, commercial,
and publicly owned vehicles in the United States was about 134 million per
year; for the period, 1986 to 2015, the average was about 220 million per year,
roughly a sixty-four percent increase.298 In contrast, the average number of
defective vehicles recalled per year jumped by almost 132%,299 more than twice
the rate of growth of registrations.
And this analysis masks the most recent trends. If we look at just the post-
Glacial rebound (2002-2015), the average number of all defective vehicles
recalled is nearly 21 million vehicles per year-over three times the average of
the 1966-1985 period.300 Focusing just on recalls directly "influenced' 3 1 by
297. The foregoing figures cover recalls related only to safety defects, not failure to
comply with safety standards. The overall figures include motor vehicles, equipment, child safety seats,
and tires. All recall data are extracted from Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Annual Recalls
Reports, 1966 to 2015, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP. (2015), www.safercar.gov/staticfiles/safercar/pdf/2015-
annual-recalls-report.pdf [hereinafter NHTSA, Annual Recalls Reports]. For similar figures, see Daniel
P. Malone & John F. Creamer, NHTSA and the Next 50 Years: Time for Congress to Act Boldly (Again)
3 (SAE Int'l, Technical Papers 2016-01-7000).
298. Motor vehicle registration data were taken from Fed. Highway Admin., Welcome
to the Office of Policy & Governmental Affairs, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP., www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy (last
visited Nov. 6, 2016). The registration data here cited here are for automobiles, trucks and buses, but not
motorcycles. The trends cited here would not be materially affected by including motorcycles, as they
constitute a tiny fraction (two to three percent) of all motor vehicle registrations. Data for 2015 were not
yet posted on the Administration's website and were estimated based on the average increase in
registrations over the preceding ten years. Data represent state registrations excluding Puerto Rico.
299. The average recall for the period 1966 to 1985 entailed approximately 6.6 million
vehicles, while the average recall for the period 1986 to 2015 entailed approximately 15.35 million
vehicles. See NHTSA, Annual Recalls Reports, supra note 297.
300. ld.
301. The agency classified recalls as either "voluntary," signifying that the company
undertook the recall at its own initiative, or "influenced," meaning that the recall was undertaken
following an agency investigation. Id. Manufacturers, of course, have a legal obligation to recall
defective vehicles irrespective of whether the agency conducts an investigation. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118(c),
30119-20.
The percentages of vehicle recalls influenced by NHTSA, in each of the five-year periods
from 1966 to 2015, were 19% (1966-70), 61% (1971-75), 57% (1976-80, the period in which the per se
theory was judicially approved), 72% (1981-85), 61% (1986-90), 73% (1991-95), 71% (1996-2000),
56% (2001-05), 50% (2006-10), and 38% (2011 -15). NHTSA, Annual Recalls Reports, supra note 297.
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NHTSA, the average recall was 3.918 million defective vehicles for the period
1966-1985; in the thirty years thereafter, the average more than doubled to
8.245 million vehicles.°2
The five-year period from 2011 to 2015 was the most recall-intensive in
NHTSA's history. The numbers are mind-boggling. Some 147 million vehicles
were recalled during that period, an annual average of 29.4 million vehicles per
year. In just the past two years (2014-2015), nearly 100 million vehicles have
been recalled, almost two out of every five vehicles registered in the entire
country.3°3 To be sure, the percentage of influenced recalls has dipped to about
thirty-eight percent.30 4 But this may well be an artifact of the somewhat
arbitrary manner in which "influence" is reported. In practical terms, every
recall is "influenced" by NHTSA because companies can never be sure when
the Agency will get wind of a defect, find that the companies failed to disclose
it, and ignite a flash fire of adverse publicity, congressional hearings, and trial
lawyer inquiries.
In these circumstances, industry-initiated recalls are the order of the day.
Recalls are "voluntary" in the same sense as paying taxes-withhold disclosure
at your peril.3°5 A manufacturer's failure to initiate a recall when it knows of a
defect is not just punishable by fines. It can cause the manufacturer to be
accused of a cover up and callous disregard for the safety of its customers. And
any whiff of scandal can subject management to Congress's usual gleeful
pillorying of any firm that has failed to comply with a legal requirement that it
and the public like. Finally, recalls are embedded in an enforcement system that
is hard for a company to game. Over 45,000 complaints flood into the
Agency's office of defects investigation every year,3 °6 as does a huge amount
of information from other sources.
The entire recall apparatus has evolved into a kind of in terrorem
confessional society. The earlier the confession, the better, especially since,
pursuant to the FAST Act passed last year, "whistle blowers" are now being
encouraged to propel confessors into the confessional stall.307 And companies
302. Id.
303. Id. NiTSA, Annual Recalls Reports, supra note 297.
304. See supra note 301.
305. A former NHTSA official explained, "It is like saying I voluntarily paid my
income tax. I did it because the law requires me to." Christopher Jensen, Safety Recalls May Be
'Voluntary,' but Are Required by Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/20 0/09/2 I /safety-recalls-may-be-voluntary-but-are-required-by-law.
306. Examining the GM Recall and NHTSA's Defect Investigation Process: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. &
Transp., 113th Cong. 48 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Senate Commerce Hearing] (statement of David
Friedman, Acting Administrator, NHTSA).
307. Recognizing that some company executives may be slow to acknowledge their
sins, the Motor Vehicle Safety Whistleblower Act authorizes NHTSA in some circumstances to use a
portion of civil penalty fines to pay a bounty to whistleblowers who assist in successful enforcement
actions. Pub. L. No. 114-94 §§ 24,351-52, 129 Stat. 1716 (2015) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 30,172
(2016)).
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themselves are required to supply NHTSA with a constant stream of data that
might suggest the existence of a defect. Pursuant to the TREAD Act,
companies must submit quarterly Early Warning Reports (EWR) covering
information on incidents involving death or injury, aggregate data on property
damage claims, consumer complaints, warranty claims, and field reports on
their investigation of specific incidents, among other information."8 NHTSA
receives an enormous amount of data.30 9 NHTSA reports that it "uses
sophisticated data-mining techniques to identify trends in the data that may be
evidence of a safety defect."31 Obviously, these techniques are not foolproof.
When a company determines that a defect is safety related, the company
must notify the Agency within five days in a submission known as a "573
report.'31l The report is required to include a chronology of events that led to
the recall determination. Intentional failure to disclose information, or
affirmatively misleading the Agency, subjects the manufacturer to the
possibility of penalties. The Agency routinely reviews 573 reports to ensure
that companies are meeting their five-day reporting obligation. If the Agency
has reason to believe a company has not done so, it opens a second
investigation, known as a "timeliness query." Between 2009 and 2014,
automakers paid fines totaling more than $85 million for lack of timeliness in
reporting defects.312 During 2015 alone, manufacturers were fined $470 million
for defect and recall reporting failures."' Commenting on a recent speech on
recalls by the NHTSA chief counsel to defense attorneys, one observer distilled
the message as follows: "Call us before we call you." '314
B. Encore, Legal Culture
From a legislative perspective, the recall regime has become a sort of
regulatory breeder reactor, generating more political energy to strengthen the
regime than it takes to get the recall issue on the legislative agenda once again.
Unlike the rulemaking side, legislation so far has only strengthened the regime,
308. 49 U.S.C. § 30,166(1)-(m); 67 Fed. Reg. 45,822 (July 10, 2002) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 579(C)).
309. See GM Ignition Switch Recall: Why Did It Take So Long?: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 64
(2014) (statement of David Friedman, Acting Administrator, NHTSA).
310. Id.
311. Id. § 573.6 (2016); see also 2014 Senate Commerce Hearing, supra note 306, at
7 (statement of David Friedman, Acting Administrator, NHTSA) (describing the reporting
requirements).
312. 2014 Senate Commerce Hearing, supra note 306, at 50 (statement of David
Friedman, Acting Administrator, NHTSA).
313. Malone & Creamer, supra note 297.
314. NHTSA's Message to the Defense: Call Us Before We Call You, SAFETY RES. &
STRATEGIES, INC. (June 6, 2014), http://www.safetyresearch.net/blog/articles/nhtsa's-message-defense-
call-us-we-call-you.
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not weakened it.315 Industry and the Agency struggle to keep pace with their
respective obligations. Inevitably, they fail. The result in Congress is invariably
fresh calls for further reforms. The legislative history of NHTSA's recall
authority is a perpetual cycle of amendment, industry and/or Agency
malfeasance, congressional outrage, and further amendment. The circle spirals
ever upward in search of more recalls more quickly, more corrective justice,
and more punishment.
There are, no doubt, cases where companies have dragged their heels, or
worse, in reporting and rectifying recalls. Nor is the Agency's record
unblemished by any means.316 For example, Ralph Nader blasted NHTSA in a
2014 editorial, claiming it had not ordered a manufacturer to recall its vehicles
for thirty-five years.317 But Nader's complaint hardly tells the whole story.
NHTSA generally negotiates the scope of a recall without the need for a formal
administrative order. And as Fiat Chrysler and others have recently learned,
and again hardly for the first time, the recall regime is not kind to those,
including the Agency, who fail to meet Congress's expectations. Hearings with
titles like, Volt Vehicle Fire: What Did NHTSA Know, and When Did It Know
It? 318 and The G.M. Ignition Switch Recall: Why Did It Take So Long?,319 tell
the story without readers perusing the text. In an important sense, NHTSA does
not regulate recalls-recalls regulate NHTSA.
315. In addition to the 1974 Amendments, the TREAD Act, and MAP-21, Congress
most recently passed legislation in late 2015, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act,
which contains a host of provisions seeking to strengthen the Agency's recall program. Pub. L. 114-94,
129 Stat. 1702 (2015). Among other things, the FAST Act requires improvements in the availability of
recall information, id. § 24,103 (codified at 49 U.S.C § 30,119); provides for notification of recalls by
email, id. § 24,104 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,119); calls for a pilot program to assess the use of state
DMVs to assist with recall notifications, id. § 24,106 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,119); requires rental
car companies to remedy defects before renting their vehicles, id. § 24,109 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §
30,101); requires an assessment of the feasibility of technical devices in vehicles that would provide
notice of open recalls; triples the maximum fines for recall violations from $35 million to $105 million,
id. § 24,110 (codified at 49 USC § 30,165(a)); extends the obligation to provide free remedy of defects
from ten to fifteen years, id. § 24,403 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,117); and requires dealers to check for
open recalls, id. § 24,107 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30,120(f)).
316. See, for example, the DOT Inspector General's report criticizing NHTSA's
handling of the GM ignition switch recall and identifying seventeen recommendations to improve the
Agency's defect investigation process. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DOT OIG
REPORT ST-2015-063, INADEQUATE DATA AND ANALYSIS UNDERMINE NHTSA's EFFORTS TO
IDENTIFY AND INVESTIGATE VEHICLE SAFETY CONCERNS (2015). Six months later, Congress
appropriated substantial funds for NHTSA for 2016 through 2020 on Department of Transportation
certification that the Agency had implemented all of the recommendations.
317. Ralph Nader, Safety in Name Only at NHTSA, USA TODAY (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/20 14/09/17/ralph-nader-safety-nhtsa-investigation-regulation-
congress-gm-stalled-column/1 5801047.
318. Volt Vehicle Fire: What Did NHTSA Know and When Did It Know It? Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus Oversight & Gov't Spending of the H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov't Reform, 112th Cong. 111 (2012).
319. The G.M. Ignition Switch Recall: Why Did It Take So Long? Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 131
(2014).
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The per se defect theory approved by the courts in the 1970s has emerged
from the post-Glacial rebound alive and well. It continues to be a vital
cornerstone of the Agency's recall power. In contrast to its heavy procedural
and evidentiary burdens in rulemaking, the Agency's burden in defects cases
remains as light as the proverbial feather. Industry resistance to recalls is
largely a futile act. Against the backdrop of the Agency's earlier successive
judicial wins, industry has brought very few challenges. Writing in 2001, a
retired enforcement attorney formerly working with the Agency's office of
defects investigation wrote:
What is remarkable is ... that there has been no further litigation
contesting the agency's determination that a safety-related defect[] exists
.... My own interpretation is that the basic law was settled in a manner
very favorable to the Government in Wheels and Pitman Arms, and the
manufacturers have grudgingly accepted those cases as the law ...
[M]anufacturers have been unwilling, when push comes to shove, to
contest a NHTSA safety-defect determination made in light of the Wheels
and Pitman Arms precedents. In fact, what has been happening since the
Wheels and Pitman Arms decisions is that the manufacturers have
acquiesced to the agency's informal position by the end of a defect
investigation, before a formal agency defect determination is made. With
hardly any exceptions, when NHTSA and a manufacturer come eyeball-to-
eyeball on a safety defect controversy, the manufacturer blinks 
first.3 20
To be sure, the agency "lost" two recall-related cases in the post-Struggle
era, but the courts in both cases went out of their way to underscore the
continued vitality of NHTSA's fulsome recall authority. In many respects, the
two cases are more illuminating about the limitations of NHTSA's rulemaking
power than its recall authority.
The first case was Unites States v. Chrysler Corp.,3 2' handed down by the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the same court that decided the recall-
empowering Wheels (1975) and Pitman Arms (1977) cases.322 The Chrysler
case involved a recall for failure to comply with a safety standard, not for a
safety-related defect. The court found that the Agency had violated the 1966
Act and Chrysler's Due Process rights because the standard at issue, FMVSS
201 on seat belt anchorage assemblies, did not specify with sufficient clarity
the testing requirements that Chrysler needed to meet in order to demonstrate
compliance.323 As a result, Chrysler had been denied "fair notice" of what was
expected of it. The problem lay in the rule, not the recall.
320. Allan J. Kam, Director, Highway Traffic Safety Assocs., LLC, Address on
NHTSA Safety Defect Investigations at the ATLA 2001 Annual Convention, Products Liability Section
(July 17, 2001), http://www.htsassociates.com/NHTSA-safety defect-investigations.shtml.
321. United States v. Chrysler, 158 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
322. United States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Wheels);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 561 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.) (Pitman Arms).
323. 158 F.3d at 1354.
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The second defect-related case that NHTSA lost, also handed down by the
D.C. Circuit, presented a more direct challenge to the Agency's recall powers.
In United States v. General Motors, the court ruled that the government had
failed to meet its burden in seeking a recall of GM's "X platform" cars alleged
by the Agency to be defective because their rear wheels were predisposed to
lock up prematurely."4 But the problem with NHTSA's position was that it had
no evidence that a defect existed other than consumer complaints -complaints
that the Agency's own publicity about the problem may have generated.
In the absence of any broken part, or any theory of how such a part might
be failing, the court searched diligently for evidence that would meet even the
lax standards of the per se theory. It failed to find it. Indeed, the evidence
revealed that the problem in GM X cars was no worse than in comparable cars
of other manufacturers. If the Agency wanted to establish the inadequacy of a
component or aspect of vehicle performance that was general to industry, it
could not do so by means of its recall powers. That was a task for rulemaking.
The courts would not allow NHTSA to engage in a form of de facto rulemaking
that exploited the strategic strengths of its recall powers. If NHTSA wanted to
force technology, such as ABS brakes that would avoid "lock up," it needed to
pass through the rulemaking paddle line.
Legal culture has been kind to recalls in other ways. Recently, the Agency
and DOJ have been able to leverage recalls by negotiating far-reaching consent
decrees to gain a foothold deep inside companies' internal management.
Building off lessons learned in cases involving GM, Honda, and Takata, the
Agency in July 2015 entered into a consent decree with Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles (FCA) that contained no fewer than thirty "performance
obligations." According to press accounts, "[c]entral to the pact is a top-to-
bottom revamp of FCA's current recall and defect practices, a process that will
be overseen by an independent monitor who will report to NHTSA and will
have broad authority to hire staff and investigate safety issues.325 One observer
noted, "It doesn't have any teeth with other OEMs, but what it's trying to do is
set up a model or a standard of behavior within the industry.326 Through
recalls, NHTSA seems to be gaining a seat at the internal management able in
ways that it has never been able to achieve through standard setting.
Courts and Congress were not alone in driving the Agency upward and
onward in its recall efforts. Product liability and shareholder derivative suits
also contributed.327 The plaintiffs' bar feasted on the ever-growing
324. 841 F.2d. 400,400 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
325. Ryan Beene, NHTSA Uses FCA Order to Clean Up Industry, AUTOMOTIVE




327. See, e.g., Mike Wood, How the NHTSA Has Become a Great Witness for Product
Liability Litigation, LAWGURU (May 1, 2016), https://www.lawguru.com/articles/law/how-the-nhtsa-
has-become-a-great-witness-for-product-liability-litigation; Jason. J. Thompson, GM Recall Litigation is
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informational disclosures that he recall regime forced industry to disgorge.
Negative publicity and reputational damage further upped the ante. Explaining
why companies shied away from resisting NHTSA in court, a former counsel to
the defects office noted, "Challenging the agency's recall order would bring
more adverse media attention. General Motors's experience with the X Cars
litigation could be described as winning the battle and losing the war; the
publicity negatively impacted sales of the vehicles at issue. There is no market
share to be gained in fighting NHTSA." '32 8 In sum, just about everything in the
legal environment and beyond worked to nurture recalls. In good times and in
bad, the crocodile prospered.
C. Costs and Benefits
And what contribution have recalls made to the safety ecosystem in which
they have proliferated? In 1976, NHTSA's own advisory council concluded:
"The question naturally arises -do the safety benefits of the program justify the
cost? Curiously, no one knows. Indeed, the scarcity of facts and the abundance
of unknown factors make any definitive evaluation of the defect-recall program
very difficult." '329 Very little has changed in the nearly forty years since the
council's pronouncement. NHTSA has declined to undertake a cost-benefit
calculation of recalls; OMB has kept its distance; and the overall efficacy of the
program remains a mystery.
That said, at least something is known, or suspected, about the costs of the
recall program. NHTSA has estimated that he average cost of a recall is $100
per vehicle.33 ° If that estimate is valid, the direct costs of recalls in recent years
(2002 to 2015) would total about $2.1 billion annually, assuming all vehicles
were returned.331 A study of indirect recall costs, focusing in particular on the
effects of recalls on share prices, has estimated that indirect costs in all
likelihood exceed direct costs,332 suggesting that total recall costs are running
on average over $4 billion annually, again assuming all vehicles were returned.
Of course, not all vehicles are recalled-the current overall completion
rate is seventy-five percent. But Congress, the Agency, and industry are
working hard to increase that rate,333 and in some recent years, 2014 (49.8
a Battle on Three Sides, SOMMERS SCHWARTZ BLOG (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://www.sommerspc.com/blog/2014/08/gm-recall-litigation-is-a-battle-on-three-sides (reporting that
a GM recall was tied to products liability, shareholder, and consumer fraud lawsuits).
328. Kam, supra note 320.
329. McDonald, supra note 19, at 12-13.
330. Id. at 13.
331. As previously indicated, an average of about 21 million vehicles was recalled
each year from 2002 to 2015. See discussion supra note 300.
332. McDonald, supra note 19, at 16 (citing Nicholas G. Rupp, The Attributes of a
Costly Recall: Evidence from the Automotive Industry, REV. OF INDUS. ORGS. 21 (2004)) ( "[T]he
indirect costs of automotive recalls are likely larger than the direct costs.").
333. Increasing the recall completion rate is presently an Agency priority. The Agency
held a workshop with industry representatives and others on April 28, 2015, for this purpose. See Press
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million vehicles) and 2015 (49.2 million vehicles) for example,334 the number
of recalled vehicles has far exceeded the post-Glacial average. So $4 billion in
annual recall costs seems a plausible benchmark. By rough comparison, the
midpoint of costs estimated by OMB to have been incurred by all of NHTSA's
major safety rules (again without discounting for costs that would have
occurred anyway through voluntary industry action) was about $5.5 billion
annually for the period 2002 to 2012.
As to recall benefits, apart from the occasional anecdote, essentially
nothing is known.335 There is certainly reason to doubt that recall safety
benefits are appreciable. NHTSA itself has reported that vehicular defects
rarely cause auto accidents. The most recent study suggests that in 2014,
vehicle failures (excluding failures due to poor maintenance) accounted for less
than one percent of accidents,336 and there is concern many recalls do not deal
with serious safety issues.337 A leading consumer group recently acknowledged
that "the fact is that the vast majority of recalls do not involve a single death or
injury .,338
In sum, the best that can be said is that the efficacy of the recall program
is mysterious and dubious. We would be surprised if the vast majority of recalls
could meet the cost-benefit criteria that NHTSA and OMB typically apply to
auto safety rules. Yet, if anything, Congress and the public seem to want more
aggressive recall activity, not less. NHTSA is happy to oblige. In 2014, the
Agency collected from industry more in civil penalties ($126 million) than in
the previous forty-three years combined.339 In July 2015, NHTSA levied its
Release, NHTSA, U.S. DOT Hosts Workshop To Boost Recall Completion Rates (April 28, 2015),
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-dot-hosts-workshop-boost-recall-completion-rates.
Several FAST Act provisions discussed above are designed to drive up completion rates. See supra note
307. In a set of "safety principles" recently reached with the DOT, industry has committed to aim for a
one hundred percent completion rate. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Proactive Safety Principles
2016, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP. (last visited Nov. 6, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-
room/proactive-safety-principles-2016. One concern is that recalls are now so prevalent the public is
suffering "recall fatigue."
334. NHTSA, Annual Recalls Reports, supra note 297.
335. One study has suggested that recalls may reduce the accident rate of affected
vehicles by ten percent. Bae and Silva U.S. Case Study, supra note 19. Concern has been expressed,
however, that the authors did not control for a number of confounding variables. McDonald, supra note
19, at 17.
336. See Oversight of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th
Cong. 69 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 NHTSA Oversight Hearing] (remarks of Mitch Bainwol, President,
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers).
337. Ryan Beene, Carlson Vows to Press NADA's Fight Against Regulation,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Apr. 2, 2016, 9:06 PM),
http://www.autonews.com/article/20160402/RETA1L06/160409936/carlson-vows-to-press-nadas-fight-
against-regulation (citing analysis by Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers that only six percent of
vehicle recalls are "hazardous").
338. Center for Auto Safety, Comment Letter on NHTSA Guidance Bulletin 2016-02:
Safety-Related Defects and Emerging Automotive Technologies, at I (May 2, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2016-0040-0031.
339. Mark Rosekind, Administrator, NHTSA, Testimony Before the Subcommittee of
Transportation, Housing, Urban Affairs and Related Agencies of the House Committee on
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largest-ever-to-date civil penalty against Fiat Chrysler: $105 million.34 ° Shortly
thereafter, the Agency beat that record fining Takata, $200 million, in
connection with the recall of the company's defective airbags.34' As these pages
are being written, the Justice Department has announced that Takata will also
plead guilty to wire fraud and pay $1 billion in criminal penalties in connection
with its airbag fiasco.
3 42
IX. Bureaucratic Adaptation in a Changing World
A. Review of the Bidding
Our story to this point is largely one of agency adaptation to a relatively
stable legal culture. One constant is judicial review. Reviewing courts profess
deference to agency expertise, but expertise must be demonstrated, not merely
invoked. This has made technology-forcing difficult, if not impossible, when
the evidence that would demonstrate the efficacy and reasonableness of new
safety technologies is limited or unavailable. But evidence is not a problem
when vehicles have demonstrable defects, and the legal system has long been
solicitous of consumers who are the victims of defective products. In this legal
environment, setting technology-forcing standards is highly problematic, while
recalling defective vehicles is virtually unconstrained.
From this perspective alone, one might predict that NHTSA would find
rulemaking troublesome and recalling defective vehicles rewarding. But, the
Agency's legal environment is also inhabited by executive branch and
congressional overseers who have the constitutional authority to empower,
fund, staff, and oversee the Agency's operations. In a sense, the constant in this
corner of the Agency's legal culture is inconstancy, but the messages from
these constitutionally authorized political overseers concerning how NHTSA
should deploy its resources have reinforced the lessons of judicial review.
Although Congress unanimously adopted the Motor Vehicle Safety Act in
1966, it has done almost nothing to aid the Agency in overcoming the
limitations of its original standard-setting mandate. And when mandating
Appropriations (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.nhtsa.gov/About-NHTSA/Congressional-
Testimony/testimony mr house_04142016.
340. Ryan Beene, Fiat Chrysler Hit with Record $105 Million U.S. Penalty over
Recalls, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (July 26, 2015),
http://www.autonews.com/article/20150726/OEM1 1/1 50729909/fiat-chrysler-hit-with-record-$105-
million-u.s.-penalty-over-recalls.
341. Of the $200 million, $70 million was payable in cash. The balance became due if
the company violated its consent decree or additional legal violations were discovered. Press Release,
Dep't of Transp., U.S. DOT Imposes Largest Civil Penalty in NHTSA's History on Takata for Violating
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/us-dot-imposes-
largest-civil-penalty-nhtsa-history-takata-violating-motor-vehicle.
342. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Takata Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty and
Pay $1 Billion in Criminal Penalties for Airbag Scheme (Jan. 13, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/takata-corporation-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-I -billion-criminal-
penalties-airbag-scheme.
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standard setting on particular topics, Congress has imprudently doubled down
on existing requirements (the passenger-side airbag fiasco) and sent the Agency
on strange safety quests having vanishingly small effects on the overall public
health mission contemplated in 1966. Legislation has strengthened the
Agency's hand significantly only with respect to the administration of the
defects program.
At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, executive oversight has largely
emphasized concern about the costs of regulation. While only the Reagan
Administration sought systematically to dismantle the Agency's standard-
setting program, every administration since Jimmy Carter's has imposed or
reinforced regulatory analysis requirements that apply only to rulemaking, not
to recalls.
During its first three-and-a-half decades, NHTSA responded to these
signals by virtually abandoning its effort to force technology by rules in favor
of an increasingly aggressive and popular recall program. The story thereafter
has been somewhat different. Rulemaking of a sort has to some degree been
reenergized. But standard setting has taken a new form-one that we have
characterized as co-regulation or cooperative regulation. By setting standards
that require the dissemination of safety technologies already in widespread use,
the Agency has entered into an implicit partnership with the motor vehicle
industry. The industry now sets the safety performance agenda by developing
and deploying new safety technologies. The Agency's role has become one of
setting standards that largely accept the performance characteristics of the
technologies the industry is already deploying. It seeks mainly to universalize
those technologies' availability to all motorists.
That, at least, is the story on the standard-setting side of the regulatory
ledger. Reinforced by both its legal and political overseers, the Agency remains
aggressively in the defect-investigation and vehicle-recall business. It gets into
legal trouble only if it tries to use the recall program as a substitute for
rulemaking. And it has political trouble, largely with Congress, only when it
fails to act quickly and vigorously enough with respect to some particular
safety defect.
We should be clear, however, that while the legal culture shapes
regulatory technique, it does not determine it. Agencies can adapt in differing
ways to legal and political goals or constraints, and NHTSA has done so over
its fifty-year history. To take an obvious example, NHTSA has over time taken
two radically different approaches to the constraints on its standard-setting
functions. Having first virtually abandoned standard setting with any
measurable safety impact, the Agency returned to the field with the co-
regulatory strategy just described. Reinterpreting its mandate as one of
technology diffusion rather than technology forcing may not be terribly
ambitious, but it would be hard to maintain that these efforts have no safety
benefit. And rulemaking in this form has proven to be legally invulnerable and
politically unobjectionable.
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Nor are we arguing that the aforementioned adaptations are solely the
result of creative adjustments to the Agency's legal environment. Agency
regulatory technique is shaped by many other factors as well. In NHTSA's
case, for example, it seems clear that some of the basic behavioral, market, and
technological assumptions on which the 1966 Act was predicated are highly
questionable in today's world. The Agency's strategic vision seems to be
premised, at least in part, on these new understandings. In this section we
provide a sketch of this revised vision of the vehicle safety world and how it
reinforces the adaptive strategy that we have described.
B. A Changed World
When America embarked on its experiment in auto safety regulation in
1966, that initiative was premised on a number of critical beliefs. One was that
the behavioral technique of regulating automotive safety by enforcing traffic
laws was a failed strategy. State and local enforcement campaigns against
speeding, drunk driving, and other traffic offenses were ubiquitous. Driver
education was mandatory in most high schools, and motorists were constantly
exhorted to behave responsibly through advertising campaigns, sermons, and
bumper stickers. That road carnage continued unabated led to a simple
conclusion: changing driver behavior was suboptimal, perhaps even a fool's
errand.
Second, it was widely believed both inside and outside the automobile
industry that safety did not sell.343 To be sure, it would be bad for business for
an automobile to be recognized as less safe than its competitors. But attempts to
market safety technologies seemed to have effects only at the extreme high end
of the automotive market. Optional safety features were chosen only by those
whose budgets were relatively unconstrained. Making safety technologies a
standard feature added costs that most potential customers were unwilling to
pay. The carnage on the highways may have been imposing high social costs,
but the market did not seem capable of factoring those costs into individual
transactions.
Finally, the proponents of auto safety regulation were convinced that the
big payoff from safety regulation would come through making vehicles more
crashworthy. In an increasingly mobile society, and one in which driver error or
irresponsibility seemed intractable, the relatively high volume of crashes was
seen as unavoidable. But the deaths and injuries from those crashes might be
avoidable if the "second collision"-the contact between vehicle passengers
and the vehicle or its external physical environment-could be made less
forceful. NHTSA's safety regulatory mandate included efforts both to improve
343. Diana T. Kurylko, Ford Had a Better Idea in 1956, But It Found That Safety
Didn't Sell, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (June 26, 1996),
http://www.autonews.com/article/19960626/ANA/606260836/ford-had-a-better-idea-in-1956-but-it-
found-that-safety-didnt-sell.
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crash avoidance and vehicle crashworthiness. But the big payoffs were thought
to come from the latter. It was those technologies that were the important ones
to force by performance standards.
NHTSA's most important initiative, its passive restraints rule, was
premised on all of these assumptions. Vehicles already had lap and shoulder
belts, but usage rates were abysmally low. Driver behavior in this regard
seemed thoroughly incorrigible. Passive restraints, whether motorized
automatic belts or airbags, were likely to have extremely modest market
penetration. Mercedes buyers would pay the tariff, but this equipment was
unlikely to be found in Fords and Chevrolets. And this was the technology that
had the greatest promise for limiting the effects of the second collision.
Yet the history of the passive restraints rule and the reaction to it seemed
to belie the once conventional assumptions concerning driver behavior and the
marketability of safety technologies. Secretary Dole's creative reissuance of the
passive restraints rule, with its incentives both for the adoption of state
mandatory seat belt use laws (MULs) and the use of airbags as the preferred
passive restraints technology, set off a series of responses, both at the state
level and in the automobile industry, that had surprising effects.34 4
Because of a campaign that in practical effect brought together vehicle
manufacturers and vehicle safety partisans,345 many states that had been
resistant to mandatory use laws adopted them. Even more surprisingly, the
utilization rates of manual lap and shoulder belts doubled almost immediately
and have been increasing ever since. Average utilization rates have gone from
around fourteen percent in 1983, at the time of the MUL campaign, to nearly
eighty percent nationally two decades later.346 For 2015, NHTSA reported
national usage rates of 88.5%. At least in this regard, motorist behavior
seems to have been malleable.
Second, a decision by Ford Motor Company to comply with the passive
restraints rule by installing airbags in its vehicles had a remarkable snowball
effect. The press began to report on motorists in Fords, and other vehicles
equipped with airbags, who walked away from serious collisions with hardly a
344. MARTIN ALBAUM, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, SAFETY SELLS: MARKET
FORCES AND REGULATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRBAGS 130-145 (2005),
http://www.safetysells.org/contents.htm. The Dole Decision provided that a passive restraints rule
would be phased in from 1986 to 1989, but would be rescinded if, no later than April 1, 1989, states
representing two-thirds of the U.S. population enacted mandatory seat belt use laws meeting certain
minimum criteria (the so called "trap door" provision). The rule also provided special credits for the
implementation of phase-in requirements using airbags as opposed to automatic belts. Id. at 134.
345. The industry and safety partisans were, in fact, at odds with one another, but the
dynamics of their strategies ended up complementing one another in practical terms. Industry wanted
MULs that could be counted against the trap door requirement. Safety advocates also supported MULs,
but wanted them formulated in a way that prevented their being counted against the two-thirds rule.
Thus, in effect, both groups were lobbying for some form of mandatory seat belt law.
346. ALBAUM, supra note 344, at 151, 183.
347. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT-HS-812-243, TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS: RESEARCH NOTE, SEATBELT USE IN 2015-OVERALL RESULTS (Feb. 2016),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812243.
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scratch. Airbags worked, motorists wanted them, and vehicle manufacturers
seemingly began to compete to see how many airbags they could cram into a
vehicle. Safety could sell.348
Manufacturers' marketing strategies began to change, and not just with
respect to airbags. The story that we have been telling in this paper about
NHTSA's diffusion strategy would be unthinkable without a market for vehicle
safety. The Agency could not piggyback on the industry's development and
deployment of new safety technologies if there were not a market for those
technologies. Without a population receptive to the lure of safer vehicles,
automobile companies would not be marketing blind spot warning devices,
180-degree rear visibility cameras or driver-assisted braking and lane-holding
technologies .
This latter point brings us to the final assumption underlying the 1966
Act: the promise of crashworthiness over crash avoidance. Notice that the
technologies just mentioned are all crash-avoidance technologies. Moreover,
the motoring public is increasingly exposed to the prospect of the so-called
self-driving (autonomous) vehicle.35° If and when they are perfected,351
autonomous vehicles suggest an astonishing new world-one in which there
348. See ALBAUM, supra note 344, at 137-43. We do not, of course, mean to suggest
that the Dole Decision alone "created" a market for auto safety. There is some evidence that public
perceptions began changing even before, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. See id. at 104 (noting that
during this period, a manufacturer for the first time cited safety performance in mass advertising and
public opinion surveys recorded increasing public concern over vehicle safety).
349. Industry has stated repeatedly that market competition is a driving force in safety
innovation and that companies are implementing features voluntarily in advance of mandates. See 2005
House SAFETEA-LU Hearing, supra note 125, at 33 (statement of Fred Weber, President and CEO,
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers) ("[S]afety is an area in which manufacturers compete and seek
competitive advantage. Safety 'sells' and manufacturers are leveraging their safety performance and
equipment in efforts to distinguish their products from competitors. , . . [N]ine of the top 10 features
most desired by consumers in their next new vehicle are designed to enhance vehicle or occupant safety
.... "); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety & Ins. of the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 112th Cong. 41 (2010) (statement of Robert Strassburger, Vice President,
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers) ("Most of the safety features on motor vehicles in the U.S.-
antilock brakes, stability control, side airbags for head and chest protection, side curtains, pre-crash
occupant positioning, lane departure warning, collision avoidance, and more, were developed and
implemented voluntarily by manufacturers, in advance of any regulatory mandates.").
350. Self-driving cars comprise a wide range of automated vehicle (AV) technologies
whose common feature is their contribution to automating some aspect of the operation of a vehicle that
traditionally has been controlled by the driver. AV technologies rely heavily on software algorithms,
artificial intelligence, and electronic sensors comprising radar, lidar, global position systems, and optical
cameras to transmit sensory data from the environment to the computer processor. See How Autonomous
Vehicles Will Shape the Future of Surface Transportation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Highways
& Transit of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 113th Cong. vii (2013) (memorandum from
subcommittee staff to members) (noting that AV technologies provide the chance for massive reductions
in automobile accidents). For a compelling account of AV technologies and the policy issues they
present, see James M. Anderson et al., Autonomous Vehicle Technology: A Guide for Policymakers,
RAND Corp. (2016) [hereinafter 2016 Rand Report],
http://www.rand.org/pubs/researchreports/RR443-2.html.
351. A 2016 report by Moody's found that self-driving cars will be available by 2020,
common by 2030, standard by 2035, in the majority by 2045, and ubiquitous by 2055. 2016 NHTSA
Oversight Hearing, supra note 336, at 70.
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are very few, vehicular crashes at all. The auto safety vision of the future seems
to be one premised almost wholly on crash avoidance. It could even be a future
in which crashworthiness technologies become largely irrelevant.
The other thing to notice about these crash avoidance technologies is their
crucial reliance on advanced electronics, sensors, and software. Automobiles
are now something like rolling computers. In contrast, collapsing steering
wheels, energy absorbing crash zones, improved door latches, rigid passenger
compartments, and the like were not only crashworthiness technologies, they
were the province of the mechanical and automotive engineers that
conventionally populated automobile manufacturers and component suppliers.
New digital systems are the domain of different professionals. These
technologies often emerge from outside the motor vehicle industry, and, like
other digital electronic systems, the pace of technological innovation is rapid.
Forcing technological innovation in industries where innovation is the basic
business model begins to seem like a peculiar regulatory strategy.
C. NHTSA's Response
Both the emergence of a market for auto safety and the changes in the
nature of emerging vehicle safety technologies tend to reinforce the direction of
NHTSA's adaptation to the signals from its legal and political environment.
Public acceptability has always been a concern for the Agency. The fallout
from the consumer revolt against the ignition interlock in the 1970s left
indelible institutional memories of the pitfalls of getting too far in front of
evolving public opinion. And NHTSA can only make educated guesses at what
the motoring public might find acceptable. Public tastes change, sometimes
dramatically. The massive shift in public opinion concerning the desirability of
airbags is perhaps the most dramatic example. But, while NHTSA regulates by
general rules, manufacturers can probe the market with limited experiments.
New safety features can be provided as options and limited to just a few models
in a manufacturer's product line. Market experience will then guide the pace of
dissemination. In this context, the prudent path for an agency concerned about
public acceptability of safety innovations is surely to follow the industry's lead.
Acceleration in the pace of safety innovation seems to suggest a similar
strategy. NHTSA's rulemaking process is nothing if not ponderous. And its
research capacities are miniscule by comparison with the industry that it
regulates. Indeed, when the question is how digital electronic systems might
promote automobile safety, it is far from clear how "the industry" should be
defined. New developments might come from almost anywhere. Once again,
these developments suggest something like the approach that NHTSA seems to
be taking. In the so-called "tech sector," many promising ideas will fail to reach
the market for reasons both technological and economic. Those that do can be
nudged along by rules requiring universal application.
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These developments also suggest the potential efficacy of additional, non-
coercive regulatory techniques. If there is a market for vehicle safety, one
obvious regulatory strategy is to seek to ensure that it is well informed.
Providing consumers with information is one of the least coercive, and least
legally and politically controversial, techniques available to regulatory
agencies. The opportunity for providing this sort of potentially market-
perfecting assistance has not been lost on either Congress or the Agency.
In 1972, just as the legal and political groundwork was being laid for the
collapse of rulemaking at NHTSA, Congress passed the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972.352 Title II of that statute authorized
NHTSA to establish an information disclosure regime to assist purchasers of
new cars in evaluating the relative safety performance of new motor vehicles.353
In 1978, during the Ice Age of rulemaking, NHTSA began testing vehicles
pursuant to its New Car Assessment Program (NCAP). NHTSA has steadily
upgraded the program over time, but more importantly for the present
discussion, the Agency seems to see the NCAP program as a potential
substitute for rulemaking.
In proceedings to further upgrade the NCAP program, NHTSA has
identified a number of emerging safety technologies: vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
communications, advanced vehicle automation (self-driven cars), crash
imminent braking, blind spot detection, advanced lighting technology,
automatic lane keeping, and automatic pedestrian protection, to name a few.
But, with one exception,354 NHTSA seems not to be planning to provide
performance standards for any of these emerging technologies. Instead, the
Agency has proposed to add a number of standards to the information provided
in the NCAP program.
In giving vehicles a better safety score because of the inclusion of new
safety technologies, NHTSA would simply be following the lead of the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), which already requires vehicles
to have certain technologies, such as automatic emergency braking (AEB) in
order to earn its "top safety pick" rating. Regulation by information provision is
sufficiently non-coercive that it does not require the exercise of state power at
all.
Collaboration with industry can take other forms. In 2015, NHTSA's
Administrator, Mark Rosekind, testified in congressional hearings that he had
"really been pushing" a collaborative model with industry, reasoning that
352. Pub. L. No. 92-513, 86 Stat. 947 (1972) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 32,908, 32,912-13, 32,918, and 42 U.S.C. § 6,363 (2012)).
353. See id.
354. The exception, vehicle-to-vehicle communication technology, is discussed infta
note 366 and accompanying text.
355. New Car Assessment Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,522 (Dec. 16, 2015). In parallel,
Congress has directed the Agency to include crash avoidance information on vehicles' "Monroney"
stickers. FAST Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1702 (2015) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32,302).
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voluntary agreements "provide an opportunity to expedite and expand safety
beyond the minimums we get from rulemaking.356 As a model for broader
application, Rosekind highlighted a voluntary agreement between NHTSA, the
IIHS, and ten major motor vehicle manufacturers under which the latter had




The agreement would have some of the features of a rule. For example, the
parties were working on a timetable and on the development of specific
performance criteria that would provide benchmarks for manufacturers to meet
their commitment. But there was no suggestion that the agreement was meant
to be legally enforceable.358
In a world in which technological development is firmly in the control of
the industry and its component suppliers, and in which motor vehicle
manufacturers now seem to value a reputation for providing advanced safety
features on their vehicles, this sort of collaborative or cooperative approach
may be perfectly sensible. There is certainly the potential for speeding up the
process of making safety advances available to the motoring public. The
collaborating manufacturers and other public and private institutions will have
no occasion to bombard the Agency with objections to a rulemaking proposal
or threaten to bring the whole process to a halt through judicial review. There is
no rule to be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget with attendant
resource-intensive regulatory analyses. "Regulated" parties who are not being
coerced or shamed, but are instead treated as committed partners in a common
enterprise, may be motivated to outperform their voluntary commitments rather
than merely meeting the letter of the law as established by a performance
standard.
Hope springs eternal, and this is not the place to attempt to provide an
evaluation of the potential efficacy of NHTSA's information and voluntary
agreement strategies. But, the developments we have been describing raise an
obvious question: what role, if any, remains for the sort of command and
control, technology-forcing rulemaking that was thought to be at the heart of
the 1966 Motor Vehicle Safety Act?
356. Examining Ways to Improve Vehicle and Roadway Safety: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Comm., Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. 30 (2015)
(testimony of Mark Rosekind, Administrator, NHTSA).
357. Press Release, NHTSA, DOT and IIHS Announce Historic Commitment from 10
Automakers to Include Automatic Emergency Braking on All New Vehicles (Sept. 11, 2015),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About%20NHTSA/Press%2OReleases/nhtsa-iihs-commitment-on-aeb-09112015.
358. Another recent example of collaboration is the set of "Proactive Safety
Principles" agreed to by DOT and industry earlier this year. See supra note 316. The process of adopting
voluntary principles, unlike standard setting by rule, tends to exclude consideration of the views of other
stakeholders.
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X. The Future of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Regulation
A. The Forgotten Virtues of Mandatory Standards
While our views on these matters are speculative at this stage of our
research, we are doubtful that a strategy based increasingly on information
provision and voluntary commitments from industry will meet the need for
automobile safety envisioned by the 1966 Motor Vehicle Safety Act. While
progress has been made, it is still the case that over 38,000 motorists died from
accidents on American roadways in 2015.159 The estimated costs of motor
vehicle accidents are in the hundreds of billions of dollars annually and motor
vehicle crashes continue to be the leading cause of death for persons aged
fifteen to twenty-four. They are the second leading cause of death for persons
twenty-five to thirty-four.36 ° Yes, the fatality rate expressed as deaths per miles
driven has decreased dramatically in the U.S.; but motor vehicle deaths per
capita in the U.S. are by far the highest compared to many other high income
countries, and our progress in reducing them the slowest.361 We are surely
decades away from the zero-accident Nirvana of a motor vehicle fleet
composed entirely of faultless, autonomous vehicles.
In the meantime, a market-based strategy of voluntary agreements and
information provision is likely to be a suboptimal strategy. First, we must
remember that the market for safety in motor vehicles did not emerge
independently of regulation. Prior to 1966, motor vehicle manufacturers seldom
advertised the safety characteristics of their vehicles. And, but for the Agency's
persistent promotion of passive restraints technology, the airbag industry might
well have disappeared before sufficient experience with airbags convinced
consumers that they were life-saving, and therefore desirable, features of
automobiles.
Even the recall program, which has little demonstrable effect on overall
death and injury statistics, may well have contributed importantly to the
359. Motor vehicle fatalities are on the rise. The 2015 total (38,300 fatalities)
represents an eight percent increase over 2014 (35,398 fatalities), the largest percentage increase in fifty
years. Fatalities in the first half of 2016 are nine percent higher that the corresponding period in 2015.
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, NSC MOTOR VEHICLE FATALITY ESTIMATES (2016),
http://www.nsc.org/NewsDocuments/2016/6%20month%20fatality%20estimates.pdf.
360. USA Causes of Death by Age and Gender, WORLDLIFEEXPECTANCY (last visited
Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/usa-cause-of-death-by-age-and-gender.
361. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, VITAL SIGNS, MOTOR
VEHICLE CRASH DEATHS, https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/motor-vehicle-safety/index.html (citing to
data from the World Health Organization and the International Road Traffic and Accident Database).
U.S. motor vehicle deaths per 100,000 people in 2013 were nearly two to four times greater than
corresponding deaths in nine other countries in the high-income cohort, which included Canada, Japan,
New Zealand, and several European countries. CDC noted, "Even when considering population size,
miles traveled, and number of registered vehicles, the US consistently ranked poorly relative to other
high-income countries for crash deaths." Id. Between 2000 and 2013, the average reduction in motor
vehicle deaths among nineteen high- income countries was 56%. The most successful country was Spain
(75% reduction); the least successful was the United States (31% reduction). Id.
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development of the vehicle safety market. Making a virtue of necessity,
automobile manufacturers in the early years of the recall program advertised
their good experience by comparison with their competitors. This was a game
that virtually every manufacturer could play. In every three- or six-month
period, some manufacturer always had the best recall record. Moreover, the
constant play that the press gives to Agency recalls, whether "voluntary" or
mandated, keeps vehicle safety in the public eye.
Second, the pace of safety technology development and diffusion matters.
The prospect of NHTSA's mandating airbags unquestionably helped drive their
technological development in the early days. As a result, airbags were ready for
mass deployment many years before the Agency's ultimate mandate for passive
restraints made them available in large numbers and stimulated widespread
consumer demand. Without regulation, the market was miniscule, and diffusion
almost non-existent. In the meantime, thousands of lives that might have been
saved were lost. Pushing the pace of improved performance and dissemination
of advanced crash avoidance technologies by rulemaking could be equally
important.
The penetration of some crashworthiness technologies is proceeding at
only an annual rate of about two percent to five percent of the vehicle fleet. But
some estimates suggest that widespread use of such technologies already
available could save as many as 10,000 lives annually.362 Yet the agency at
present demurs mandating such technologies arguing that rulemaking is
protracted, complex, and burdensome,363 and that "enough penetration" is
needed to "provide sufficient data" to justify such rules.364 It appears legal
362. Oversight of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th
Cong. 89-90 (2016) (testimony of Ann Wilson, Senior Vice President of Government Affairs, Motor &
Vehicle Equipment Manufacturers Ass'n). An analysis by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
found that incorporation in passenger vehicles of four crash avoidance technologies already on the
market (lane departure warning/prevention, forward collision warning/mitigation, blind spot detection,
and adaptive headlights) would prevent or mitigate 1/3 of fatal accidents and 1.9 million crashes
involving passenger vehicles. See Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, New Estimates of Benefits of
Crash Avoidance Features on Passenger Vehicles, 45 STATUs REP. (May 20, 2010). A 2016 Carnegie
Mellon study found that implementation of three technologies (blind spot monitoring, lane departure
warning, and forward collision crash avoidance systems) could together prevent or reduce the severity of
up to 1.3 million crashes a year, including 10,100 fatal accidents. See Partially Automated Cars Provide
Enough Benefits To Warrant Widespread Adoption of Current Safety Technologies, CARNEGIE MELLON
U. (July 18, 2016),
https://engineering.cmu.edu/media/press/2016/07 18-partially-automated-cars.html.
363. Asked at a recent congressional hearing why the Agency had not mandated some
of the proven crash avoidance technologies already available, the NHTSA Administrator responded
(citing other diffusion rules such as ESC and rear view cameras) that such measures, "took six, eight,
and ten years to actually get through the regulatory process" and that "by the time those rules would
come out, it would be irrelevant for the new technologies that would have evolved". The Administrator
argued that voluntary agreements could "beat" rules by 3 to 4 years. See The Automated and Self
Driving Vehicle Revolution: What Is the Role of Government? Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Transp., Housing and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Commerce (Nov. 16, 2016) (testimony of Mark
Rosekind, NHTSA Administrator), video available at http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings.
364. No one should hold their breath if NHTSA is waiting for "enough penetration"
before mandating the diffusion of crashworthiness technologies already available. The turnover rate of
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culture is a formidable constraint even on the technology diffusion rulemaking
model.
Motor vehicle manufacturers have responded to questions about the pace
of diffusion by lobbying for carrots rather than sticks. They have argued that
they should be given incentives to deploy these technologies in the form of
credits against their fuel economy and emission reduction obligations.365 If
market forces alone were going to accelerate dissemination of these new
technologies, the manufacturers would not need these sorts of incentives. And
sticks are both available and, at least superficially, superior. Standard setting
could mandate diffusion without rolling back fuel economy and air quality
improvement goals. While we doubt that NHTSA's twenty-first century
diffusion efforts have had or will have significant safety payoffs beyond what
otherwise would have occurred, that belief is based on the standards' timidity.
The Agency has been consistently late to the game. It need not adopt
requirements that most devices already meet or wait until half the fleet already
has a new safety advance before pushing the pace of diffusion by rule.
The Agency's proposal to mandate vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
communications technology recognizes that certain advances simply cannot be
promoted adequately by market forces alone.366 No manufacturer has an
the U.S. motor vehicle fleet is agonizingly slow, and full penetration of a new technology in all
registered vehicles can typically take decades. See, e.g., Highway Loss Data Institute, Predicted
Availability of Safety Feature on Registered Vehicles-a 2015 Update, 32 BULLETIN I (Sept. 2015)
[hereinafter HDLI 2015 study]. Moreover, the turnover rate appears to slowing. The average age of
passenger cars and light trucks in operation in the United States has risen from 8.4 years in 1995 to 11.4
years in 2014. Motorists are holding on to their vehicles considerably longer. See Table 1-26, Average
Age of Automobiles and Trucks in Operation in the United States, BUREAU TRANSP. STAT. (last visited
Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.rita.dot.gov.
The potential of auto safety rules to accelerate the penetration rate is clear, but variable
with the particular technology involved. HDLI analyzed several crash avoidance technologies and
reported that federal mandates could speed up penetration "by as much as six years." HDLI 2015 study,
supra note 364, at 1. However, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, with which HDLI is
affiliated, reported that a mandate for forward collision warnings (which HDLI also appears to have
considered) could have accelerated the 95% penetration rate by 15 years. See Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, Vehicle to Vehicle Communications, NHTSA Docket 2014-0022, Comments of
the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, at 2 (Oct. 20, 2014). Further examination of this issue is
needed.
365. Examining Ways to Improve Vehicle and Roadway Safety: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. (2015).
Industry officials described modest incentives, id. at 77, of emission and fuel economy credits for
adopting crash-avoidance measures as "incentivizing lifesaving technologies," id. at 126, and something
they "certainly support," id. at 125.
366. Following an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking in 2014, 79 Fed. Reg.
49,270 (Aug. 20, 2014) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571), the Agency on December 13, 2016 formally
proposed a new safety standard (FMVSS 150) mandating V2V communications functionality in new
light vehicles and standardizing the message and format of V2V transmissions for sending and receiving
"basic safety messages" concerning such matters as vehicle location, heading, and speed. V2V
Communications, 82 Fed. Reg. 3854 (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter 2016 V2V Proposal]. The Agency's
proposal does not cover vehicle to infrastructure (V21) communications, which enable "intelligent"
highway infrastructure and vehicles to communicate, but V21 functionality is expected to build upon
V2V functionality.
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incentive to include V2V technologies in a fleet that does not have other
vehicles with which to communicate. Why should motor vehicle purchasers
seek such capability in the absence of an assurance other purchasers will do the
same? The promise of V2V technology can be realized only to the extent a
critical mass of vehicles, a network, has that functionality and it is interoperable
among vehicles of different makes. Being a first mover here has costs but
virtually no marketable benefits.
Other technologies are likely to be justifiable on externality and lifesaving
grounds, but extremely unattractive from a marketing perspective. Both
NHTSA and state highway officials are increasingly concerned about the
problem of distracted driving, particularly with respect to cell phone utilization.
Many states have adopted prohibitions against texting while driving or using
other than hands-free mobile devices. But the effect on motorists seems to be
extremely modest, and, as the seat belt experience shows, it can take decades to
change behavior. Meanwhile a technological solution-a plug-in device that
disables a driver's cell phone when the vehicle is underway-has been
The V2V proposal establishes performance standards for devices conveying such
messages at a rate of up to ten transmissions per second within a minimum range of three hundred
meters, and predicated on using on-board dedicated short-range radio communication (DSRC)
technology. That technology employs omnidirectional radio signals that provide 360-degree coverage
and "see" around corners and through buildings. The proposal would also impose security and privacy
safeguards for V2V communications. At present, the Agency seeks only to establish and regulate a
basic, "data-rich" V2V platform; it would leave the development and choice of particular applications
(for example, warnings and advisories based on V2V transmissions) to the market. The Agency has
stated, however, that rules mandating specific applications may be forthcoming. See id. at 10-11,15, 70-
71.
The Agency has advanced an explicit market failure rationale for the rule. In its 2014
notice, it stated:
NHTSA believes that V2V capability will not develop absent regulation, because
there would not be any immediate safety benefits for consumers who are early
adopters of V2V. V2V begins to provide safety benefits only if a significant number
of vehicles in the fleet are equipped with it and if there is a means to ensure secure
and reliable communication between vehicles. NHTSA believes that no single
manufacturer would have the incentive to build vehicles able to "talk" to other
vehicles, if there are no other vehicles to talk to-leading to likely market failure
without the creation of a mandate to induce collective action.
79 Fed. Reg. 49,270.
The Agency has affirmed this rationale, with variations, in its December 2016 proposal,
urging that the market is incapable of efficiently and rapidly advancing the two essential features of an
effective V2V system: interoperability and a "critical mass" of vehicles communicating with one
another. See 2016 V2V Proposal, supra, at 11-12, 67. The Agency argues that V2V communications
display "the same characteristics as more familiar network communications technologies"; that
consumes might not voluntarily invest in V2V because the benefits to them depended on other
consumers doing the same, which could not be assured; and that V2V communications entail "a
significant network externality" because a buyer's adoption benefits not only the buyer but other
motorists whose protection is improved: "the society-wide benefits of individual vehicle buyers'
decisions . . . extend well beyond the direct increase in their own safety." Id. at 12. The agency invited
comment on its "tentative conclusions" that V2V "represents a classic 'collective action' problem of the
sort government regulation is designed to address." Id. at 67.
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developed.367 Without a mandate, market diffusion of this technology seems
unlikely. Drivers see the advantages of blind spot warning technologies,
emergency braking assistance, and rearview cameras. A device that prevents
use of their cell phones? Not so much.
NHTSA's approach to the distracted driving problem has been
incremental and restrained. In "Phase I", it carved out a small portion of the
problem -distractions caused by devices installed in the vehicle-and then
declined to establish performance standards for reasons that hark back to its
early unhappy experience with the ignition interlock. Announcing its intention
to address in-vehicle devices, the Agency outlined two sets of measures to
address the safety problem caused by drivers performing secondary (non-
driving) tasks, such as communications, entertainment, and information
gathering on in-vehicle devices.368
First, it identified several tasks that it deemed so inherently distracting-
such as displaying video not related to driving, and automatically scrolling
text-that devices should be designed to preclude them. Second, the Agency
identified testing methods and time-based criteria for assessing all other
secondary tasks enabled by the devices. For example, the Agency proposed that
in-vehicle devices should be designed so that "tasks can be completed by the
driver while driving with glances away from the roadway of 2 seconds or less
and a cumulative time spent away from the roadway of 12 seconds or less. 369
Notwithstanding the seemingly self-evident desirability of discouraging
drivers from watching movies or otherwise diverting their attention from the
road more than momentarily, NHTSA proposed and then decided to embody
these provisions not in mandatory safety standards but rather in non-binding,
unenforceable, voluntary "guidelines.' 370 The Agency gave three reasons for
this approach. First, "the rapid pace of technology evolution cannot be fully
addressed with a static rule," and guidelines "can be issued more quickly than
regulations that go through the rulemaking process.371 Second, more research
was needed "to permit accurate estimation of the benefits ... though NHTSA
firmly believes that there are safety benefits to be gained .... 372 Finally, the
Agency noted its rules must have "repeatable, objective means for determining
compliance," but that "driver distraction testing involves drivers with inherent
367. Indeed, there are several such devices. For a report on one, see Mark Peckham,
Want to Keep Your Teens (or Employees) from Texting Behind the Wheel?, TIME (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://techland.time.com/2012/12/05/want-to-keep-your-teens-or-employees-from-texting-behind-the-
wheel.
368. See Visual-Manual NHTSA Driver Distraction Guidelines for In-Vehicle
Electronic Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,200 (Feb. 24, 2012).
369. Id. at 11,202.
370. Visual-Manual NHTSA Driver Distraction Guidelines for In-Vehicle Electronic
Devices, 78 Fed. Reg. 24,818, 24,829 (Apr. 26,2013).
371. Visual-Manual NHTSA Driver Distraction Guidelines for In-Vehicle Electronic
Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,207 (Feb. 24,2012).
372. Id.
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individual differences that present a unique challenge.37 3 Over forty years
later, shades of the Chrysler decision, once again.
Recently, the Agency has proceeded to "Phase II" of its effort to reduce
distracted driving, again through guidelines. These proposed measures
374
address the risks presented by portable devices, such as smartphones, tablets,
and wristwatch computers, as well as after-market electronic devices. Once
again, the Agency eschews mandating any blocking technology. Instead, the
Phase II guidelines piggyback the Phase I guidelines issued for in-vehicle
devices. The Agency recommends that motor vehicle manufacturers and
portable device producers incorporate "pairing" functionality, which in effect
ties portable devices to in-vehicle devices, which, in turn, operate (hopefully) in
conformity with the Phase I guidelines.
The Agency recognizes, however, that some drivers may not want to
"pair" their portable devices and thus limit their functionality in this way. The
Agency therefore recommends that portable devices also be equipped with a
"driver mode" setting that would, in effect, also subject the device to Phase I
limits. The Agency prefers that the driver mode activate automatically when the
device senses that a driver is using it. However, such activation technology is
still being developed, and the Agency therefore recognizes the need for driver
mode settings that are activated at the driver's election.
In sum, the Phase II guidelines are an exuberant celebration of
volunteerism. To have any effect, manufacturers must first elect to incorporate
the recommended technology, and drivers must then elect to use it. The Agency
makes it "absolutely clear" that its guidelines "are voluntary and non-binding".
NHTSA almost certainly lacks authority to issue mandatory rules for portable
devices, but clearly could have done so with respect to manufacturer installed
or permanently installed after market equipment. It might also have required
manufacturers to install blocking devices that would prevent driver use of
portable electronic devices. The predictable political consequences of such an
intrusion on motorists' freedom are too obvious to require extended
consideration. Distracted driving may be a serious problem that has contributed
substantially to the upswing in motor vehicle fatalities in recent years, but in
this case, as with the ignition interlock, public acceptance (or the Agency's
apprehension of it) trumps the "need for motor vehicle safety."
B. Deference and Discontent: The Case of Highly Automated Vehicles
How the Agency should deal with the rapidly changing technological
context in which it now finds itself is an enormously complex matter that we
are not yet prepared to address. Instead, we will close by flagging some of the
373. Id.
374. Visual-Manual NHTSA Driver Distraction Guidelines for Portable and
Aftermarket Devices, 81 Fed. Reg. 87,656 (Dec. 5, 2016).
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regulatory issues NHTSA is now confronting as it applies far more broadly the
approach it has taken to the issue of distracted driving. For the Agency is now
embracing "guidelines," "best practices," and "recommendations" as its
technique of choice with respect to crashworthiness generally and highly
automated vehicles (HAVs) specifically. In that context, industry (which liked
guidelines for distracted driving) is demanding a much more robust regulatory
response-indeed, stronger in some respects than the Agency has been willing
to provide.
To date, NHTSA has approached the regulation of HAV technologies
very gingerly, to say the least. It has issued only a single standard, FMVSS 126
in 2007, on electronic stability control, which, the reader will remember, set
performance standards that ninety-eight percent of all ESC systems already in
use met. The only other noteworthy initiatives in the HAV field are the
Agency's voluntary agreement on ABS in 2015, its Federal Automated
Vehicles Policy released in September 2016, and most recently, the Agency's
pending rulemaking on V2V communications announced in December 2016,
Otherwise, as its rulemaking priorities for 2015-2017 reveal, NHTSA has
no plans to regulate any of the individual HAV technologies any time soon,
even those that are well advanced in development or already being
commercialized.375 While it is not intuitively obvious why broadly framed,
technology-diffusing standards of the kind NHTSA developed in the aftermath
of the Ice Age are inappropriate for at least some HAV technologies, NHTSA
has made clear that its preferred approach is something else altogether: the non-
binding guidelines model previewed with respect to distracted driving.
In January 2016, the Agency issued an update of its 2013 statement of
policy37 6 on automated vehicles .3 " The Agency declared it would act quickly.
First, it promised to propose within six months best-practice guidance to
industry on establishing principles of safe operation for fully autonomous
vehicles. Second, taking note of state involvement in the area and the
desirability of a nationally consistent approach, the Agency committed to
"work with the states to craft and propose model policy guidance that helps
375. See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Overview of NHTSA Priority Plan for
Vehicle Safety and Fuel Economy 2015 to 2017, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP. (2015),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/Laws-Regs. In the crash-avoidance area, apart from the issue of V2V
communications, the Agency contemplates only a single rulemaking, namely, to require the installation
of speed-limiting devices in heavy trucks in response to a petition from the American Trucking
Association. Id. at 9. With respect to all other advanced crash avoidance technologies, the Agency stated
that it would confine its activities to research and promoting the technologies through inclusion in
NCAP. Id. at 3-4.
376. NHTSA, Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles, U.S.
DEP'T TRANSP. (May 30, 2013),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/U.S .+Department+of+Transportation+Releases+
Policy+on+Automated+Vehicle+Development.
377. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT/NHTSA Policy Statement
Concerning Automated Vehicles, 2016 Update to "Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning
Automated Vehicles," U.S. DEP'T TRANSP. (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Autonomous-Vehicles-Policy-Update-2016.pdf.
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policymakers address issues in both the testing and wider deployment of
vehicles at advanced stages of automation.' 378 Beyond these "guidelines" the
Agency promised individualized deregulation:
NHTSA will fully utilize its currently available regulatory tools, such as
interpretations and exemptions, to more rapidly enable safety innovations.
The agency encourages manufacturers to, when appropriate, seek the use
of NHTSA's exemption authority to field test fleets that can demonstrate
the safety benefits of automation technology. 
379
The proposition that NHTSA's existing safety standards might be an
obstacle to innovation was by no means theoretical. Only two months earlier,
Google had written the Agency expressing concern that the company might not
be able to certify compliance with many of NHTSA's safety standards, as
required by the MVSA, in the case of the fully autonomous vehicle that Google
was developing.38 ° The starting point for its concern was that Google's car was
entirely controlled by artificial intelligence, something Google called a "Self
Driving System" (SDS), such that no driver was needed, or indeed, wanted.
In fact, the car's design eliminated the steering wheel, brake pedal, and
accelerator pedal. Yet, many of the Agency's standards require that a vehicle
device or basic feature be located near "the driver" or "the driver's seating
position.,381 Google acknowledged that it could design its vehicle to include
conventional controls but was reluctant to do so because the SDS was
programmed consistently to make "optimal decisions" for the vehicle's
occupants (as well as for pedestrians and other road users).382 Google argued
that providing functions like steering, acceleration, braking, or turn signals
"could be detrimental to safety because the human occupants could attempt to
override the SDS's decisions.383
NHTSA responded that, while it was possible to provide a formal
interpretation of its rules to the effect that Google's SDS was a "driver," that
response would not end the inquiry because many of the issues raised by
Google, such as testing, "present policy issues beyond the scope and limitations
of interpretations.3 84 The Agency acknowledged that it could address these
issues by means of rulemaking, but noted somewhat glumly that "it can take
378. Id. at 1.
379. Id. at 2.
380. See Letter from Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Chris
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substantial periods of time to develop rulemaking proposals and final rules,"
and that such proceedings are "ill-suited as first-line regulatory mechanisms to
address rapidly-evolving vehicle technologies.'385 To escape the Catch-22 of
being subject to rules too obsolescent to make sense but too cumbersome to
revise, the Agency encouraged Google to petition for an exemption altogether
from the regulatory requirements it could not meet.38 6 Google's problems were
not unique, as a similar inquiry from BMW 387 and a March 2016 DOT research
report388 indicate. Nor were HAV developers only concerned with federal
regulation.
At hearings seeking information to support its promised AV guidelines,
manufacturers seemed more alarmed by emerging state regulation.
Commentators repeatedly expressed concern that NHTSA was creating what
one witness called a "policy vacuum" that states were rapidly filling with a
"patchwork" of inconsistent regulations.3 89 Consider the lament of the
Association of Global Automakers:
In the absence of clear federal action up to now, a focus on the near-term
deployment of automated vehicle systems has caused several states to take
action. Without the clear direction of a uniform national program there is
an increased likelihood of a patchwork of conflicting requirements.
A principal goal of the agency-and of all of the stakeholders involved in
the process-should be avoiding a patchwork of different federal and state
standards for automated technologies. Despite NHTSA's important actions
to date with respect to automated vehicles, many states have stepped into
what they perceive to be a policy vacuum in the field.
390
Comment after comment from industry and others echoed the same
concern,391 perhaps understandably so. In the few years preceding the hearing,
385. Id.
386. At the same time, the Agency encouraged Google to "reconsider its view" that
conventional controls and devices (steering wheels, foot pedals, rear view mirrors) "may never be
needed in any circumstance" and that "there is not a risk of harm associated with their absence." Id.
387. See Letter from Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Samuel
Campbell HI, Dep't Head, BMW of North America (Jan. 4, 2016), http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/15-
005347%20BMW%20Brake%20Transmission%20Shift%2Olnterlock%20v5.htm.
388. TECH. INNOVATION & POLICY Div., DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOT-VNTSC-OSTR- 16-
03, REVIEW OF FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS (FMVSS) FOR AUTOMATED VEHICLES:
IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF AUTOMATED
VEHICLES USING FMVSS (Mar. 2016).
389. Ass'n of Global Automakers, Comment Letter on the Development of Guidelines
for the Deployment of Automated Vehicles, at 1-2 (May 9, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2016-0036-0051 [hereinafter Global Auto.
Comment].
390. Id.
391. See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't Transp., Public Meeting on
Automated Vehicle Operational Guidance, at 35 (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2016-0036-0076 [hereinafter Public Meeting
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some twenty-four states had introduced over fifty bills on autonomous vehicle
technology.392 In the immediately preceding twelve months, fifteen states had
proposed such measures, and California, Nevada, and Florida had enacted
legislation .3" Each took a "slightly different" approach and used different
definitions that would "impact the way automakers design and manufacture
automated vehicles .
At times, it seemed that industry was almost begging NHTSA to regulate
it. Under the MVSA of 1966, states may not have in force motor vehicle
performance standards that are not identical to existing federal standards. But
guidelines are not standards. Again, the Association of Global Automakers
stated:
As we enter a new era of automotive safety, rapidly advancing
technologies and different mobility models, the agency feels the need to
explore new ways of addressing these complex issues. While the normal
rulemaking process used to promulgate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards has the advantage of being data-focused, scientifically rigorous,
deliberative and participatory, it is sometimes criticized for being too
slow. Recognizing this problem, in recent times, the agency has tried other
approaches such as issuing guidelines and agency interpretations, and
encouraging the development of industry-led standard-setting and best
practices. While these approaches may work in certain contexts and
provide for a more streamlined process, we believe these approaches, as
well as the statutory rulemaking model, need to be reconsidered in the
long-run to ensure that safety standards remain national in scope,
performance based, work to promote innovation and are equally
Transcript] (statement of Ralf Muenster, CTO Director, Texas Instruments) ("[O]ne important policy
goal should be avoiding a patchwork of different federal and state standards."); id. at 37, 39 (statement
of Emily Frascaroli, Counsel, Ford) ("[T]he proper regulatory environment begins with uniform
nationwide guidelines .... [A]ny prohibition on vehicles that are capable of operation without a driver
in the vehicle, such as were included in California's draft regulations, will be an inhibiter to the
revolutionary opportunities fully autonomous vehicles may provide"); id. at 43 (statement of James
Kuffner, CTO, Toyota) (noting that some regulatory frameworks imposed by states are "burdensome
and restrictive, having the unintended effect of impeding progress and innovation"); id. at 55 (statement
of Robert Grant, Legislative Counsel, Lyft) ("The worst possible scenario for the growth of autonomous
vehicles is an inconsistent and conflicting patchwork of local, municipal, and county laws that will
hamper efforts to bring AV technology to market."); id. at 82 (statement of John Weinberger, Vice
President, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers) (noting that the Alliance, which represents seventy-
seven percent of all new car and light truck sales revenue is the United States is "very concerned that a
patchwork of potentially conflicting vehicle certification and performance regulations at the state level
will be costly for consumers and stifle safety innovation"); id. at 116 (statement of Chris Urmson, Lead
Engineer, Google) (stating that allowing a "patchwork" of state laws to continue to develop will "create
complications for interstate commerce").
392. Id. at 137 (statement of Katherine Yehl, Director of Government Affairs, Volvo).
393. Google, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Guidelines for the Safe Deployment
and Operation of Automated Vehicle Safety Technologies (May 7, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2016-0036-0046.
394. Association of Global Automakers, Inc., Comments on NHTSA's Request for
Public Comment on the Development of Guidelines for the Deployment of Automated Vehicles 2 (May
9, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2016-0036-0051.
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applicable to all autonakers who seek to sell vehicles in the United
States 395
Industry might well desire, as its lead trade association explained, a
"nationally applicable legal and regulatory framework that avoids a patchwork
of state laws and regulations and maintains self-certification practices . ...
But industry also believed, as Toyota explained, that "it is too soon to set
minimum performance requirements for automated driving systems" and that
"it is best for NHTSA, as it has done in the past, to set performance
requirements after the technology has been introduced to the market.397
Standards were needed so that innovation could go forward, but NHTSA
should wait for it to be both developed and deployed. Catch-22. Google's
presentation even seemed to imply reversion to an old but extremely powerful
regulatory technique: licensing. Its representative suggested, "Congress should
give NHTSA the power to approve the new safety-enhancing technology
features on full speed vehicles without the need to issue a new or amended
regulation.3 Perhaps industry wanted NHTSA to have certification authority
for motor vehicles similar to the Federal Aviation Administration's licensing
authority concerning new aircraft. If so, to our knowledge, no one said so.399
NHTSA has responded with a set of non-binding guidelines, its Federal
Automated Vehicles Policy.4 °0 This Article is not the place to provide a detailed
analysis of this very complex document, but a few general points bear
emphasis. First, NHTSA views the development of HAV technologies as a
potential revolution in motor vehicle transportation that can offer a multitude of
safety and mobility benefits. Second, the Agency understands that HAV
development is taking place in a remarkably complex and dynamic
technological environment and that it is currently in no position to provide
mandatory performance standards for these emerging technologies. Indeed, it is
concerned that its existing standards could stand in the way of useful
395. Global Auto. Comment, supra note 389, at 4-5 (emphasis added).
396. Public Meeting Transcript, supra note 391, at 84 (comments of John Weinberger,
Vice President of Innovation, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers).
397. Id. at 43-44 (emphasis added) (comments of James Kuffner, CTO, Toyota
Research Institute). The proposition that NHTSA should regulate technology only after its introduction
seemed to be received wisdom at the hearing. The Agency's historic mission of forcing technology was
such a distant memory that speakers eulogized the practice, seemingly unaware. Google's representative
stated, "We have a proud history in the U.S. of introducing new safety innovations into our fleets. As
manufacturers iterate and as consumers adopt the new technology, industry standards evolve and
eventually a rulemaking process gives us federal standards." Id. at 114.
398. Id. at 113-18 (comments of Chris Urmson, Lead Engineer, Google).
399. The MVSA, of course, presently has no licensing provisions, let alone
preemptive ones. NHTSA is currently considering what lessons can be learned from the aviation
industry experience. Press Release, NHTSA, DOT Convenes Aviation and Automobile Industry Forum
on Safety (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/nhtsa-faa-safety-
forum-04222016.
400. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Federal Automated Vehicles Policy:
Accelerating the Next Revolution in Roadway Safety, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. (Sept. 2016),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/av/index .html [hereinafter HA V Policy].
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experimentation and deployment of HAVs, and the Agency promises to
expedite the processing of interpretation and exemption requests concerning
existing standards at the behest of HAV developers.
Third, the Agency views itself as in a partnership with developers for the
safe and rapid deployment of HAVs. The subtitle of its guidelines is
"Accelerating the Next Revolution in Roadway Safety." NHTSA sees its
current role as facilitating the exchange of information among participants in
HAV development, providing a model approach for state functions, such as
licensing, insurance regulation, and traffic safety laws, and participating in
HAV monitoring in ways that reassure consumers that new technologies are
safe. To that latter end, the Agency foresees the possibility of standard setting
in the future, but for now contemplates only one new rule: a mandate that
manufacturers self-assess the safety of new HAV equipment.4"1 Standing in the
way of standards that would permit NHTSA to judge compliance for itself, or
as a check on manufacturers' self-certification, is, once again, the 1972
Chrysler opinion's demand for objectivity, interpreted as identical results from
identical tests.°2 As the Agency's guidance document explains,4 °3 HAVs must
be capable of reacting appropriately to diverse and rapidly changing driving
environments. If a standardized test environment were specified, it would be
child's play to program a vehicle to pass the test. But that would tell the
Agency and the public little about whether the vehicle could perform safely in
the countless actual environments that vehicles encounter every second of
every day. NHTSA does not concede that it is barred from taking a sensible
approach to testing, but suggests that it may seek legislation to make clear that
"objectivity" does not prevent realistic testing protocols for HAVs.404
NHTSA's guidance document nevertheless reminds manufacturers that it
retains one coercive regulatory technique that requires no new statutory
authority: its capacity to both recall defective vehicles and demand record
keeping and reporting in support of its defects monitoring and investigation.4
After surveying fifteen broadly defined areas that might affect the safety
performance of HAVs, the Agency requests manufacturers to provide it with a
"safety assessment letter" that details how they are attending to all these
401. Id. at 15.
402. Id. at 77 ("The requirement in the Vehicle Safety Act that each vehicle standard
be 'objective' was interpreted in the 1970s to mean that a standard's "tests to determine compliance
must be capable of producing identical results when test conditions are exactly duplicated.").
403. Id. at 77-78.
404. Id. at 70.
405. Id. at 50. Contemporaneously, the Agency issued an "Enforcement Guidance
Bulletin" elaborating how it will apply its sweeping recall powers to automated safety technologies. 81
Fed. Reg. 65,705-09 (Sept. 23, 2016). It reminded readers of the case law that had so generously eased
the agency's burden of proof to establish a safety-related defect, including that the agency did not need
to proffer an engineering explanation or root cause, and that "merely a 'non-de minimis' quantity" of
failures could be sufficient to make a showing. Id. at 65,708. The Agency suggested some best practices
for companies to follow but also made clear that the Bulletin's guidance "did not establish any defense
to any violations of the Safety Act." Id. at 65,709.
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matters.4 °6 These letters are to be sent to the Agency's General Counsel-the
official who oversees defect investigations and recall proceedings.
In sum, it appears that the recall crocodile has adapted to yet another new
and turbulent environment. As motor vehicle technology rapidly evolves, the
Agency, for the foreseeable future, cannot tell us, let alone prescribe by rule,
the essential features of a "safe" HAV. But the crocodile is apparently not so
bewildered or confined. He will know an unsafe ("defective") HAV when he
sees it.
A Final Word
The collapse of NHTSA's rulemaking efforts induced by the legal culture
led us to speculate nearly three decades ago that a strategy of accommodation
might be the way forward if NHTSA was to surmount the barriers to standard
setting that lay before it.40 7 Perhaps we should have added that successful
adaptation is not necessarily successful regulation. NHTSA's current response
to the emergence of HAV technologies - a response that seems to eschew
standard setting for even widely deployed crash avoidance technologies-
suggests that the Agency may have overlearned the lessons of the past.
A. Glimpsing the Road Ahead
We cannot begin here to outline a reform agenda that will ensure NHTSA
has the regulatory tools it requires to "meet the need for motor vehicle safety,"
assuming for the moment that "we the people" still want it to do so. That is a
task for another day. We can, however, touch upon some aspects of the
technological upheaval now underway that are likely to affect the viability of
future regulation and the form it may take. We say "likely" because our
analysis at this point is conjectural and our understanding of the emerging
technology still embryonic. Above all, our observations here are intended to be
illustrative, not exhaustive, of the contributions rulemaking may yet still make
to advancing motor vehicle safety.
To begin with, the shift in focus from crashworthiness to crash avoidance
is not a trivial matter from the standpoint of regulatory design. The
quintessential crashworthiness technology-the airbag -encountered many
obstacles along the tortured, thirty-year path to its adoption. But the airbag had
one thing going for it. Once motorists were persuaded of the airbag's efficacy,
they could at least be certain of capturing essentially all the benefits of their
investment in it. Like other crashworthiness technologies, the airbag benefits
406. HAV Policy, supra note 400, at 15-16.
407. MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 5, at 250-253.
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almost exclusively the passengers of the vehicle in which it is installed. Airbags
are of little consequence to other roadway inhabitants.
The same cannot be said of crash avoidance technologies. By their nature,
avoidance technologies enhance the safety of many fellow travelers on the
roadway, not just the safety of the motorists paying for them. Crash avoidance
technologies are "positive externalities" on wheels.4 °8 They benefit not only the
occupants of other vehicles with which a collision is avoided, but also
pedestrians and bicyclists. Basic economics posits that, absent some market
intervention, crash avoidance technology will be "under-consumed," that is, it
will not reach the level of usage that would be achieved in a market in which its
benefits are fully internalized in the purchasing decision.
Moreover, the inherent tendency of crash avoidance technology to sub-
optimal penetration is dynamic. Consider the extreme case of the last motorist
contemplating the purchase of a crash avoidance device. His incentives are far
weaker than those who preceded him in purchasing it. As the latecomer, he
knows that other motorists have already done so and will avoid him. Acting
rationally, he may well decide to luxuriate in his status as a "free rider." In
theory, at least, these free rider effects will kick in well before the last adopter.
As crash avoidance technology increases in penetration, the incentives for its
further adoption dissipate.
We cannot know, of course, how powerful these economic incentives will
be in the market for crash avoidance technologies. Incentives are not behaviors.
And some, perhaps many, of them will have other, non-safety benefits that will
increase their attractiveness to vehicle purchasers. Nevertheless, the changed
market circumstances as the focus of innovation shifts from crashworthiness to
crash avoidance cannot be ignored.
Subsidization is a conventional policy response for promoting the
consumption of goods entailing positive externalities and free rider effects.
Subsidies reduce the effective price purchasers pay, and move the demand
curve closer to alignment with the level of consumption that a perfect market
would produce.40 9 The problem for NHTSA is simple. It does not have the
authority to confer subsidies, and is unlikely to acquire it any time soon given
budgetary and other constraints. To be sure, a case could be made, for example,
for allocating recall fines to cash rebates supporting motorists' purchase of
crash avoidance technologies. Such a program might even be packaged as
shrewd industrial policy to advance U.S. technology leadership in the
strategically important global automotive market. But we doubt such an
initiative would pass muster in today's Congress or Executive branch, and in
408. For a discussion of the positive externalities of crash avoidance technology, see
Rand Report, supra note 350, at 135-38.
409. Subsidization presents its own set of challenges, including among others, the
quantification of offsetting negative externalities and the amount of the subsidy needed to produce the
socially efficient result without accompanying over consumption. Id.
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any event, subsidies will not overcome all the obstacles crash avoidance
technologies face in the marketplace, as we shall see.
The Agency, however, already has another tool to reduce the prices
motorists pay for crash avoidance devices: command and control rule making.
By mandating universal adoption, NHTSA can force economies of scale,
reduce the marginal costs of production, and lower prices to motorists. Of
course, mandates are an imperfect substitute for subsidies, which can be more
easily fine-tuned. But mandates also eliminate the free rider problem, and,
assuming the efficacy of the technology, reduce the negative externalities that
all accidents cause, for example higher insurance premiums and lost
productivity.
There are additional reasons why policy makers may wish to pursue
rulemaking mandates in the crash avoidance context. To understand why, it is
helpful to distinguish two branches of the underlying technology. The first is
motor vehicle connectivity, at issue in NHTSA's pending proceeding to require
light vehicles to be equipped with a V2V platform communication technology
so that they can exchange basic safety messages and warnings. The second
branch comprises various levels of automated driving, in which sensors
instantaneously gather millions of data points descriptive of the surrounding
environment, which are then analyzed by powerful software algorithms to
generate appropriate commands to maneuver the vehicle without human
intervention. Note that these two branches are overlapping and complementary,
but distinct. Self-driving cars may or may not be able to communicate with one
another, and connected cars may or may not be automated. Over time, it seems
likely the two branches will converge.
A key point for policy makers is that both kinds of crash avoidance
display strong "network effects."4 ' Consider first the case of connected cars.
As we have seen in the Agency's V2V rulemaking, each additional user of the
V2V platform increases the utility of those already using it-there is one more
car to "talk to," a classical network effect. But, as NHTSA has pointed out, no
prospective user of V2V technology can be certain whether others (and if so,
how many) will join the V2V network. This uncertainty, or early mover
disadvantage, increases the risk of investment and deters optimal usage.
NHTSA sees this as a classic problem of collective action well suited to
correction by its proposed mandate.
Will a V2V mandate alone solve the problem? It seems unlikely. First, it
appears plausible that the efficacy of at least some applications on the V2V
platform may depend on or be affected by the availability of other applications.
In that event, the problem of collective action migrates from the platform level
410. While network effects can take various direct and indirect forms, the core idea is
that each additional user enhances the benefit of the network to users already participating in it. The
classic example is a telephone network, whose utility increases as the number of persons to call and be
called increases.
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to the application level. Second, the generic problem of positive externalities
should affect V2V applications as it does other crash avoidance technologies.
But, the V2V platform has no intrinsic value apart from the applications it runs.
Suboptimal utilization of applications means suboptimal utilization of the
platform. Perhaps sensing that possibility, NHTSA itself has already said it
may need to mandate some V2V applications in due course.
Network effects arise in the context of vehicle automation as well. A
distinctive property of algorithms, the brainpower of AV technologies, is their
capacity to "learn" in proportion to the data they are asked to analyze. Consider
the paradigm of Google's search engine. Google introduced a good product
from the beginning, but that alone was not the secret sauce of its success.
Google achieved overwhelming dominance because it was the beneficiary of a
positive feedback loop. The more searches Google conducted, the more
powerful -faster, more accurate, and more reliable-the search engine became,
leading to the demand for more searches. And so the virtuous cycle thrust
relentlessly forward. Ultimately, the database of prior searches enabled Google
to anticipate a search query before a user even fully typed it.
What lessons are to be learned for AV algorithms? First, to the extent
positive externalities produce suboptimal utilization, they diminish the safety of
those who otherwise would have chosen to deploy AV technologies had their
benefits been fully internalized. But the deeper problem is that suboptimal
utilization also diminishes the efficacy of the technology of those who elect to
deploy it. If information is shared, machines can learn from the experience of
other machines. By diminishing the database of real world experience, limited
utilization degrades the capacity of critical algorithms to learn from mistakes.
There is yet another challenge worth mentioning in this context. The
interests of suppliers and users of AV algorithms may not be fully aligned.
Users presumably want the most powerful algorithms possible. For the reasons
just explained, this ideally would entail access to the database of usage of other
algorithms. But suppliers have no incentive to share such data, even if
competition law allowed them to do so. Each supplier seeks to gain market
share and brand recognition, and is likely to regard its algorithm database as a
trade secret. In these circumstances, it may be appropriate for NHTSA to
require suppliers to share data essential to the life saving potential of their
algorithms, while leaving suppliers free to compete on other grounds, such as
the human-machine interface (which, however, may also benefit from
standardization). The Agency would need to balance suppliers' commercial
incentives to innovate against the need for motor vehicle safety in the use of a
public utility, namely the nation's roadways and airways.
4 1
411. Shaping the Future of Autonomous Vehicles: How Policy Makers Can Promote
Safety, Mobility, and Efficiency in an Uncertain World: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp.,
Housing and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Commerce & Related Agencies of the S. Appropriations
Comm. 114th Cong. 5 (Nov. 16, 2016) (testimony by Nidhi Kalra, Rand Corp.) (mentioning that sharing
driving data across industry could accelerate improvements by autonomous vehicle developers and
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We reiterate that only the foolhardiest observer would advance a
rulemaking agenda at this early state in the emergence of crash avoidance
innovation. That is not our purpose here. We recognize that standards pose
complex challenges, such as identifying objective performance criteria and
appropriate testing protocols. We also understand that premature regulation
may stifle innovation. But so may regulation that is late to the party in the face
of positive externalities and foregone network benefits. Our point is simply that
command and control rulemaking may yet play a constructive role in advancing
the safety of crash avoidance technologies, assuming, of course, that legal
culture allows it to do so. To paraphrase, reports of the demise of rulemaking
are likely premature.
B. Facing the Here and Now
In the meantime, the adaptability and popularity of NHTSA's recall
authority may be providential as the Agency seeks to remain relevant, perhaps
even powerful, in the new HAV world. As NHTSA's HAV guidelines report,
ninety-four percent of all current vehicle crashes are attributable to driver
decisions or errors.412 As more and more decisions are committed to digital
systems, more and more crashes will be prima facie evidence of equipment
failures that might justify a defects investigation and, potentially, a recall.
If manufacturers want to avoid those sorts of inquiries, they would do well
to respond carefully and comprehensively to NHTSA's requests for safety
assessment letters and to adopt systems for production, testing, and quality
assurance as the Agency recommends. The current guidance is quite general in
its recommendations for the development of those systems, but the agency
makes clear that its guidelines are a work in progress that will be continuously
updated as more information on HAV production and performance becomes
available.4 13
While the blurring of the line between "drivers" and "vehicles"
complicates NHTSA's relationship with state regulators who have historically
established the qualifications for and licensed most drivers, it can leverage the
Agency's ability to substitute guidance for standard setting. Whether NHTSA
will aggressively exploit this potentially powerful regulatory tool, and how the
industry will react if it does, remains an open question.
However the agency proceeds, we should add that our reservations about
the systemic efficacy of recalling conventional automobiles do not apply with
equal force to recalling self-driving cars at this formative stage of their
development and in the circumstances NHTSA proposes. Context is king. The
combination of highly specified voluntary safety assessments performed by
arguing that concern for protecting trade secrets "must be balanced" with "need for safe autonomous
vehicle technology").
412. HA V Policy, supra note 400, at 5.
413. Id. at 9.
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industry itself, but backed up by the agency's fulsome recall power and product
liability exposure, is a technique that seems exquisitely well suited to the legal,
market, and technological circumstances in which NHTSA finds itself.
Enforced self-regulation of this kind responds "both to the delay, red tape,
costs, and stultification of innovation that can result from imposing detailed
regulations on business, and to the naivet6 of trusting companies to regulate
themselves.4 14 Such soft law approaches seem especially well suited to sectors
that are in the grip of rapid innovation, such as today's automobile industry,
because the alternative, in this case command and control regulation,
presupposes, among other things, "clear definitions of what is to be
regulated."'415
As we have said, we believe that regulating HAVs by rule will have its
virtues sooner rather than later. But the Agency's orchestration of an enforced
self-regulatory regime may well be a preferable approach in the intermediate
term. We began this Article by portraying NHTSA administrators as
resourceful survivors, not knaves or fools. The "guidance" approach to current
regulation of HAVs seems to us to be yet another adaptation, but one that is, as
yet, untested in the context of NHTSA's regulatory regime.
The line between guidance-generally not subject to procedural
requirements, cost-benefit analysis, or judicial review-and rulemaking-
subject to all three-is murky, to say the least.416 Other agencies that have tried
to exploit this legal uncertainty have not gone unchallenged. And as was
recounted earlier, the only serious legal challenge to NHTSA's recall authority
was when it attempted, in effect, to substitute a recall for a standard.417 The
boundary between guidance and standard setting may well be the next
battleground where motor vehicle safety regulation encounters the demands of
American legal culture.4 18
414. See J. Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate
Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1446, 1470 (1982). NIITSA's model of enforced self-regulation of
HAVs also responds to the Agency's limited resources and technical expertise, especially in software
and advanced electronics, in comparison to that of industry. In addition, in the context of pervasive
scientific uncertainty, that model largely shifts the burden of proof to industry to establish the
parameters of a safe HAV.
415. See Gary E. Marchant, Douglas J. Sylvester, & Kenneth W. Abbott, A New Soft
Law Approach to Nanotechnology Oversight: A Voluntary Product Certification Scheme, 123 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 123, 125 (2010). The authors adapt the Ayres-Braithwaite regulatory pyramid to the
context of a rapidly innovating sector (nanotechnology), showing a gradual progression from soft to
hard regulatory oversight as the sector matures and technology stabilizes. Id. at 132-33. For a discussion
of the original Ayres-Braithwaite pyramid, see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
416. For an overview of the doctrine, see JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 652-57 (2014) (excerpting relevant cases and providing
citation to prominent secondary literature).
417. United States v. Chrysler, 158 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
418. The Agency and its critics have already made an initial foray into the dense fog
separating rulemaking and policy statements. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 452 F.3d 798 (2006)
(agency statement on regional recalls constitutes expression of policy not de facto rule embracing
binding norms).
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